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In order to develop a scientific understanding of team resilience, the three primary goals 
of the current research effort were to (1) summarize the research literature on resilience in 
and of small groups and systems, (2) articulate a framework to direct the synthesis of 
existing and future resilience-related research, and (3) construct a substantive theory of 
team resilience.  This exploratory research used a grounded theory approach to explore 
resilience phenomena experienced by small unit members in the US Army.  Participants 
were sampled from military occupational specialties within Combat Arms, as classified 
by the US Army Regimental System, and included members of small units from Air 
Defense Artillery, Armor, Aviation, Field Artillery, and Infantry.  Herein, team is used to 
refer to a bounded group of US Army Soldiers working together toward a shared 
functional goal (e.g., tasking, mission).  Review of the cross-disciplinary literature on 
resilience in and of teams suggested multiple, plausible and sometimes competing 
conceptualizations of team resilience. The resulting Team Resilience Framework that was 
developed as part of this study identifies five key components that can be used to clarify 
and organize varied conceptualizations of team resilience: 1) who (of whom), 2) what (to 
what), 3) why (for what), 4) when (at what time), and 5) where (under what 
circumstances).  The Team Resilience Framework was applied in this study and resulted 
in a rich description of the context in which team resilience occurs.  Qualitative analysis 
of interview and focus group transcripts indicate that team resilience is an iterative 
process of managing disruptor cues, disruptors, and disruptions which includes five 
primary action phases: specification, mobilization, detection, determination (adjustment, 
Megan L. Dove-Steinkamp, Ph.D. – University of Connecticut, 2017 
as necessary); and reset.  Important elements and influential factors are associated with 
each phase of the process.  Study findings from this foundational research contribute to 
an enriched understanding of team resilience generally, and also can be used more 
specifically to articulate an operationalization of small unit (team) resilience that best 
suits the needs of the US Army.  Other practical applications and implications for future 
research are also discussed. 
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A Grounded Theoretical Analysis of Team Resilience in the U.S. Army 
 
Organizations increasingly rely on team work arrangements to facilitate strategic 
objectives and manage operational demands (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 
2000).  In dynamic, complex organizational environments, work teams can sometimes be 
exposed to rapid and/or unpredictable change (Kozlowski, Gully, Brown, Salas, Smith, & 
Nason, 2001).  Unpredictable fluctuations in demands or resources can disrupt and 
threaten the function of work teams even in systems designed to support flexible 
responses to change (Meneghal, Salanova, & Martinez, 2014).  Achievement of desirable 
team outcomes (e.g., performance, viability, team member satisfaction) under such 
conditions can depend upon shifts in team processes (Welsh, 2014). Thus, the design of 
the modern workplace requires a sophisticated understanding of teamwork in the face of 
disruptions (Stephens, Heaphy, Carmeli, Spreitzer, & Dutton, 2013). 
General responses to disruption by humans and human systems can be examined 
using a resilience perspective (Lundberg & Rankin, 2014).  In fact, resilience 
perspectives are becoming very common and have been applied in fields as diverse as 
psychology, ecology, human factors, business, education, military, sports, and 
economics.  Resilience perspectives afford a shift in focus from what could go wrong to 
how entities/systems respond when something does go wrong (Dalziell & McManus, 
2004). Because it is not always possible to design systems to be impervious to 
disruptions – especially for types of disruptions that cannot be predicted – resilience 
perspectives often emphasize the development/strengthening of new and existing 
adaptive capacities (resources, strategies), and this development/strengthening is 
purported to increase the likelihood of positive outcomes for stakeholders (Burnard & 
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Bhamra, 2011). Those systems that are better able to withstand, recover from, and/or 
improve upon themselves in response to disruptions are generally viewed as resilient 
(Welsh, 2014). 
Given the mounting support for collective resilience phenomena among other 
bounded groups (e.g., family resilience), as well as the identification of team-level 
analogs of other related psychological constructs (e.g., efficacy), teams may also have the 
potential to engender a particular type of collective resilience. To date, however, there 
has been little scholarly attention afforded to developing a scientific understanding of 
team resilience.  Therefore, the purpose of the current research effort is to: (1) summarize 
the research literature on resilience in and of small groups and systems, (2) articulate a 
framework to direct the synthesis of existing and future resilience-related research, and 
(3) construct a substantive theory of team resilience. These foundational efforts are 
suggested here to be critical for the development of a comprehensive theory of team 
resilience. 
Cross-Discipline Review of Resilience 
 
Resilience perspectives have become ubiquitous, increasingly appearing in both 
academic and nonacademic discourses. To demonstrate the proliferation of the term 
“resilience”, a keyword search of the designated online databases was conducted for five 
year increments spanning 1970 to 2014.  Figure 1 illustrates the marked increase in 
scholarly interest across a diverse set of disciplines since the mid-1990s. This trend is 
commensurate with observed frequencies for online searches, using Google, featuring the 
term “resilience” (Google, 2013, as cited in Robertson & Cooper, 2013). Robertson and 
Cooper (2013) report that the frequency of searches using the term “resilience” increased 
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nearly twofold between the years 2005 and 2014.  A set of simple Google keyword 
searches were conducted to ascertain the popularity of the term “resilience” relative to 
other related terms. As of May 31, 2015 the term “resilience” (without additional 
derivatives) returned 36,600,000 hits; nearly as many as “complex systems” 
(46,800,000), “coping” (47,300,000), “vulnerability” (51,000,000), and with more hits 
than “adaptability” (13,400,000).  Despite growing attention to and application across 
academic disciplines and in general discourse, there is surprisingly little agreement with 
respect to what resilience actually is (Anderson, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of publications featuring "resilience" in title as a function of time and 
discipline 
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A literature search was conducted using combinations of relevant keywords (e.g., 
group (work)/team (work), resilience/resistance/recovery/growth) via online databases 
(e.g., EBSCOhost), as well as through cross-referencing of exemplar sources.  Sources 
were drawn from a diverse array of disciplines, including psychology, ecology, human 
factors, organizational science, geography, public health and public policy; and 
emphasized reviews of collective resilience (e.g., family, socio-ecological, 
organizational)
1
.  Every effort was made to use as representative a sample of the relevant 
literature as possible for the cross-discipline review. 
The concept of resilience originated in physics and mathematics to describe how 
specific materials behave under stress. Some materials bend rather than break under 
applied pressure/force and, upon cessation of said force, return to their previous form. 
The speed (efficiency) with which a material returns to its previous state is characterized 
in terms of its resilience (Dalziell & McManus, 2004) and the capacity for the material to 
return to a previous state is characterized in terms of its stability (Holling, 1973). From 
this perspective, both resilience and stability are properties of materials that afford 
description and classification of material responses when perturbed from a state of 
equilibrium. This perspective assumes that resilient, stable systems can be engineered 
once designs are based on a thorough risk analysis and all probable vulnerabilities are 
either compensated for or are eliminated (Sheridan, 2008). 
The term resilience was adopted by other disciplines in the late twentieth century, 
initially receiving heightened interest in the fields of ecology and psychology (Kulig, 
Edge, Townsend, Lightfoot, & Reimer, 2013).  For example, Holling (1973) observed 
 
 
1 
The results of this literature search identified only fifteen publications explicitly focused on the construct 
team resilience. This literature will be discussed in detail in a later section. 
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that while some ecological systems (i.e., organisms and their environments) return to a 
previous state of equilibrium following a disruption or perturbation, others do not. Of 
particular interest were the systems that, once perturbed, remained intact in terms of 
function, structure, and feedback loops … yet were somehow changed (Welsh, 2014). 
According to the engineering perspective, physical systems that do not return to the pre- 
disruption equilibrium state are unstable and are likely to fail eventually. Yet, Holling 
(1973) observed ecological systems that were thriving despite having shifted to an altered 
state following perturbation. Holling reasoned that ecological systems may have more 
than one stable state, and that stability (and thus also resilience) is not dependent upon the 
maintenance of a single state of equilibrium.   Holling’s observations stimulated a marked 
change in how resilience was conceptualized in ecology, and this has differentiated the 
conceptualization of ecological resilience from that of mathematics and physics (Cretney, 
2014). 
Psychological resilience was born from concurrent endeavors to understand 
variability in recovery from childhood trauma (Bonanno, Westphal, & Mancini, 2010); 
some victims of childhood trauma developed into functional adults while others 
(seemingly) did not (Reid & Botterill, 2013). Psychologists surmised that there was 
something special about the individual that allowed him or her to continue to function 
despite adversity, and initial research efforts were focused on the identification of 
protective/promotive traits.  As the study of psychological resilience matured, and 
longitudinal analyses were incorporated, psychologists developed a greater appreciation 
for the influence of situational factors on individual outcomes (Saltzman, Lester, 
Beardslee, Layne, Woodward, & Nash, 2011).  Recently, psychologists have warmed to a 
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systems approach to the study of resilience that accounts for complex interactions among 
endogenous and exogenous factors over time (Cicchetti, 2013). Whether conceptualized 
as an outcome, trait, or process, psychological resilience is traditionally associated with 
exposure to (at least potentially) traumatic events (Bonnano et al., 2010). 
Recently, there has been an increased interest in understanding resilience at other 
levels of analysis (Masten & Monn, 2015).  For example, an ecological perspective was 
adapted by Adger (2000) to describe how social-ecological systems collectively manage 
disruptions.  In the socio-ecological perspective, social and ecological systems are 
interdependent, their processes and outcomes directly affected – for better or for worse – 
by one another (Cretney, 2014). Other fields have adopted a specific focus on the 
resilience of human systems; for example, there are growing literatures pertaining to 
family resilience (e.g., Walsh, 2013), community resilience (e.g., Norris, Stevens, 
Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008), and organizational resilience (e.g., Bhamra, 
Dani, & Burnard, 2011). 
Definitions of Resilience across Disciplines 
 
Resilience has been examined in a wide range of contexts, both academic and 
nonacademic.  As Bene, Wood, Newsham, and Davies (2012) have suggested, the 
popularity of the resilience construct can be attributed, at least in part, to “the fact that 
people, irrespective of their backgrounds and experience, are able to sit down and work 
together based on the intuitive and loose meaning of resilience” (p.45).  Often, resilience 
is presented in discussion without clarification/explanation, with contributors assuming a 
shared understanding of the term.  However, a critical review of the literature reveals 
nontrivial differences in how resilience is conceptualized across – and even within – 
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disciplines (Bolzan & Fran, 2012).  Table 1 presents representative definitions of 
resilience that vary widely.  The inconsistencies and contradictions in the 
conceptualization of resilience both across and within disciplines jeopardize the synthesis 
of the literature and the utility of resilience perspectives (Meredith, Sherbourne, Gailott, 
Hansell, Ritschard et al., 2011). 
Most conceptualizations of resilience are related to the management of disruption 
so as to maintain, regain, and/or improve the function of a system (Welsh, 2014). 
Resilience can be loosely conceptualized as being: “(i) of something, (ii) to something, 
 
(iii) to an endpoint” (Allmark, Bhanbro, & Chrisp, 2014, p.62).  For example, an 
ecologist might conceptualize resilience as having to do with (i) an ecological system 
(ii) to a drought (iii) to harvest yield; whereas a psychologist might conceptualize 
resilience as having to do with (i) an individual (ii) to trauma (iii) to psychological health. 
Each discipline focuses on a specific level of analysis (e.g., ecosystem is to ecology as 
individual is to psychology).  Despite a general emphasis on an entity’s response to a 
disruption, resilience is alternately conceptualized as a set of relatively stable protective 
attributes (i.e., trait), an outcome (i.e., emergent state), or a trajectory of response 
(i.e., process).  More detailed treatments of these and other inconsistencies identified in 
the resilience literature are provided in subsequent sections of this paper. 
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Table 1.  Representative definitions of resilience 
 
Author(s) Level of analysis Definition 
 
Bonanno et al. 
(2010) 
 
 
Individual 
An outcome pattern following a potentially 
traumatic event characterized by a stable 
trajectory of healthy psychological and physical 
functioning 
 
Luthar & Cicchetti 
(2000) 
 
 
Individual 
A dynamic process wherein individuals display 
positive adaptation despite experiences of 
significant adversity or trauma 
 
 
Rutter (2006) 
 
 
Individual 
Reduced vulnerability to environmental risk 
experiences, the overcoming of a stress or 
adversity, or a relatively good outcome despite 
risk experiences 
 
Masten & Monn 
(2015) 
 
 
Family 
The capacity of a dynamic system to adapt 
successfully to disruptions that threaten its 
function, viability, or development 
 
 
Patterson (2002) 
 
 
Family 
The processes by which families are able to 
adapt and function competently following 
exposure to significant adversity or crises 
 
 
Walsh (2013) 
 
 
Family 
The ability of families to withstand and 
rebound from disruptive life challenges, 
strengthened and more resourceful 
 
 
Furniss et al. 
(2011) 
 
 
Team 
Ability to recover from some unexpected event, 
or to avoid accidents happening despite the 
persistence of poor circumstances 
 
 
Morgan et al. 
(2013) 
 
 
Team 
A dynamic, psychosocial process which 
protects a group of individuals from the 
potential negative effect of the stressors they 
collectively encounter 
 
Allmark et al. 
(2014) 
 
 
Community 
The internal quality i) of something ii) to return 
to a state iii) in the face of external challenge or 
adversity 
 
Norris et al. 
(2008) 
 
Community 
A process linking a set of adaptive capacities to 
a positive trajectory of functioning and 
adaptation after a disruption 
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Bhamra et al. 
(2011) 
 
Organization 
Capability and ability of an element to return to 
a stable state after a disruption 
 
Holling (1973) 
 
Ecosystem 
The amount of disruption that an ecosystem 
could withstand without changing self- 
organized processes and structures 
Rankin et al. 
(2014) 
Socio-technical 
system 
The ability to sustain required operations in 
both expected and unexpected conditions 
 
Ungar (2013) 
 
Socio-ecological 
system 
Capacity of both individuals and their 
environments to interact in ways that optimize 
developmental processes 
 
Walker et al. 
(2004) 
 
Socio-ecological 
system 
The capacity of a system to absorb disruption 
and reorganize while undergoing change so as 
to still retain essentially the same function, 
structure, identity, and feedbacks 
 
 
Criterion for Demonstrating Resilience 
 
Established criteria for determining when resilience occurs remain elusive.  Some 
authors have conceptualized resilience as an ability (e.g., Rankin, Lundberg, Woltjer, 
Rollenhagen, & Hollnagel, 2014) or a quality (e.g., Allmark et al., 2014) of a system. 
These conceptualizations treat resilience as a trait characteristic of a system or a set of 
relatively stable system attributes.  Other researchers have suggested that resilience is an 
emergent state, an outcome – although temporary in its own rite (e.g., Holling, 1973). 
Still others have conceptualized resilience as a process representing the way a system 
responds to disruption in terms of some predetermined outcome of interest (e.g., 
Patterson, 2002).  Although Allmark et al.’s (2014) heuristic is useful, it lacks an 
explanation for how the relationship between a disruption (e.g., drought, trauma) and an 
outcome (e.g., harvest yield, psychological health) is to be considered at the specific focal 
level of interest (e.g., ecological system, individual).  Coupled with ambiguity as to 
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whether resilience is a trait, an emergent state, or a dynamic process, it remains unclear 
how researchers, practitioners, and other stakeholders could ever agree that resilience has 
occurred. 
These same inconsistencies can be found with respect to a particular level of 
analysis.  For example, community resilience is sometimes conceptualized as a trait (e.g., 
Allmark et al., 2014) and other times as a process (e.g., Norris et al., 2008).  If resilience 
is conceptualized as a process, it is unclear whether it is evidenced through resistance 
(e.g., Rankin et al., 2014), recovery (e.g., Bharma, Dani, & Burnard, 2011), or some other 
response trajectory (e.g., reorganization; Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004). 
The criteria by which resilience is identified has important implications for how this 
construct can be understood and applied in specific contexts, and so the relative 
advantages of conceptualizing resilience as a trait, an emergent state, or a dynamic 
process are worth considering in more detail. 
Resilience Conceptualized as a Trait or Global Property 
 
A trait is a relatively enduring characteristic of an entity (Conger & Conger, 
2002).  Trait conceptualizations of resilience are traditionally utilized by psychologists 
and engineers.  For example, a resilient individual is credited with an ability to 
successfully manage disruptions through personal initiative and agency (Walsh, 1996); a 
resilient system is engineered so as to minimize or eliminate vulnerabilities.  According 
to trait/global property conceptualizations, a resilient individual or system would be 
expected to function more consistently than a less resilient counterpart despite exposure 
to potential disruption. 
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Conceptualizations of resilience as a trait/global property have implications for 
practice.  A trait or global property is, according to most conceptualizations, not 
malleable.  In an applied setting, such as a work context, to the extent trait resilience can 
be reliably associated with important outcomes; resilience might be used as a foundation 
for the construction of selection procedures and assessment of fit (e.g., person-job, 
person-team, person-organization). 
When human beings are the focal level of analysis, the conceptualization of 
resilience as a trait may inadvertently promote victim-blaming: Because resilient 
individuals are believed to have the capacity to willfully confront and skillfully manage 
disruptions without assistance from external supports, faltering may be attributed to 
personal flaws (Luthar et al., 2000). Critics of conceptualizations of resilience as trait 
draw attention to the frank possibility that an emphasis on traits and personal agency 
could potentially limit recognition of vulnerable individuals.  Holding vulnerable 
individuals responsible for lacking a resilience trait could affect the allocation of needed 
resources and support that could otherwise promote positive outcomes for these 
individuals.  Some researchers (e.g., Masten & Monn, 2015) have argued that certain 
individual differences (e.g., self-esteem, optimism, positive affect) may simply make 
resilience more likely – giving the illusion that resilience is, itself, a trait. 
Resilience Conceptualized as an Emergent State 
 
Traits and global properties are differentiated from states as a function of relative 
permanency, whereby states exist for a shorter period of time (Hamaker, Nesselroade, & 
Molenaar, 2007).  Drawing on Holling’s (1973) seminal work, ecologists and other 
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systems scholars have generally embraced state conceptualizations of resilience.  From 
this perspective, resilience is something that an individual or a system momentarily is. 
According to multi-level theory, emergent states manifest as a consequence of 
some particular process or set of processes that can be classified as either compositional 
or configural (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).  Compositional phenomena represent shared 
properties of system components and are usually represented as the sum or average of 
individual component inputs. Climate is an oft-cited example of a compositional group 
phenomenon, because climate exists only to the degree that individual members of the 
group agree that it exists.  Not only are individual perceptions relevant, but the 
sharedness of those perceptions results in the compositional emergent phenomenon. 
Configural phenomena, on the other hand, do not represent shared properties of system 
components, but rather disparity in or a particular pattern of individual components’ 
inputs has meaning at the system level. Group performance can be an example of a 
configural group phenomenon.  When group members are expected to perform very 
different, but interdependent tasks, the performance of the group will look very different 
than the performance of any single group member.  Compositional and configural 
conceptualizations of resilience as an emergent state can result in nontrivial differences in 
relative relationships with unit-level antecedents, outcomes, and cross-level effects. 
Thus, conceptualizations of resilience as an emergent state would necessarily require an 
explanation for how the state is believed to come about (e.g., whether the state emerges 
through compositional or configural processes). 
Conceptualizations of resilience as an emergent state have implications for 
practice.  Unlike a trait or global property, states are subject to change and so, under the 
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right conditions, entities and systems can be moved from one state to another. 
Understanding the conditions that influence state change can provide, in a work setting, a 
foundation for designing interventions and training.  State conceptualizations of 
resilience may also be more forgiving of individuals and systems that falter. 
Resilience Conceptualized as a Process 
 
While both trait and state conceptualizations of resilience treat resilience as 
something that an entity – at least momentarily – is (Sheridan, 2008), a growing number 
of scholars across a variety of disciplines, including psychology, endorse 
conceptualizations of resilience as something a system does (e.g., Klarreich, 1998; 
Patterson, 2002).  From this perspective, resilience is a pattern of responses that unfold 
over time.  For example, Norris et al. (2008) defined resilience as “a process linking a set 
of adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation after a 
disruption” (p.130).  To date, there is no consensus on what the process of resilience 
actually looks like. 
In many studies, resilience has been inferred by observing changes in some 
outcome of interest over time.  Several resilience trajectories have been proposed 
(Bonanno et al., 2010; Norris et al., 2009), including resistance, recovery, renewal, and 
growth.  Figure 2 shows a set of idealized response trajectories associated with resilience 
processes in the scientific literature.  Time is represented along the x-axis and includes 
the period before the onset of a disruption (Pre-D), the onset disruption (D), as well as the 
timing of multiple measurements/observations following the onset of the disruption (M1, 
M2, M3). The level of dysfunction is plotted on the y-axis. The colored lines represent 
various response trajectories associated with disruption (e.g., resistance, recovery).  Some 
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scholars strongly advocate for a single trajectory of resilience while others argue the 
possibility that resilience is actually a set of trajectories. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Illustrations of idealized potential resilience trajectories 
 
 
 
Resistance.  This trajectory is associated with persistent function despite exposure 
to a disruption (Masten & Wright, 2010).   Consider an individual performing a work- 
related task who is exposed to a disruption. Resistance would be indicated by the 
individual’s uninterrupted work performance (Bonanno et al., 2010) – although resistance 
trajectories may include very slight deviations from time to time due to natural variability 
in human (or system) behavior.  When resilience is interpreted as resistance, then 
resilience is an absolute: either one is or one is not resilient with respect to a specific 
disruption at a particular time.  Resilience conceptualized as resistance is practically 
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synonymous with the engineering concept of stability.  Indeed, Norris et al. (2009) 
suggest that resistance is the “hypothetical ideal” with respect to exposure – because it is 
like having immunity to disruption, whereby the status quo remains unaffected
2
. 
Recovery. This trajectory, sometimes referred to as transient dysfunction (e.g., 
Norris et al., 2008), is associated with a return to baseline function following some lapse 
in function (Sudmeier-Rieux, 2014).  Traditionally, both engineers and psychologists 
have emphasized recovery when conceptualizing resilience.  In engineering, the 
timeliness of return is important – the efficiency with which a material returns to steady 
state is indicative of resilience (Dalziell & McManus, 2004).  If resilience is a function of 
efficiency of return to baseline levels of pre-disruption functioning, then entities may 
rebound more or less quickly than one another and resilience may be classified along a 
continuum. 
Some researchers have specified an ideal recovery period and do not accept 
eventual recovery as a sufficient criterion of resilience (e.g., Tierney, 2003). Bonanno 
(2008) differentiates resilience from recovery, suggesting that psychological resilience is 
represented by timely return (e.g., weeks), and that recovery takes longer (e.g., months). 
Norris, Tracy, and Galea (2009) concur with time-dependent differentiation of recovery 
and resilience trajectories.  Masten & Wright (2010), however, see recovery as dependent 
on severity of exposure, whereby duration or repetition over time could make for longer 
recovery period; and conceptualize recovery as a specific trajectory subsumed by the 
more encompassing resilience phenomenon. 
 
 
 
 
 
2   This view is not uncontested. 
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Resilience conceptualized as recovery has received much criticism, mostly among 
ecologists, concerning the nature to what the entity is supposedly returning.  Dalziell and 
McManus (2004) argue that returning to the condition that exposed the entity to 
disruption in the first place is problematic, as it may set the individual or system up for 
repeat exposure.  Folke (2006) argues that recovery, in the sense that it is a return to 
things as they were, is not really possible except for by linear systems – because 
nonlinear systems are constantly changing and evolving.  Ecologists are increasingly 
moving away from conceptualizations of resilience that focus on recovery, preferring 
instead to operationalize resilience as reorganization and renewal. 
Renewal. Resilience conceptualized as renewal embraces change to a 
qualitatively different state.  Rather than persisting under exposure (resistance) or 
returning to baseline (recovery), resilience may be considered a trajectory towards a “new 
normal” (Norris et al., 2008). Norris et al. (2008) observe that behavior pre- and post- 
disruption conditions may be very different from one another.  Scholars are split as to 
whether this form of change is desirable. Some scholars suggest that the transformed 
state is better, because it can leave the entity “strengthened and more resourceful” 
(Masten & Wright, 2010; Vogus & Sutcliff, 2007).  Other scholars argue that the altered 
state is simply different (Folke, 2006; Norris et al., 2008).  In addition, some critics have 
argued that resilience conceptualized as renewal could harm the system, particularly in 
instances where the change is not for the better (e.g., Gallopin, 2006). Still others have 
not included renewal in their set of trajectories (e.g., Bonanno et al., 2010), arguing that a 
fundamental change calls into question whether the focal entity is still the same entity. 
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Growth. This trajectory represents resilience as positive change following 
experience of a disruption and could be considered a type of transformation.  In human 
systems, growth is associated with meaning making, sense making, and learning as a 
result of disruption (Tedeshi & McNally, 2011).  Like ecology, psychology has been 
moving toward models of resilience that account for change (McGreary, 2011) – 
although unlike ecology, psychologists are focused only on positive change (Masten & 
Wright, 2010).  Some researchers have distinguished recovery from growth by observing 
that recovery implies bouncing back, while growth implies bouncing forward (Sudmeier- 
Rieux, 2014). 
Accommodating the potential for renewal (and growth) changes the original 
meaning of the term resilience.  While some researchers see this as augmenting the 
resilience concept (Folke, 2006), there is debate as to whether renewal should be 
subsumed under the resilience umbrella (Levine et al., 2009).  Indeed, Tedeschi & 
McNally (2011) differentiate resilience from growth as two separate trajectories, and 
suggest that it may be less likely for resilient individuals to experience growth because 
resilient individuals are less likely to have to struggle with negative effects of disruptions. 
From this perspective, resilience trajectories are less likely to reflect a demonstrable or 
lengthy dip in function.  However, these authors speculate that individuals who 
experience growth may then become more resilient to future disruptions. Some scholars 
argue that growth is superior to resilience (Levine, Laufer, Stein, Hamama-Raz, & 
Solomon, 2009), while others consider that growth serves a more palliative than 
constructive purpose (Tedeschi & McNally, 2011). 
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Concluding remarks about resilience trajectories.  Conceptualizing resilience as 
a process has implications for practice.  Resilience as a process implies capacity for 
change.  If, in a work context, the sequence and nature of the process of resilience can be 
reliably identified and observed, then it may be possible to identify periods of 
vulnerability that place the process at some risk of failing.  It would then be possible to 
design interventions that can support appropriate change and/or better guide the resilience 
trajectory to reduce this risk.  In addition, a proactive training approach could be adopted 
to build individuals’ adaptive capacities so that they are better prepared to manage their 
trajectory when exposed to potential disruptions. The value in conceptualizing resilience 
as a particular trajectory is that it offers some specific ways to intervene that are likely to 
have significant impact on particular state and goal outcomes of interest. 
Scholars disagree as to whether resilience is accurately described as a single 
response trajectory, or as a group of trajectories.  Often conceptualizations – either 
implicitly or explicitly –allow for multiple resilience trajectories.  In particular, resistance 
and recovery trajectories are frequently combined in current definitions of resilience (e.g., 
Masten & Wright, 2010).  Examples include, “preservation and/or recovery of pre- 
morbid functioning after exposure” (McGreary, 2011) and “ability to resist, cope with, 
recover from, and succeed” (Montpetit, Bergeman, Deboeck, Tibero, & Boker, 2010, 
p.631).  The argument for or against subsuming multiple trajectories under the common 
label “resilience” is to some degree related to whether or not the trajectories have similar 
effects with respect to a specified outcome or set of outcomes.  If resilience, for example, 
is defined as recovery (and not resistance or growth) then resilience is bounded and 
cannot include trajectories related to resistance or growth.  If, however, resilience is 
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refers to management of change, then that could subsume all other trajectories. 
Researchers disagree as to which approach is most parsimonious, defining resilience as 
one specific trajectory (McGeary, 2011) or, rather, as a phenomenon with multiple 
distinguishable trajectories – perhaps none of which are labeled “resilience” in and of 
themselves (Luthar et l., 2000). 
Specificity of Resilience 
 
It remains unclear whether resilience is a general phenomenon or is domain- 
specific (Scholz, Blumer, & Brand, 2012).  Ungar (2013) remarks that “resilience looks 
the same and different within and between populations, with mechanisms to predict 
positive growth sensitive to individual, contextual, and cultural variation” (p.XX). 
Indeed, it has been suggested that an individual or system may “develop resilience to 
threat A and B but not to threat C” (Orbist, Pfeffer, & Henley, 2010, p.290).  To the 
extent that resilience is a function of adaptive capacity, resilience in one domain may tax 
limited resources and lead to a loss of resilience in another domain (Furniss et al., 2011; 
Walker, Gunderson, Kinzig, Folke, Carpenter, & Schulta, 2006).  In addition, there may 
be spillover from one domain to another.  Masten & Wright (2010) suggest that 
competence begets competence.   Resilience in one domain may buffer the potential 
impact of disruptions in other domains (Ungar, 2013). Perceived similarity across 
domains may contribute to the appearance of a general phenomenon of resilience when, 
in fact, this may not be the case. 
If resilience is domain- , event-, context-, or outcome-specific, then it is difficult 
to know if and when results can be synthesized across studies and applications.  Earlier, it 
was noted that the value and relationship between adaptive capacities, vulnerabilities, and 
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resilience is not absolute.  Therefore, specific contexts may yield or require very different 
relationships among these. Rutter (2012) warns against assuming relationships based on 
theoretical presumptions rather than empirical observations.  These relationships, rather, 
should be systematically explored over time across a variety of populations and contexts 
(Bonanno, 2004).  For example, much of the psychological resilience literature has 
focused on young people.  It is not clear whether this knowledge extends to adults 
(Vanhove, Herian, Perez, Harms, & Lester, 2015). 
Concluding Remarks about Criterion 
 
Trait/global property, emergent state, and process conceptualizations approach 
resilience in different ways.  Sudemeier-Rieux (2014) and others (e.g., Wilson, 2014) 
argue that resilience is most likely both an outcome (emergent state) and a process.  If 
there are multiple resiliencies – whether trait, state and process or multiple patterns of 
response to disruption – then the study of resilience runs the risk of lacking sufficient 
specificity for scientific clarity, resulting in inconsistencies, knowledge gaps, and lack of 
synthesis within and across conceptualizations (Anderson, 2015).  Further, having 
multiple resiliencies could result in a lack of faith in the construct and an inability to 
inform current and future policies and interventions (Walsh, 2013). 
Disruption 
 
Resilience is loosely conceptualized as “(i) of something, (ii) to something, (iii) to 
an endpoint” (Allmark et al., 2014, p.62). Thus, resilience requires an entity to be 
exposed to “something”.  Scanning the definitions in Table 1, one can see a broad array 
of terms used to refer to these stimuli, including “challenge” (Allmark et al., 2014), 
“crisis” (Patterson, 2002), “potentially traumatic event” (Bonanno et al., 2010), and 
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“disruption” (e.g., Walker et al., 2004).  The definitions of resilience also vary with 
respect to whether an entity must simply be exposed to a potential disruption (e.g., 
Bonanno et al., 2010) or actually experience a disruption (e.g., Luthar & Cicchetti, 2000). 
Inconsistent terminology has both intentional and unintentional implications. 
Disruptors may be conceptualized as a function of their frequency, duration, or 
magnitude (Sarafino & Smith, 2014).  In general, more frequent, long-lasting, and high 
impact exposures are assumed to result in greater disruption to system performance 
(Bonanno et al., 2010).  These exposures are also likely to become more salient to 
individuals or systems. This observation has prompted many resilience scholars to focus 
on system response to extreme threats, such as trauma (Patterson, 2002).  However, the 
accumulation of lesser exposures –which occur less frequently, for shorter periods, or 
have less of an impact – can result in measurable disruption to system performance, 
which can be commensurate with that of more frequent, long-lasting, or high impact 
counterparts (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007).  Everyday disruptions may slowly overwhelm a 
system and affect function (Walsh, 2013). 
According to some perspectives, stimuli must necessarily be perceived as 
negative in order to affect resilience.  In stress appraisal theory, however, there is 
opportunity to view stressors as challenges, presumably positive events that nonetheless 
disrupt behavior (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Fletcher & Sarkar, 2013). Negative and 
positive events can co-occur or have reciprocal effects, which can affect meaningful 
assignment of valence.  Luthar et al. (2000) underscore the need for researchers and 
practitioners to carefully articulate the nature of relevant events when conceptualizing 
resilience.  To the extent that daily hassles and, perhaps, positive events have the 
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potential to disrupt system function, then efforts to understand and conceptualize 
resilience should necessarily consider a range of events – at least until a resolution is 
reached.  Indeed, different stimuli may require different management strategies and 
responses (Vurgin et al., 2011). 
Outcomes Associated with Resilience 
 
Although resilience is sometimes conceptualized as an outcome in and of itself 
(e.g., an emergent state), trait/global property and process conceptualizations of resilience 
can emphasize different outcomes, including, “healthy levels of physical and 
psychological functioning” (Bonanno et al., 2010, p.5), positive adjustment (Vogus & 
Sutcliffe, 2007), well-being (Bolzan & Fran, 2012), and/or competence (Morgan, 
Fletcher, & Sarkar, 2013).  The criterion cutoff for inferring resilience may depend on 
context and/or the specific nature of exposure. For example, “the optimal outcome 
indicators are those that are conceptually most relevant to the risk encountered, so that 
when there are serious life adversities such as exposure to war, the absence of psychiatric 
distress can be more logical outcome than excellence in functioning at school” (Luthar & 
Cicchetti, 2000, p.858).  While most conceptualizations of resilience focus on positive 
outcomes, that which is deemed positive is relative to the level of risk for what could 
have otherwise occurred.  Thus, superior performance need not always be a prerequisite 
for inferring resilience. 
To define the outcome of interest, one must necessarily make some judgment 
about appropriate behavior (Rigsby, 1994). When resilience is considered in terms of 
complex systems, there may be no one way to be resilient.  In fact, an entity may appear 
to manage a disruption in unusual or even self-defeating ways (Bonanno, 2008).  This 
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discrepancy is observed in Bottrell’s (2009) study of marginalized youth, in which 
educators and administrators perceived student truancy and misbehavior as a lack of 
resilience while students understood their own behaviors as “opportunities to express 
competence … Judged according to the girls’ logics, their school resistances and truancy 
may thus be read as acts of resilience” (p.329).  Indeed, outcomes may be assessed 
differently by different stakeholders – how an individual actor perceives his or her 
performance may be different than how an observer perceives his or her performance 
(Dalziell & Mcmanus, 2004; Gordon & Song, 1994). Subjectivity and social norms 
dictate conceptualizations of appropriate behavior; criteria by which meaningful 
outcomes are identified and evaluated are socially constructed (Walsh, 1996). 
This raises concern that those with more status/power/influence may advance the criteria 
used, set the outcomes and thus “alternate pathways” to resilience may go unrecognized 
or can be stigmatized (Bottrell, 2009). 
Contextual Factors Associated with Resilience 
 
The resilience literature has begun to identify contextual factors, sometimes 
differentiated as protective/promotive or risks/vulnerabilities, which affect the 
management of disruption.  Protective and promotive factors modify an effect in a 
positive direction (Luthar et al., 2000); protective factors serve to buffer the exposure to, 
experience of, and effect of events, and promotive factors provide a positive boost in how 
an event is handled (Fetcher & Sarkar, 2013).  Collectively, protective and promotive 
factors are sometimes referred to as adaptive capacities, emphasizing their contribution to 
an entity’s overall potential to successfully avoid or manage disruption (Dalziell & 
McManus, 2004).  Risks and vulnerabilities, on the other hand, modify an effect in a 
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negative direction (Luthar et al., 2000).  Risk and vulnerability considerations can be 
used to question whether positive outcomes, such as superior function, are necessarily a 
function of resilience or, rather, are a result of low risk or exposure (Luthar et al., 2000, 
p.550). 
The identification of protective/promotive and risk/vulnerability factors is an 
important direction for research because they may change the way disruptions affect an 
entity over time (Luthar et al., 2000; Norris et al., 2009). However, the relationships of 
protective/promotive and risk/vulnerability factors to resilience may not apply for all 
entities across all situations at all times (Ungar, 2003). What functions as a protective 
factor for one entity or event may function as a vulnerability for another entity or event 
(Luthar et al., 2000).  Rutter (2006) illustrates how the value of a contextual factor is not 
absolute by way of analogy: sickle cells are a risk factor for most people, however are 
protective when an individual is exposed to malaria. 
The complexity of protective/promotive and risk/vulnerability factors makes it 
difficult to identify causal patterns of resilience (Ungar, 2013b). Often, 
protective/promotive and risk/vulnerability factors co-occur (Vanhove et al., 2015) and 
there can exist bidirectional relationships between and/or interactions among various 
protective/promotive and/or risk/vulnerability factors (Patterson, 2002).  The effects of 
these factors can also accumulate over time and strain already limited resources.  For 
these reasons, Ungar (2013) argues that it is essential that resilience be understood 
through the lens of the context in which a focal entity is exposed to and responds to 
disruption(s). 
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Concluding Remarks about the Cross-Discipline Literature Review 
 
While many advocate for the continued utility of resilience perspectives, critics 
point to a number of concerns.  For example, resilience is typically treated as a positive 
phenomenon, with a focus on strengths and prevention of negative outcomes. Critics 
argue that resilience in and of itself is neither positive nor negative (Bene et al., 2012), 
but merely a framework for understanding how entities manage disruptions.  Critics also 
suggest that the resilience construct, particularly when defined as resistance or recovery, 
does not allow for change.  Entities are expected to remain at or (quickly) return to the 
status quo, a state in which the entity is vulnerable to repeat occurrences.  These critics 
argue that instead of as you were resilience should emphasize as you should be (Allmark 
et al., 2014).  As indicated earlier, what constitutes as you should be is often dictated by 
normative expectations for appropriate behavior and is susceptible to criticism, as well 
(Furniss et al., 2011). 
In addition, a number of criticisms surround the concept of agency.  On the one 
hand, psychological research has been criticized for placing too much emphasis on 
agency, as it poses opportunities for victim blaming.  If focus is on agency, then onus is 
on the individual (system component) to be resilient by working with what they have, 
even if it isn’t much, or to go find what they need.  By this approach, usually individuals 
who are able to be resilient are commended, while those who are not resilient are blamed 
(Barrios, 2014). Critics worry that a shift in focus to resilience might reinforce myths 
that anyone can make it if they just try hard enough (Rigsby, 1994).  Interestingly, socio- 
ecologists argue that there is too little emphasis on agency (Cretney, 2014), again, 
pointing to the need for better synthesis across disciplines. 
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Grove (2015) expresses the concern that the increasing differences in the use and 
application of the term “resilience” has the effect of discrediting resilience, resulting in 
resilience becoming an overgeneralized buzzword. Others have echoed this concern 
(e.g., Bene et al., 2012).  This apparent concept slurring may actually be because there is 
no single agreed upon trait, state, or process that embodies resilience.  There may be 
multiple resiliencies – Masten and Obradovic (2006) write “resilience is a complex 
family of concepts that always requires careful conceptual and operational definition”. 
Anderson (2015), on the other hand, suggests that we should embrace diversity in 
resiliencies, instead of trying to force a common ground.  Otherwise, we have only a 
theoretical and not a practical, applicable construct. 
This cross-discipline literature review underscores troublesome gaps and 
inconsistencies in the current understanding of resilience in and of small groups. Despite 
the growing cross-disciplinary interest in resilience perspectives and their application, 
there are nontrivial differences in how resilience is conceptualized within and across 
disciplines (Welsh, 2014).  Indeed, the literature on resilience lacks agreement with 
respect to a definition, as well as relevant antecedents, mediating factors/processes, and 
outcomes (Ganong & Coleman, 2002).  Collaborative, cross-discipline efforts can help to 
identify issues of scale and to inform relationships among levels of analysis (Cicchetti, 
2013). Without attention to other disciplines, theory becomes constricted and 
incomplete, even contradictory – as this review has noted.  These fundamental concerns 
compromise the utility of the resilience construct (Luthar et al., 2000), and complicate 
direct applications to the team level.  This is the time to take a critical pause and consider 
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the relevance and appropriate use(s) of the construct.  A framework is needed to direct 
the alignment of conceptualization, measurement, and analysis of (team) resilience. 
Framework for Conceptualizing Team Resilience 
 
The cross-discipline review of the resilience literature revealed a multitude of 
plausible conceptualizations of resilience.  These conceptualizations vary both across and 
within disciplines, as shown in Table 1. A science of resilience can only advance to the 
extent that researchers are able to agree on a means of accommodating and organizing 
multiple plausible conceptualizations of its focal construct.  A framework for organizing 
team resilience-related efforts must provide an opportunity for researchers to consider 
multiple conceptualizations of resilience, and also provide guidelines for researchers to 
articulate comparable conceptualizations of the construct.  Such a framework should first 
specify the criterion for demonstrating team resilience; that is, whether team resilience is 
being conceptualized as a global property, an emergent state, and/or a process; and 
include a statement as to the generalizability of a set of results across other entities, 
disruptions, outcomes, times, and/or contexts. A standardized framework can both direct 
the clarification of key components of alternate conceptualizations of team resilience and 
inform the design of future research efforts, including the selection and timing of 
measurements and the analyses performed. 
Specification of the Criterion for Demonstrating Team Resilience 
 
Team resilience will have different implications for practice depending on how it 
is conceptualized. Team processes are the mechanisms through which teams effect 
change and shift from state to state.  Interactions among team members can coalesce into 
emergent states (Sanders, Munford, & Leibenberg., 2012). Behavioral indicators of 
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effective and ineffective team processes could be identified and monitored, signaling 
when an intervention or training could be administered to an underperforming work team 
to bolster improvement or course correction (i.e., team resilience as a process) and thus 
increase likelihood of a desired outcome (i.e., team resilience as a emergent state).  On 
the other hand, a brittle or non-resilient team (i.e., team resilience as a global property) 
would be unlikely to benefit from intervention or training and would thus need to be 
dismantled.  Organizations could develop and use a set of criteria to select combinations 
of members to form new, resilient teams.  To simply suggest that a team is or should be 
resilient provides no insight into the past, present, or future of the team. 
Conceptualizations of team resilience should be explicit as to whether the construct is 
being conceptualized as a global property, emergent state, and/or process. 
The cross-discipline literature search identified only fifteen empirical efforts 
purporting to address team resilience and few authors explicitly specified the criterion for 
observing team resilience.  Indeed, while most authors defined team resilience as an 
“ability” or a “capacity” of a work group, it was not often clear whether team resilience 
was being conceptualized as a relatively enduring property of the team or, rather, a state 
that could be created or changed. Although four of the fifteen articles conceptualized 
team resilience as a process (Edson, 2012; Meneghal et al., 2014; Morgan et al., 2013; 
and Morgan et al., 2015), only two endeavored to actually describe the process of 
resilience (Morgan et al., 2013; Morgan et al., 2015). 
Specifying Conceptualizations of Team Resilience as a Global Property 
 
Team resilience, as a global construct, has no lower-level analog and is explicitly 
distinct from individual resilience (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).  A simple example of a 
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global group property is group cohesion.  Group cohesion is a meaningless construct if 
there is no group, because an individual cannot be cohesive with his or herself.  Unit 
resilience, as a global property of the unit, might, for example, mean that the unit could 
be designed to withstand or adapt to breakdowns in unit processes (e.g., added 
redundancy in group member functions).  A global assessment of team resilience should 
yield a single score for each team assessed. 
Specifying Conceptualizations of Team Resilience as an Emergent State 
 
Because teamwork is a function of interdependencies among team members, an 
understanding of individual-level work phenomena does not always inform an 
understanding of team-level phenomena in the workplace (Baker, 1992) and one should 
be careful not to assume isomorphism across levels of analysis.  Not all emergent states 
are created equal.  Indeed, I have argued in the previous section that conceptualizations of 
(team) resilience as an emergent state should include an explanation of how the state is 
expected to come about.  To demonstrate potential differences among alternate 
conceptualizations of team resilience as an emergent state, the reader is encouraged to 
consider the following four examples: 
Conceptualization E1: Team resilience is the combination of team members’ 
perceptions of psychological resilience that emerges through composition.  This 
conceptualization assumes that resilience is isomorphic across levels of analysis and that 
quantification of team resilience is dependent upon some composite of resilience at the 
lower level.  This conceptualization of team resilience does not require homogeneity of 
perceptions across team members (Arthur, Bell, & Edwards, 2007; Chan, 1998). 
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Conceptualization E2: Team resilience is the shared experience of team 
members’ perceptions of psychological resilience that emerges through composition. 
This conceptualization also assumes that resilience is isomorphic across levels of analysis 
and that quantification of team resilience is dependent upon some composite of resilience 
at the lower level. However, this conceptualization of team resilience requires 
homogeneity of perceptions across team members, arising through shared experience and 
processes (e.g., affective sharing), and is indexed as some function of within-team 
agreement (Chan, 1998). 
Conceptualization E3: Team resilience is the combination of team members’ 
shared perceptions of team resilience that emerges through composition. Similar to 
conceptualizations 1 and 2, this conceptualization assumes that resilience is isomorphic 
across levels of analysis and that quantification of team resilience is dependent upon 
some composite of resilience at the lower level, however this conceptualization requires 
respondents to provide appraisals using a referent-shift model. This conceptualization 
assumes that team members are knowledgeable about the level of resilience shared by the 
team as a whole.   Like conceptualization E2, perceptions of team resilience are assumed 
to be homogeneous across team members (Arthur et al., 2007; Chan, 1998). 
The subtle differences between conceptualizations E1, E2, and E3 could result in 
nontrivial differences in relative relationships with team outcomes and cross-level effects. 
In fact, with respect to the study of alternate conceptualizations of team efficacy, Arthur 
et al. (2007) found that both the additive and referent-shift conceptualizations were 
significant predictors of team (i.e., team) performance.  However, use of a referent-shift 
compilation model explained more variance in parallel analyses of team performance, 
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and the referent-shift conceptualization added incremental validity when part of the 
hierarchical analysis.  While the authors argue that the explicit alignment of efficacy and 
performance at the team level should be expected to result in a stronger relationship, this 
is only likely when team members have direct knowledge of the team phenomena 
(Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). 
Conceptualization E4: Team resilience is the pattern of team members’ 
perceptions of individual resilience that emerges through configuration. This 
conceptualization assumes that resilience is homologous across levels of analysis but that 
quantification of team resilience is dependent upon some disparity or exemplar value of 
resilience at the lower level (Chan, 1998).  This conceptualization of team resilience 
implies heterogeneity of perceptions across team members. 
Concluding remarks about team resilience conceptualized as an emergent state. 
Funke et al. (2012) argue that additive models, as the most parsimonious of approaches, 
may be preferred – although it should be noted that Kozlowski and Klein (2000) have 
expressed concern about the overreliance on compositional models of emergent team 
constructs.  Empirical efforts have demonstrated that other variables, including the degree 
of interdependence across team members, can affect the nature of emergent phenomena 
(Funke et al., 2012).  Bell (2007) has suggested that compositional and configural 
models, at least with respect to team demographics (e.g., personality factors, cognitive 
ability), should be considered simultaneously, as they provide different information about 
the make-up of the team.  Emergent phenomena require time to emerge, thus different 
conceptualizations of team resilience may prove more or less meaningful at different 
stages in team development (Arthur et al., 2007). 
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A developed theoretical foundation for studying team resilience as an emergent 
state should provide a concise definition of the construct, as well as an explanation of the 
processes through which it emerges (if it does, in fact, emerge) from the lower level.  The 
reader is referred to Furniss et al. (2011) for a “resilience markers framework for small 
teams” (p.2) which suggests additional considerations for the conceptualization of team 
resilience as an emergent state, specifically. 
Specifying Conceptualizations of (Team) Resilience as a Process 
 
Conceptualizations of resilience as a process, like those of resilience as an 
emergent state, require detailed specification. Resilience is often inferred through 
changes in some criterion over time.  To demonstrate the differences between alternate 
conceptualizations of team resilience as a process, the reader is encouraged to consider 
the team resilience in terms of each of four distinct trajectories: 
Conceptualization P1 (Resistance): Team resilience is characterized as 
persistence of function despite exposure to disruption. This conceptualization is 
evidenced through minimal variability over time with respect to some team outcome. 
Conceptualizing team resilience as resistance emphasizes a specific criterion cutoff score 
by which teams are classified as either resilient or not resilient (i.e., brittle). 
Conceptualization P2 (Recovery): Team resilience is characterized by the 
(timely) return to pre-disruption function following a decrement in function after 
exposure to a disruption. This conceptualization is evidenced through a period of steady 
baseline function with respect to some team outcome, followed first by decline in 
function upon/after exposure to disruption and then by a return to baseline function. 
Conceptualizing team resilience as recovery may emphasize a time period within which a 
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team would be expected to return to pre-disruption function.  The use of a criterion cutoff 
score would allow an opportunity to classify teams as either resilient or not resilient (i.e., 
brittle), whereas attention paid to observed variability in recovery periods (i.e., more or 
less time to recover) would be indicative of a resilience continuum. 
Conceptualization P3 (Renewal): Team resilience is characterized by 
qualitatively different functioning following exposure to disruption.  Conceptualizing 
team resilience as renewal presents a measurement challenge, as team function will 
change qualitatively but not quantitatively. The use of a criterion checklist would allow 
an opportunity to classify teams as either resilient or not resilience (e.g., minimum 
magnitude of change), or as falling along some resilience continuum (e.g., number of 
changes). 
Conceptualization P4 (Growth): Team resilience is characterized by improved 
functioning following exposure to disruption. This conceptualization is evidence through 
a period of steady baseline function with respect to some team outcome, followed by an 
eventual increase in post-disruption function.  Conceptualizing team resilience as growth 
may or may not account, first, for a post-disruption decrement in function (i.e., recovery 
plus growth versus growth).  The use of a difference score to measure a change in pre- 
and post-disruption function after some period of time would allow researchers to either 
classify teams are resilient or not resilient (i.e., brittle) or to classify team function along 
some resilience continuum. 
Concluding remarks about team resilience conceptualized as process.  More 
empirical research is needed to determine the prevalence of these various and other 
possible response trajectories.  Norris et al. (2008) and Bonanno et al. (2010) have led 
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some initial efforts.  Norris et al (2009) found that all identified trajectories were 
observed in measurable amounts. Bonanno et al. (2010) reports that the prevalence of 
each trajectory can be quantified: resilience (35-65%), recovery (15-25%), chronic 
distress – functional impairment that lasts a long time, maybe years (5-30%), and delayed 
distress – gradual worsening over time (0-15%).  At least four other resilience trajectories 
have been identified in the literature, including relapsing/remitting, delayed dysfunction 
(Bonanno, 2008), chronic dysfunction (Norris et al., 2009), and normalization (Masten & 
Wright, 2010).  Cross-sectional studies are not likely to be able to differentiate among 
trajectories, and so future studies of resilience trajectories will need to make use of 
longitudinal designs (Norris et al., 2009). 
In addition to specifying the specific response trajectory(ies) of interest, 
researchers must also specify at what time response trajectories are expected to change 
course. Most studies applying process conceptualizations of resilience focus on 
observations of the outcome of interest and how it changes over time. Fewer studies 
consider the behaviors that promote the observed changes in response trajectories. 
Efforts that consider the nature of the process can help to elucidate how team resilience 
occurs (state conceptualization) and/or how disruptions are managed (process 
conceptualizations). 
While resilience trajectories are perhaps indicative of various processes for 
managing disruption, a focus on outcomes alone does not illuminate the process(es) 
responsible for observed fluctuations over time.  The distinction between emergent states 
and team processes is sometimes muddied in the literature.  Many empirical efforts which 
purport to study team processes effectively measure and analyze these constructs as 
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mediating mechanisms.  While these efforts may underscore temporal dynamics, they fail 
to describe the process(es) of interest.  To help clarify the distinction, Marks, Mathieu, 
and Zaccaro (2001) have defined team processes as: “members’ interdependent acts that 
convert inputs to outcomes through cognitive, verbal, and behavior activities directed 
toward organizing taskwork to achieve collective goals” (p.357; italics in original).  As 
with emergent states, the processes that change team inputs into outputs, while (often) a 
collective effort, can be achieved through a set of interdependent activities that can be 
performed by individual team members either concurrently or sequentially (i.e., not every 
team member is doing the same thing at the same time). Studies designed to describe the 
how teams manage disruptions are few (e.g., Morgan, Fletcher, & Sarkar, 2015). 
Concluding Remarks about the Specification of a Criterion for Resilience 
 
Well-articulated conceptualizations of team resilience should explicitly specify 
which criterion (i.e., global property, emergent state, and/or process) is of interest.  In 
addition, resilience is sometimes conceptualized as a general phenomenon and sometimes 
a specific phenomenon.  Efforts are needed to explicate the generalizability of the 
phenomenon to other entities, disruptions, outcomes, timelines, and/or contextual factors. 
Application of an Expanded Heuristic Approach 
Allmark et al.’s (2014) heuristic approach offers a broad conceptualization of 
resilience as a function of the relationships among a focal entity, disruption(s), and 
outcome(s) of interest. Because this heuristic approach does not bind resilience to any 
particular entity, disruption, outcome or response trajectory, it provides a useful starting 
point for the development of a general team resilience framework.  The three components 
of the heuristic correspond to the questions, of what, to what, and for what. Two 
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additional components are added here: at what time, to account for temporal dynamics, 
and under what circumstances, to contextualize the stated relationships.  This expanded 
heuristic approach offers an inclusive framework for operationalizing resilience, reduces 
the possibility of stakeholders making erroneous assumptions, provides direction and 
justification for the number and timing of measurements, and fosters opportunities for 
replicability across research efforts.  The expanded heuristic approach is presented in 
Figure 3. Each of the components of this expanded heuristic approach is described in 
more detail in the sections that follow. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Illustration of the expanded Team Resilience Heuristic Approach 
 
 
Component 1: Resilience of what? 
 
Conceptualization of resilience can become complicated when the unit of analysis 
is a system or a collective.  Recall that, by definition, teams are collectives working 
toward a (set of) common goal(s).  Groups are classified as teams when there is 
interdependence among members (Salas, Dickinson, Converse, & Tannenbaum, 1992). 
Work teams are often complex socio-technical systems nested within organizations and 
composed of interdependent subsystems (e.g., team members, technologies).  Although 
interdependence is inherent to team work, work teams are created for any number of 
reasons and can perform a multitude of tasks.  Thus, teams will vary with respect to the 
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degree of interdependence required (Saavedra, Earley, & Van Dyne, 1993).  Different 
degrees of interdependence can greatly affect the generalizability of results to other team 
contexts. In addition, because teamwork is purpose-driven behavior, team resilience may 
not be the same as other forms of collective resilience.  Therefore, it is important that 
studies of team resilience are predicated on the specification of a shared goal/set of 
shared goals and are contextualized using a rich description of the teamwork 
arrangement. 
In practice, researchers have applied the term team resilience to study a diverse 
array of focal entities, including student project teams (e.g., Edson, 2012), emergency 
response teams (Furniss et al., 2012), Top Management Teams (e.g., Carmeli et al., 
2012), sports teams (e.g., Morgan et al., 2013), and restaurant staff (Bennett et al., 2010). 
A diverse sampling of work teams should improve the generalizability and utility of the 
team resilience construct, assuming the research across samples uses the same or very 
similar conceptualization of team resilience. However, there is as yet insufficient 
consistency across conceptualizations of team resilience.  The science of team resilience 
might yet benefit from this diversity of samples if sufficient details about the team work 
arrangements are provided – which would enable consumers of this literature to draw 
inferences about parallels and differences across studies. Unfortunately, very few of 
these efforts have specified the particulars of the team.  There has been intermittent 
mention across studies of team size (e.g., Carmeli et al., 2012), functional purpose (e.g., 
Edson et al., 2012), and membership tenure (e.g., West et al., 2009) – but this information 
is not presented consistently.  Nor do most studies address interdependency among team 
members.  As an example, it is unclear the ways in which restaurant workers must 
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coordinate efforts to achieve a common goal (Bennett et al., 2010).  Thus, the expanded 
framework encourages authors to provide detailed descriptions of focal team(s) and team 
work arrangement(s) so as to facilitate comparisons and synthesis across team resilience 
research efforts. 
Component 2: Resilience to what? 
 
“Disruption” warrants thorough explanation.  To avoid confounding an exposure 
with its effect, I recommend the use of the terms disruptor and disruption. Herein, the 
term disruptor is used to refer to anything that has the potential to interrupt familiar 
routines or situations and thus affect – either directly or indirectly – team processes and 
team outcomes for some period of time. The term disruption is used to refer to the effect 
of exposure to a disruptor.  It is not sufficient to use non-descript terms like “challenge” 
or “complex task.” Rather, disruptors and disruptions should be described in some detail, 
preferably with examples.  Disruptors can be classified according to how often they occur 
(frequency), for how long they occur (duration), and their degree (or magnitude) of 
impact on outcome(s) of interest, and whether they were expected to occur or not. 
Disruptors, for example, may come in the form of daily hassles with relatively minor 
impact and predictable inconveniences (Pennebaker & Harber, 1993), or an event with a 
significant impact like a trauma or crisis (Bhamra et al., 2011).  In addition, multiple 
disruptors may occur simultaneously.  Disruptions should also be explained in some 
detail.  Several taxonomies of team process and outcomes have been developed (e.g., 
Marks et al., 2001) which can be used to help standardize descriptions of disruption. 
Thorough descriptions of both disruptors and disruptions will help researchers to identify 
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consistent patterns in the management of disruptions, as well as the relationship of 
disruptions with outcomes. 
In practice, researchers have studied team resilience in response to a variety of 
disruptors, often given broad labels like “challenge” (Alliger, Cerasoli, Tannenbaum, & 
Vessey, 2015), “stressor” (Bennett et al., 2010), “adversity” (Carmeli et al., 2012), and/or 
“emergency” (Gomes et al., 2014). Fewer studies (e.g., Blatt, 2009) have provided 
specific examples of these disruptors or provided rich description of what types of 
phenomena are subsumed under these broad labels.  As with the previous component of 
this expanded heuristic, there is as yet insufficient description of disruptors and 
consequent disruptions to attempt to synthesize findings across studies of team resilience. 
Component 3: Resilience for what? 
Team performance is the culmination of coordinated efforts that evolve over time, 
and is influenced by both endogenous and exogenous factors.  These coordinated efforts 
involve the independent actions of individual team members as they perform their unique 
roles and responsibilities (taskwork) as well as the interdependent efforts required to 
move the team toward the accomplishment of its goals (teamwork). It can be noted that 
individual role competency is necessary but not sufficient for team success.  Although 
team effectiveness is often evaluated in terms of performance metrics, researchers have 
studied team resilience as it related to a variety of outcomes, for example: in-role and 
extra-role performance (Meneghal et al., 2014), team processes (West et al., 2009), health 
behaviors (Bennett et al., 2010), culture of excellence (Morgan et al., 2015), and 
virtuousness (Stephens et al., 2013). 
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As stated in the cross-discipline review, in order to define the outcome of interest, 
one must necessarily make some judgment about appropriate behavior (Rigsby, 1994). 
Scholars are urged to consider that there may be multiple ways for an entity or system to 
be resilient.  Multiple approaches can lead to successful team performance, but some may 
leave one or more team members dissatisfied with how they or other team members 
managed themselves to achieve that performance.  For example, cutting corners to meet a 
deadline may make a situation unsafe for some team  members.  Morally injurious 
experiences, such as perceived violations of personal ethics, can negatively affect the 
psychological well-being of some or all team members, potentially affecting the 
willingness and/or commitment of those team members to continue to value and/or 
pursue other current and future team goals (Frankfurt & Frazier, 2016). Thus, success 
with respect to one team outcome does not imply success with respect to another team 
outcome. 
Component 4:  Resilience at what time? 
 
Complex system performance is the culmination of coordinated efforts that occur 
over time.  Team members make many diverse contributions to the coordinated effort, 
and these can be arranged in in any number of combinations, resulting in multiple paths 
that can lead to an outcome.  Team performance is inherently variable – both within and 
between systems (Henning, Bizarro, Dove-Steinkamp, & Calabrese, 2014).  In addition, 
the inherent interdependence among team members can create novel or mask existing 
feedback loops (Bakx & Nyce, 2013), changing (or concealing) system processes.  A 
minor disruption in a seemingly isolated part of the system can have dramatic effects 
elsewhere within the system – or for the entire system – and these effects could occur in 
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the short or long term (Sanders et al., 2012). For these reasons, some consideration must 
be made as to when measurements are collected as well as the source (e.g., team member) 
from which information will be collected. 
Timing of these measurements can be dictated by how resilience is 
operationalized.  If resilience is a capacity to respond (a trait or an emergent state), then it 
may be possible to assess resilience a priori – before disruption occurs.  Coping 
strategies and adaptive adjustments may have different effects in the short and long term 
(Ungar, 2013).  In addition, small changes which are in and of themselves not detectable 
(or do not have an obvious effect) may add up over time (Rankin et al., 2014). 
Conceptualizations of resilience as a process would require that some observations are 
made over time.  For example, it is necessary to specify the nature of the recovery 
trajectory, or the timing of recovery that is of most interest.  Researchers should consider 
at what point resilience is likely to be observed (or inferred) and to specify a rationale 
accordingly.  Cross-sectional studies are not likely to be able to differentiate among 
trajectories, and so future studies of team resilience trajectories will need to make use of 
longitudinal designs (Norris et al., 2009). 
In practice, research on team resilience has rarely addressed temporal dynamics. 
While inattention to temporal dynamics may be the result of global conceptualizations of 
team resilience, even those studies explicitly purporting to measure resilience either as an 
emergent state or as a process often fail to indicate a relevant timeline.  Edson (2012) 
discusses the process of becoming resilient using a stage model of team development. 
Morgan et al. (2015) bound the process of resilience within the life cycle of an elite 
sports team (i.e., seven-season history).  Both Edson (2012) and Morgan et al. (2013, 
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2015) use retrospective techniques to address temporal dynamics. West et al. (2009) was 
the only study to collect objective measures at multiple time points. The authors 
measured change in resilience after first- and final- student class group projects, and 
demonstrated that the phenomenon they labeled “team resilience” changed as a function 
of team tenure. 
Component 5: Resilience under what circumstances? 
 
Contextual factors play an important role in team resilience. Teams are subjected 
to both endogenous and exogenous influences; not everything acting on the team or team 
members originates within the team work context.  For example, team members are 
simultaneously a part of other human systems (e.g., families, community organizations), 
each with complex influences on team member behavior. These external influences 
affect how individuals behave, think, and emote at work.  Individual team member and 
team behaviors, cognitions, and emotions can have an influence on team outcomes – 
facilitative, destructive, or no effect. 
The team resilience literature postulates relationships between team resilience and 
a number of other factors, some of which may classify as protective/promotive or 
risk/vulnerability factors.  Affect has received a great deal of attention, including 
connectivity (Carmeli et al., 2013), positive emotions (Meneghal et al., 2014; West et al., 
2009), and emotional carrying capacity (Stephens et al., 2013), and is typically found to 
contribute to the emergence of team resilience. 
Suggestions for the Measurement and Analysis of Team Resilience 
 
The expanded heuristic approach, as presented above, focuses on the key 
components of who (of whom), what (to what), why (for what), when (at what time), and 
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where (under what circumstances) of team resilience.  The synthesis of team resilience 
research can likely be achieved by explicitly addressing each of these components, 
thereby providing other researchers and practitioners with sufficient information to make 
meaningful inferences about generalizability and application.  In addition, researchers are 
urged to consider how nontrivial differences in conceptualizations of resilience can result 
from differences in how each of the components of the expanded heuristic approach are 
addressed and to remain sensitive to how such differences direct measurement (e.g., 
selection of measures, timing of measurements), analysis, and intervention. 
Select and Determine Timing of Measurement(s) 
 
There are a number of resilience scales currently available but questions remain as 
to whether they accurately assess team resilience.  Scales used to assess shared properties 
at the team level should use wording that reflects that level of interest. So, although data 
is often being collected at the team member level when using these scales, the verbiage 
used must involve appraisal of the team (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).  In some cases this 
can be accomplished by altering the instructions and/or the item referents of scales that 
were originally created to capture individual resilience.  Indeed, many authors have 
assumed that team resilience is sufficiently similar to individual resilience to warrant a 
use of modified measures of psychological resilience, simply shifting the item referent 
from the individual (e.g., I/my) to the team (e.g., we/our).  However, researchers must be 
cautious about modifying scales to assess team-level phenomena for two reasons: (1) 
isomorphism of resilience across scales has not yet been sufficiently established in the 
literature and (2) this practice may alter the psychometric properties of the scale (Funke 
et al., 2012; Morgeson & Hoffman, 1999).  The direct application of psychological theory 
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at the team level may be problematic.  It is also worth noting subtle variations in the 
methods used to aggregate individual appraisals, such as shifting the referent in each item 
from “self” to “team,” may affect the meaning of the construct, resulting in the 
inadvertent measurement of different constructs.  For example, the aggregate of 
individual team member perceptions of his or her own personal resilience (self-referent) 
may mean something very different than the aggregate of individual team member 
perceptions of his or her team’s resilience (team referent). Such differences would 
complicate the synthesis of results across studies, although all purport to be interested in 
the same construct of team resilience. 
With respect to most applications, team member scores regarding team-level 
phenomena are aggregated to arrive at a single score for the team. An alternative 
approach is to arrive at a single score through discussion and consensus in the context of 
a focus team.  This latter option is time-consuming and may prove impractical for some 
applications. Reaching consensus through discussion can sometimes be problematic 
because this process can both affect and be affected by team dynamics and may result in 
biased outcomes (Funke et al., 2012; Lindsley et al., 1995). 
In addition to concerns about the availability of meaningful measures of team 
resilience, careful consideration should be given to the timing of measurement(s).  It is 
unlikely that time would affect the measurement of trait resiliency, as traits are expected 
to remain relatively stable.  However, temporal factors are inherent to both state and 
process conceptualizations of resilience.  For conceptualizations of resilience as a state, 
sufficient time must be afforded for the phenomenon to emerge.  A mistimed 
measurement may fail to observe resilience.  For process conceptualizations of resilience, 
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the timing of measurement should be selected to align with the expected response 
trajectory(ies).   Given the multiple possible resilience trajectories, capturing the 
resilience component of interest during possible change periods may require periodic 
sampling.  Indeed, having too few or mistimed measurements may obscure otherwise 
meaningful course changes in response trajectories. 
Conduct Appropriate Analyses 
 
One of the first steps in the quantitative analysis of team resilience is justification 
of aggregation.  For shared constructs, one can calculate an index of inter-team 
agreement, like rwg (James, DeMaree, & Wolf, 1993). This index addresses similarity 
among members within the same team. However, rwg does not account for between-team 
differences.  To determine whether teams vary with respect to ratings of some construct, 
one can calculate intraclass correlations (ICC).  Evidence of nontrivial team-level 
variance suggests that ratings within teams violate the assumption of independence 
associated with most statistical tests.  Therefore, an ICC of greater than zero suggests that 
subsequent analysis must be conducted at the team level (Zaccaro, Blair, Peterson, & 
Zazanis, 1995).  Once decisions about aggregation have been made, statistical analyses 
are performed using methods associated with the appropriate level(s) of analysis. For 
example, analyses performed at a single level (e.g., team-only) could proceed using 
standard ordinary least squares regression or analysis of variance. However, analyses 
which require simultaneous consideration of data at multiple levels (e.g., time nested 
within teams or team members nested within teams) need to proceed using methods 
created to handle nested data. Appropriate methods include random coefficients 
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modeling (RCM), multilevel structural equation modeling (MSEM), and within and 
between analyses (WABA). 
Concluding Remarks about the Expanded Team Resilience Framework 
 
Many researchers and practitioners see resilience as a positive phenomenon that 
builds on strengths already present in a situation and/or among its participants, and 
promotes their ability to use proactive strategies for managing adversity (Luthar, 
Cicchetti, & Becker, 2000).  And although teams are increasingly relied upon to handle 
adversity, team resilience as a construct is only beginning to receive the scholarly interest 
it deserves (e.g., Morgan et al., 2013).  The cross-discipline review of the resilience 
literature revealed an opportunity to construct a framework for team resilience which can 
support and guide the articulation of multiple conceptualizations of team resilience.  The 
resulting framework provides an evidence-based foundation upon which both future and 
existing resilience conceptualizations can be compared with one another in order to 
determine their levels of synthesis and generalizability of findings. 
Team (Small Unit) Resilience in the United States Army 
 
Earlier sections of this manuscript underscored the need for theoretical 
development of the team resilience construct.  The cross-discipline review has 
highlighted troublesome gaps and inconsistencies in our understanding of resilience that 
are echoed in the burgeoning literature of team resilience.  To date, there has been little 
guidance regarding whether and how resilience should be operationalized in team 
contexts and there may be serious drawbacks to direct application of theory developed to 
understand resilience at other levels of analysis to the team level.  I have argued that 
theoretical development of the team resilience construct can benefit by framing 
conceptualization in accordance with the expanded heuristic approach.  Given the sparse 
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attention devoted to describing the process/processes of team resilience, and because the 
extant literature offers little guidance for explicating the specific components of the 
expanded framework nor a means of crafting informed hypotheses regarding the 
relationships among said components, foundational work must be undertaken to describe 
the process of team resilience. 
Qualitative Methodology 
 
Qualitative methods are useful for exploring novel constructs and processes 
(Hemmingway, 2001), and where previous research is often limited and hypotheses 
cannot be generated (Creswell, 2007). As such, qualitative methods are “particularly 
appropriate for answering questions of ‘How?’ or ‘What?’” (Morrow, 2007, p.211). 
These methods are well-suited for the study of bounded or unique cases (e.g., teams). 
Common qualitative methodologies include phenomenology, ethnography, case study, 
narrative analysis, and grounded theory. 
Grounded Theory (GT) is a rigorous qualitative method that relies on systematic, 
iterative sampling, interviewing, and coding procedures to develop a substantive theory 
of a psychological phenomenon – such as team resilience – that is “grounded” in 
participants’ lived experiences (Fassinger, 2005).  Originally developed by sociologists 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967), GT has become a widely used tool in health and medicine (i.e., 
nursing; Sbaraini, Carter, Evans, & Blinkhorn, 2011), as well as counseling psychology 
(Yeh & Inman, 2007).   A GT models the phenomenon of interest, explicating 
relationships among core variables – called categories, emphasizing causes and 
conditions of its development over time, as well as its effects (Charmaz, 2006). These 
relationships inform propositions and hypotheses for future research. 
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GT is well-suited for foundational work, when theory is absent or inadequate 
(Creswell, Hanson, Plano, & Morales, 2007), and is often used to provide a platform 
upon which to advance a larger research program (Haverkamp & Young, 2007). 
Research questions that seek to explore a process lend themselves to the use of a 
grounded theory approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), particularly when the research 
interest is in social interactions (Sbaraini et al., 2011).  In addition, GT researchers 
suggest that the methodology holds promise for innovative studies of collective 
phenomena (Charmaz, 2006). Because the resulting substantive theory is grounded in the 
lived experiences of participants, it is often accessible for use by laymen and those in 
applied settings (Glaser, 1978). 
Foundational efforts which employ qualitative methodology can allow for the 
development of a substantive theory of team resilience. The United States (US) Army is 
interested in exploring resilience in and of units and thus presents as a meaningful sample 
with which to explore the process of managing disruption. 
Resilience and the United States Army 
 
US Army Soldiers are subjected to a variety of stressors (e.g., demanding 
missions, prolonged separation from family; Cornum, Mathews, & Seligman, 2011). 
These and other stressors can quickly deteriorate the physical and psychological health of 
Soldiers.  Poor psychological health is a leading cause of hospitalization among Army 
Soldiers (Bobrow, Cooke, Knowles, & Vieten, 2012) and can compromise the 
effectiveness of those who remain on active duty (Cornum et al., 2011). Not all Soldiers 
experience negative outcomes as a result of exposure to potential stressors, nor are those 
that do affected to the same degree (Lee et al., 2011). However, an increasing number of 
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Soldiers reportedly suffer from cognitive and psychological impairments (e.g., traumatic 
brain injuries, post-traumatic stress disorder), succumb to self-injurious behavior 
(e.g., suicide, substance use), and/or perpetrate violence against others (e.g., domestic 
abuse, sexual assault). According to a recent study, Soldiers who have committed 
suicide, tested positive for illicit drug use, or committed violent crimes scored 
significantly lower on Army measures of psychological resilience than Soldiers who have 
not been implicated in these activities (Lester, Harms, Bulling, Herian, & Spain, 2011). 
Thus, the Army has placed critical emphasis on promoting psychological resilience, 
which the Army has loosely defined as “the mental, physical, emotional, and behavioral 
ability to face and cope with adversity, adapt to change, recover, learn, and grow from 
temporary setbacks” (United States Army Ready and Resilient Campaign [R2C], 2013, 
p.3). The Army has appropriated substantial investment to the study of resilience, with 
the deliberate goal of creating an organizational culture that values, builds, and sustains 
psychological resilience. 
The US Army Ready and Resilient Campaign (R2C, 2013) suggests 
“improvements in individual resilience and performance increase the capabilities and the 
readiness of collective groups and units and the Army as a whole”.   Indeed, individuals 
are likely to influence the resilience of the collective.  However, the causal relationship 
may not be unidirectional (Bartone, 2006, p.139).  Military psychologists have begun to 
consider resilient-relevant interpersonal processes like social support (Lee et al., 2011), 
social judgment (Bartone, 2009), morale, and unit cohesion (Britt, Sinclair, & McFadden, 
2013). This literature suggests that there may be important cross-level influences of 
interest to the development of resilience at both levels of analysis (individual, collective). 
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There are multiple viable conceptualizations of resilience in small military units. 
Team resilience, as a global property of the unit, might, for example, mean that the unit 
could be designed to withstand or adapt to breakdowns in unit processes (e.g., added 
redundancy in group member functions). Alternatively, team resilience may emerge 
through composition and/or configuration. Team resilience as described in the Army 
Ready and Resilience Campaign (R2C, 2013) is an example of a compositional emergent 
phenomenon, because it assumes that team resilience is based on an additive model of 
unit member attributes.  A configural model of team resilience, on the other hand, may 
suggest, for example, that team resilience is cultivated by having a highly resilient unit 
leader. Team resilience, as a process, would describe how unit members are affected by 
and manage disruptions. 
The differences between these (and likely other possible) conceptualizations 
could result in nontrivial differences in relative relationships with unit-level antecedents, 
outcomes, and cross-level effects.  The nature of the multilevel construct – whether 
compositional, configural, or global – also affects the utility of what is currently 
understood about psychological resilience.  If unit resilience is a compositional, emergent 
property of the unit, then what we know about psychological resilience should be easily 
applied to what we want to know about unit resilience.  If unit resilience is a configural, 
emergent property of the unit, then what we know about psychological resilience may not 
apply consistently for all elements at the unit level. And if unit resilience is a global 
property of a unit, then it would be very different from psychological resilience and the 
literature on psychological resilience would have limited value. 
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Group research and multi-level theory suggest that units may experience 
resilience, and that resilience within units (some combination or configuration of unit 
member resilience) is not necessarily equivalent to unit resilience (global resilience 
phenomena). While the Army’s own R2C (2013) program suggests a compositional 
model of unit resilience, the Army appreciates there may be other conceptualizations of 
unit resilience. It is therefore important to explore, define, and differentiate between 
resilience within a unit and the possible variants of unit resilience.  More substantive 
understanding of unit resilience is an important foundation upon which the Army can 
develop tools for organizing and/or training resilient units. A useful conceptualization of 
unit resilience will both reflect the lived experiences of US Army Soldiers and be 
commensurate with the mission of the US Army. 
Research Questions 
 
The current study has been designed to address three primary research questions. 
First, the expanded framework suggests that certain conditions must be satisfied.  Rather 
than restrict the study of small unit resilience by satisfying these conditions a priori – 
either through conjecture or based upon the direction of a deficient literature – I use the 
data to identify elements of the team resilience framework as it applies to this particular 
sample.  Thus, I ask the following question: 
RQ1: How can the expanded heuristic approach inform the conceptualization of 
the process of team resilience for small military units?  Specifically: 
RQ1a: What does it mean to be a “small military unit”? 
 
RQ1b: To what potential disruptors are small military units exposed? 
 
RQ1c: What small military unit outcomes are affected by disruption? 
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RQ1d: What temporal dynamics are important for a small military unit’s 
management of disruption? 
RQ1e: Under what circumstances do small military units manage 
disruption? 
In addition, qualitative inquiry affords a critical foundation for the development of 
a theory of small unit (team) resilience.  The US Army presents as a meaningful sample 
with which to explore the process of managing disruptions. Thus, the current study will 
address the following research question: 
RQ2: How do small military units manage disruption?  Specifically: 
RQ2a:  What elements are common to the process of managing 
disruption? 
RQ2b:  What factors affect the process of managing disruption? 
 
Lastly, both multi-level theory and the cross-discipline resilience literature 
suggest that team resilience may or may not be similar to resilience at other levels of 
analysis.  Given continued interest in psychological resilience, I ask the following 
additional research question: 
RQ3: How is the process of small unit resilience related to psychological 
resilience as currently conceptualized by the US Army? 
The resulting substantive theory of small unit (team) resilience can be used to 
inform the development of future unit-level assessments, training, and other interventions 
aimed at improving the readiness and resilience of the Force.  While answers to the 
aforementioned research questions are used herein to articulate an operationalization of 
small unit (team) resilience that best suits the needs of the United States Army, 
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specifically, this foundational research can contribute to an enriched understanding of 
team resilience generally. 
Method 
 
This exploratory research used a grounded theory approach to explore resilience 
at the small-unit level.  Grounded Theory is a largely inductive qualitative methodology 
that relies on systematic iterative sampling, interviewing, and coding procedures to 
develop a substantive theory of a process (i.e., unit resilience).  Data were constructed 
through semi-structured interviews and focus groups with the target population.  A 
schematic of the grounded theory approach (Andersen, Inoue, & Walsh, 2013) is 
provided in Appendix A. 
Researcher Background and Perspectives 
 
An important aspect of grounded theory research is self-awareness, whereby the 
researcher acknowledges his or her personal biases. This study was conducted as a part 
of my doctoral training in Industrial-Organizational Psychology. My research is focused 
on personnel development and performance in complex sociotechnical systems, with an 
emphasis on occupational stress and resilience in teams.  My graduate coursework and 
research efforts have focused on the continuous development of a wide array of 
methodological and analytic skills, mostly quantitative. Thus, I position myself within a 
post-postivistic paradigm.  I was fortunate to complete my field research as a fellow with 
the Army Research Institute. Through this experience I gained a deep appreciation for 
the sacrifices made by service men and women. The Army has an expressed interest in 
the development and maintenance of psychological resilience and is interested in 
exploring the utility of similar efforts for military collectives. To counter any bias that 
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may come from my research experiences and appreciation for service men and women, I 
have taken steps to ensure the trustworthiness of this study. 
Participants 
 
The initial goal of a GT approach is to explore the breadth of a phenomenon. 
Sources are not selected to improve statistical inference – as participants would be 
recruited in quantitative research – but rather to provide sufficiently rich data to develop 
the substantive theory. Selecting a GT sample is always done purposefully, and is 
directed by criteria drawn from the questions guiding the research (Morrow, 2005). GT 
primarily uses theoretical sampling, “a process of data collection for generating theory 
whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to 
collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges” (Glaser, 
1978, p.36).   The process continues until all categories are saturated and no new 
information is being obtained (Morrow, 2007). Used well, this process avoids excessive 
oversampling and unnecessary redundancy in the data (Fassinger, 2005). 
The sample included 121 active duty Soldiers (115 males, 6 females) from the 
Combat Arms division of the US Army Regimental System (i.e., Infantry, Field Artillery, 
Armor, Aviation, and Air Defense Artillery), including small unit members, leaders, 
trainers, and other individuals well-positioned to direct, observe, and/or otherwise 
evaluate small unit performance.  Volunteers participated in 70 sessions, including 51 
individual interviews and 19 small (fewer than five participants) focus groups. 
Participants reported an average participant age of 28.06 years (SD = 5.79 years) and an 
average tenure with the military of 7.02 years (SD = 4.83).   The sample was heavily 
drawn from enlisted ranks (95 enlisted, ranging in rank from Private to Sergeant First 
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Class; 18 officers, ranging in rank from Second Lieutenant to Lieutenant Colonel; and 8 
Warrant Officers) and participation was fairly evenly drawn from branches within 
Combat Arms (22 from Infantry, 11 from Armor, 27 from Air Defense Artillery, 25 from 
Field Artillery, and 15 form Aviation,) and included 21 observers/trainers.  Thirty-five 
participants reported having a GED or high school diploma, 48 some college, 5 
associate’s degree, 23 bachelor’s degree, and 4 graduate or professional degree. 
Participants were purposefully, rather than randomly, selected so as to maximize 
the opportunity for this research to tap the full spectrum of resilience-related experiences 
at the unit level.  Initially, a well-rounded sample of Army personnel from a variety of 
specialties were requested through the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social 
Sciences’ (ARI) Research Support Request (RSR) process, with emphasis on individuals 
who are members of identifiable small units (i.e., criterion-based sampling); units of 
interest included air and tank crews, artillery crews, and infantry squads.  As the study 
progressed, selection efforts were tailored to recruit only individuals whose perspectives 
were likely to further elucidate underdeveloped elements of the emerging theory (i.e., 
theoretical sampling).  Participants meeting sampling criteria were recruited during 
formal Army-sponsored data collection opportunities. 
Data Construction 
 
Most GT studies use transcribed interviews as primary sources for data 
construction (Polkinghorne, 2005).  The typical GT interview is a set of loosely 
structured (Kvale, 1996) open-ended items and follow-up prompts (Fassinger, 2005).  In 
GT, interview items relate to the both the research questions and the subsequent analytic 
process.  GT interviews are loosely structured so as to be quickly adapted to the particular 
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source (Polkinghorne, 2005) as well as the developing theory (Glaser, 1978). “To adhere 
rigidly to [the protocol] throughout the research study will foreclose on the data 
possibilities inherent in the situation, limit the amount and type of data gathered, and 
prevent the researcher from achieving density and variation of concepts necessary for 
developing a grounded theory” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.180).  The interview protocol 
is easily adapted for use with individuals or groups, as in focus group discussions (Ehigie 
& Ehigie, 2005).  Other sources (e.g., direct or indirect observation, archival records) can 
be used to triangulate data construction, improving the rigor of the GT model. 
For this study, data was constructed through a series of individual interviews and 
small focus groups (up to five Soldiers) with the target population.  Interviews and focus 
groups followed a loosely structured script: Participants were asked about their 
experience with and/or observations of small unit performance under day-to-day and 
potentially stressful conditions.  The interview protocol included a set of loosely 
structured probes that allowed the interviewer to seek clarification and/or to elicit richer, 
thicker description of participants’ experiences.  For example, “What influenced or 
caused this phenomenon to occur?” and “What strategies were employed during this 
process?” (Creswell, 2007, p.66).  The interview and focus group protocols (See 
Appendix B) outlined the general scope of questions, although the specific items used 
became necessarily more targeted as a function of the needs of the data construction 
process.  Sessions lasted no more than 1.5 hours. 
Procedure 
 
Participation in this study was voluntary. Upon arrival at the set date and time, 
participants were escorted into the designated interview/focus group area.  The 
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interview/focus group area was private and, to the extent possible, remained void of 
distraction. The researcher was cognizant of the need to protect participants’ 
confidentiality and to encourage active participation. Thus, the interview and focus group 
protocols required that other individuals (i.e., those who are neither a member of the 
research team or would-be participants) not be permitted inside the designated interview 
area at any time during a session.  To further protect the confidentiality of focus group 
participants, focus groups were comprised of individuals within a single occupational 
specialty and from the same or similar rank/position. The focus group protocol was 
designed to ensure that no one from a participant’s direct chain of command was present 
during the session. 
After all other individuals exited the interview area, informed consent procedures 
commenced.  Participants provided consent on an individual basis (i.e., interview) or as a 
part of a small group (i.e., focus group).  Soldiers were assured that there was no penalty 
for choosing not to participate.  Participants were told that – with their consent – they 
would be audio-recorded.  For Soldiers who provided consent, interviews and focus 
groups were recorded using a digital voice recorder for the purpose of accurately 
transcribing the content.  The researcher informed participants – verbally (See Appendix 
B) and via the Informed Consent Form (See Appendix C) – about the use of audio 
recording.  Audio recording was not used with those Soldiers who wished to participate 
but did not wish to be recorded – and when one or more Soldiers in a focus group did not 
wish to be recorded, the entire session continued unrecorded.  At any time, Soldiers could 
request that the recording be paused or stopped.  In addition, the consent procedures 
informed participants about how the information they provided would be used. 
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Participants were informed that the data would be used for research purposes, which may 
include non-government purposes. Participants were informed that certain comments 
might be quoted to illustrate points identified through analysis and that, if direct quotes 
were used, these quotes would be devoid of personal identifiers. After being informed of 
the purpose and potential risks of their participation, and reviewing the Informed Consent 
Form, Soldiers were permitted to make an informed decision about whether or not they 
wished to participate in the research. Informed Consent Forms and a Privacy Statement 
Act (See Appendix D) were provided to all Soldiers at that time. Only those who agreed 
to participate and signed an Informed Consent Form continued – all others were thanked 
for their time and asked to remain quietly in a separate area until the session was over. 
Participants were asked to complete a brief demographics inventory (Appendix E) and 
then the interview/focus group commenced. 
With participants’ consent, interviews and focus groups were audio recorded 
using a handheld digital recording device. Digital recording devices were kept in a 
locked attaché when being transported or when otherwise not in use.  Recordings of 
interviews and focus groups remained in the internal memory of the digital recorder until 
the record was fully transcribed.  The researcher transcribed the audio record directly 
from the digital recorder (i.e., under no circumstances was the audio record transferred 
from the recorder).  Specific references were generalized according to position and 
location. For example, should a participant make mention of a “Captain Smith”, session 
notes were edited to read “Captain XXX.”  If the participant mentioned that (s)he spent 
several months at “FOB Shank in Afghanistan,” session notes were edited to read that 
(s)he spent several months “in Afghanistan.” Similarly, no personally identifiable 
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information (e.g., names of self or other personal relations, unit identifiers, duty 
assignments) was transcribed, with the exception of participant rank, military 
occupational specialty (MOS), and length of service. 
Session notes, audio records, hard copy transcripts, demographics inventories, and 
signed consent forms were securely stored in locked filing cabinets at the Army Research 
Institute (ARI, Fort Belvoir).  Soft copy transcripts were stored as digital files on a 
Common Access Card (CAC) controlled government workstation at ARI, as well as a 
password-protected personal laptop.  Audio recorders and personal laptops were kept in a 
locked attaché when being transported or when otherwise not in use.  The personal laptop 
was limited to official business use until the data was removed (i.e., following final 
report). Only individuals listed as members of the research team and approved as such by 
a joint agreement of the Army Research Institute and University Institutional Review 
Boards were permitted access to data generated as a part of this research protocol. 
In an effort to allow participants the opportunity to direct the content of their 
responses, and thereby facilitate the emergence of a grounded theory, the researcher 
deemed it necessary to use a less direct title/purpose in the recruitment materials and 
semi-structured interview and focus group items. Specifically, the Army has invested 
substantial resources in building the resilience of individual Soldiers.  It is likely that 
Soldiers have some experience with the products of the Ready and Resilient Campaign 
(R2C, 2013).  The possibility for preconceived notions about what it means for an 
individual to be resilient to bias participant responses with respect to unit resilience 
needed to be minimized.  Thus, on all participant materials, the title of this study read 
“Understanding Factors Associated with Unit Adaptability”. 
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The procedures outlined herein were reviewed and approved by the ARI 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). The University IRB agreed to accept the ARI 
determination. 
Analysis 
 
GT follows a systematic, iterative data construction and analysis process.  Indeed, 
“data analysis is not viewed as the final stage of qualitative research but as part of a 
rotating cycle which can [identify gaps] for collecting new and better data and lead to 
reports and interpretations” (Yeh & Inman, 2007, p.385). Although there is generally 
more data construction at the beginning of a GT study and more analysis toward the end, 
it is not unusual for an additional brief data collection to fill in and flesh out the final 
model (Glaser, 1971).  Backman and Kyngas (1999) describe GT data analysis as a 
“discussion between the actual data, the created theory, the memos and the researcher. 
Such as discussion takes place when the data are broken down, conceptualized, and put 
back together in new ways” (p.149).  In GT, data analysis is accomplished through three 
phases of coding: open, axial, and selective (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
Open Coding.  In open coding, “data are broken into discrete parts, closely 
examined, compared for similarities and differences, and questions are asked about the 
phenomenon as reflected in the data.  We compare incident with incident as we go along 
so that similar phenomena can be given the same name” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p.63). 
At this initial stage of analysis, the data is reduced into manageable groupings of 
similarly coded content (Bowen, 2008). Open coding is usually performed line-by-line or 
phrase-by-phrase (Baran & Scott, 2010). 
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The data collection and transcription processes resulted in 1258 pages of text. 
 
Open-coding commenced with the first fully transcribed interview record and continued 
throughout the data collection process.  As a part of this process, one- or two-word 
thematic codes were developed to represent the content of portions of each text.  Often, 
portions of text were assigned more than one code.  These codes were compared with one 
another and refined as additional codes were developed and subsequent transcribed 
records became available.  An excerpt from an interview with one of the study 
participants is provided to demonstrate how open codes were assigned to data (See Figure 
4).  In this example, over fifty codes were used to describe thirteen lines of text; some 
codes were used more than once and some phrases were assigned multiple codes.  In 
total, five hundred sixty-seven (567) open codes were created to describe the data, and 
included themes as diverse as asking questions, helping others, job knowledge, rank, 
physical constraints, and resource management. 
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Figure 4. An example of open-coding using an excerpt from an interview.  The open 
codes used to describe this excerpt are located above the relevant text and identified using 
red font. 
 
Axial Coding.  In axial coding, “relationships among categories are organized and 
further explicated, grouping them into more encompassing (key) categories that subsume 
several (sub)categories” (Fassinger, 2005, p.160).   At this stage of analysis, the data is 
reassembled into meaningful categories.  The process requires the researcher compare 
each code with one another, and to consider how codes are (or are not) related to one 
another and to begin constructing categories.  Abstraction continues as categories are 
compared with one another. The researcher should interrogate each category by asking 
questions of “What?”, “When?”, “Where?”, “Why?”, “How?”, and “To what end?” 
(Wilson Scott & Howell, 2010).  Axial coding will help the researcher to identify gaps 
and inconsistencies in the data, subsequently guiding theoretical sampling.  Although 
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open and axial coding are two separate procedures, they often occur in tandem (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990, p.98). 
Open- and axial-coding occurred concurrently; while open coding continued for 
new material, previously developed codes were compared with one another and 
expanded, consolidated, or otherwise modified to ensure conceptual clarity. For 
example, the original open code safety was eventually split into multiple codes, 
differentiating between safety behaviors and safety as outcome. Safety as outcome was 
then combined with effectiveness, efficiency, and other codes to create the composite 
theme, outcome.  The constant comparison of existing and emerging themes (codes) drew 
attention to discrepancies and gaps and thus guided the nature of subsequent 
conversations with participants.  The insights provided by participants informed decisions 
to adjust codes.  For example, it was unclear whether open codes like brotherhood, bond, 
cohesion, and friendship should be combined to form a more inclusive code, unity. The 
use of qualitative data management software allowed for text from one transcript to be 
combined and stored with all other excerpts assigned the same code.  Given the number 
of open codes, this ability to sort and view text, regardless of source, by thematic code 
was instrumental in axial – and later, selective – coding process. 
Selective Coding.  In selective coding, “a core story is generated which is a brief 
narrative of the most important aspects of the data, subsuming all categories and 
articulating relationships” to the central phenomenon (Fassinger, 2005, p.161).  The 
process of selective coding is akin to that of axial coding, except that it requires a higher 
level of abstraction (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  Additional data is sometimes required at 
this stage to fully develop categories. 
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Once I was confident that the broad axial codes were sufficiently saturated 
 
(i.e., no new information was being collected) and distinguished from one another, I used 
selective coding to address each of the three primary research questions. For example, to 
describe the process of resilience (RQ2), I first identified a set of broadly defined 
activities (e.g., goal acceptance, monitoring, reflection) and compared them to one 
another for similarity in function or purpose.  Activities that served a similar function or 
purpose were then combined to form the primary phases of the resilience process.  For 
example, restoration and reflection were combined to describe the reset phase of the 
resilience process. 
Memos.  In addition to coding, GT relies heavily on memoing.  Memoing “occurs 
continually throughout the research process and provides a record of conceptual, 
procedural, and analytic questions and decisions. Memos capture the evolving ideas, 
assumptions, hunches, uncertainties, insights, feelings, and choices the researcher makes 
as a study is implemented and as a theory develops” (Fassinger, 2005, p.163).  Memos 
are kept as a part of the data set, and should be expanded upon as the analysis proceeds 
and the emerging theory begins to take shape. 
For this study, analysis followed the aforementioned coding and memoing 
processes.  QSR International’s NVivo 10.0 qualitative data analysis software was used 
to organize and manage the coding process (Richards, 1999). Data analysis began as 
soon as possible after a session was transcribed, so as to better direct subsequent 
sampling (Sbaraini et al., 2011). 
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Credibility and Trustworthiness 
 
Every effort was made to ensure the quality and credibility of the research and the 
resulting substantive theory.  In particular, GT lends itself to triangulation of 
methods/sources, peer debriefings, and member checks (Morrow, 2005; Yeh & Inman, 
2007). To ensure the rigor of this study, each of the aforementioned methods was used. 
Triangulation.  The study made use of multiple methods of data construction, 
across a range of sources. Each of these methods of data collection is likely to contribute 
unique information.   For example, while individual interviews may provide detailed 
accounts of a participant’s experiences, focus groups provide an opportunity for 
participants to interact with one another.   Indeed, “if focus groups are seen as a ‘social 
space’ where participants construct their experiences based on how the discussion 
evolves and how participants interact, then an additional layer of data may be obtained” 
(Lambert & Loiselle, 2008, p.229).  Thus, focus groups were used to explore and flesh 
out ideas as they emerged from individual interviews.  In addition, this study also relied 
on data collected from multiple viewpoints, probing the personal experiences of Soldiers, 
as well as others’ observations of unit performance (e.g., trainers, leaders).  These sources 
contributed unique perspectives with respect to unit resilience. 
Peer Debriefings.  Trustworthiness can be established through a two-pronged 
approach to evaluation of the research process (Yeh & Inman, 2007), in which a group of 
experienced researchers evaluate the coding process (conduct peer debriefings) and a 
separate group of researchers attend to the high-level methods employed in the study 
(conduct inquiry audits).  Peer researchers (i.e., Army research psychologists) 
independently reviewed and coded sections of transcripts.  These efforts identified 
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possible alternatives for codes, categories, and developing relationships.  Discrepancies 
were resolved through consensus. These evaluations helped to ensure that personal bias 
did not compromise the credibility of the processes used to build the substantive theory. 
“Thus, the findings, while accepted as the subjective knowledge of the researcher, will 
not be seen as merely a product of the researcher’s (observer’s) worldview or theoretical 
proclivities” (Bowen, 2009, p.307).  In addition, members of the Dissertation Committee 
were invited to review the processes used to collect, code, and assemble the data and to 
provide feedback regarding the rigor of the research decision process. 
Member Checks.  A substantive theory should resonate with participants.  Face 
validity can be demonstrated through a process called member checks, whereby actual or 
would-be participants have the opportunity to review the substantive theory to make 
certain it is a creditable and accurate account of their experiences.  Member checks also 
afford the researcher an opportunity to clarify aspects of the emerging theory, when 
necessary.  According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), member checks are “the most critical 
technique” (p.314) for ensuring the rigor of a qualitative study.  In this study, focus 
groups were used to explore themes that were emerging from individual interviews. 
Information received from member checks was documented, used to direct future 
sampling efforts, and incorporated into the theory (Yeh & Inman, 2007). 
Results 
 
The current study was designed to address three primary research questions. 
 
First, the experiences of members of small military units were used to inform the 
specification of each of the five key components of the expanded team resilience 
framework (RQ1).  In addition, qualitative analysis was used to describe the iterative 
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process of small unit resilience (RQ2).  Lastly, the resultant substantive theory was 
compared with the Army’s current conceptualization of psychological resilience (RQ3). 
Application of the Heuristic Approach (RQ1) 
The expanded team resilience framework introduced in this study calls for the 
specification of a set of five key components, representing who (of whom), what (to 
what), why (for what), when (at what time), and where (under what circumstances) of the 
phenomenon, and is intended to guide the rich contextualization of team resilience.  This 
foundational effort was designed to capture the breadth of participant experiences, and so 
these conditions were not specified a priori.  Rather, the application of the expanded 
framework to the present study has been treated as a research question, RQ1, and the 
specification of its components has been constructed through discussions with 
participants (RQ1a-e)
3
.  Each component of the framework is described in the following 
 
subsections. 
 
Resilience of what? (RQ1a) 
 
The first component of the expanded team resilience framework refers to the focal 
entity of interest, the team.  Recall that, by a widely accepted definition, teams are 
collectives working interdependently toward a (set of) common goal(s) (Salas et al., 
1992). Teams vary with respect to a number of factors, including the purpose/intended 
function of the team, number of team members, degree of collocation/distribution of team 
members, and relative permanence of team member tenure.  While the team is 
presumably the focal entity of any study of team resilience, these and other differences 
among various team work arrangements may affect the degree to which research findings 
 
 
3 
Throughout the Results section of this manuscript, citations for direct quotes correspond to unique 
participant numbers. 
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can generalize from one study (team) to another (other teams). Therefore, until there is 
consensus regarding the conceptualization of team resilience and the respective effects of 
team work arrangements have been established, efforts to understand team resilience 
should begin with a detailed description of precisely what is meant by the team when a 
study like this is conducted. 
Table 2. Overview of primary small units sampled 
 
 
Branch Small Unit # Members 
Air Defense Artillery Fire Control Crew 3 
Air Defense Artillery Launcher Crew 4 
Armor Abrams Tank Crew 4 
Aviation Apache Air Crew 2 
Aviation Black Hawk Aircrew 4+ 
Aviation Flight Crew 4+ 
Field Artillery Fire Support Team 2 
Field Artillery Gun Section 3-9 
Infantry Squad 9 
Infantry Team 4 
 
Herein, team refers to a bounded group of US Army Soldiers working together 
toward a (set of) shared functional goals (e.g., tasking, mission).  Participants were 
sampled from military occupational specialties (MOSs) within Combat Arms, as 
classified by the US Army Regimental System (USARS), and included members of small 
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units from Air Defense Artillery, Armor, Aviation, Field Artillery, and Infantry (See 
Table 2).  These small teams share the common, overarching mission of Combat Arms: to 
close with and destroy the enemy (P107). 
Resilience to what? (RQ1b) 
 
The second component of the expanded team resilience framework refers to the 
disruptor(s) of interest.  Herein, the term disruptor is used to refer to anything that has the 
potential to interrupt familiar routines or situations and thus affect – either directly or 
indirectly – team processes and team outcomes for some period of time. Due to the 
exploratory nature of the current study, specific disruptors were not identified or selected 
a priori. Rather, participants were asked to identify stimuli (e.g., conditions, events) that 
affect – positively or negatively – how team members work together. 
Table 3.  Example disruptors as a function of category 
 
Source Exemplar 
 
 
 
Individual distraction 
attitude 
Compositional turnover 
contagion 
Relational disrespect 
competition 
Structural procedure 
team norms 
Situational physical threat 
weather 
Temporal tenure 
time urgency 
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Participants identified over 200 disruptors.  Most disruptors can be characterized 
using broad labels such as: accountability, availability, change, competition, complexity, 
control, incompatibility, incompleteness, inconsistency, lack of fit, permanence, 
predictability, pressure, routine, safety, spillover, sufficiency, uncertainty, or 
violation/error.  Comparative analysis of the disruptors identified in the current study 
suggests disruptors can also be classified using six broad labels representing 
(See Table 3): characteristics and behavior of individual team members (individual 
disruptors), specific combination of team member characteristics and behaviors 
(compositional disruptors), interactions among team members (relational disruptors), 
context that directs team member roles and how work is performed (structural 
disruptors), elements of the environments (situational disruptors), and issues related to 
the passage of time (temporal disruptors). Each type of disruptor is described in the 
following subsections. 
Individual disruptors.  Individual disruptors refer to individual team member 
characteristics, behaviors, or experiences that have the potential to interrupt familiar 
routines or situations for some period of time.  Participants offered a number of examples 
of this type of disruptor, including distraction, lack of ability or effort, and negative 
affect.  Individual disruptors can affect – either directly or indirectly – team processes 
and team outcomes. 
Team members are simultaneously a part of other human systems.  For example, 
Figure 5 illustrates the simultaneous membership of a single target individual in three 
systems; a work team, a family, and a sports team.  External experiences can spill over 
into the work domain, affecting how individuals behave, think, and emote at work. 
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Participants described several instances where team member behaviors, cognitions, or 
emotions had an impact on teamwork and/or team outcomes.  An infantry non- 
commissioned officer (NCO) explained that spillover from other life domains can affect 
one’s attention and focus at work: "I can’t have any of my Soldiers with internal conflict 
or things that are bothering them.  Because your focus will always be split.  I don’t care 
who you are, you will split your focus to some degree and that detracts from your ability 
to focus on the task at hand” (P107). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Exemplary illustration of simultaneous small group membership 
External issues (e.g., divorce, financial problems) may affect interpersonal 
 
relationships and coordination at work.  A Soldier who is upset or preoccupied with a 
personal issue may be negative, become physically or verbally aggressive, or try to 
isolate himself from other team members.  In addition, a Soldier who is preoccupied or 
otherwise disengaged is unlikely to contribute his/her share to the collective effort. 
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Failure to fulfill one’s role can increase the demands placed upon other team members 
(e.g., increased workload) and/or shift valuable resources away from the team.  For 
example, a NCO from Field Artillery explained that the time he dedicates to address an 
individual team member’s issues or concerns is time he cannot spend addressing the 
needs of the larger group.  He found this particularly upsetting when he perceived no 
legitimate cause for the individual’s disengagement or that the individual was engaging in 
purposeful misbehavior.  He explained, these Soldiers may not “realize it is taking my 
time either away from my family or my Soldiers to write [a counseling statement].   If I 
make a Soldier show up fifteen minutes prior to work, I have to be there, too.  And it just 
builds up.  And it’s, like, to the point now, you get so many of those cases that you don’t 
have enough time to do your job as an NCO. You don’t have time to mentor the other 
Soldiers and teach them their actual job.  It’s ridiculous, in my opinion. I got more words 
for it, but I will be polite” (P082). 
In polite conversation, individuals who are disengaged from the team task for any 
reason may be referred to as “weak links”.  Some participants suggested that it is 
unrealistic to expect team members to remain focused on individual and team tasks at all 
times.  An infantryman explained that the assumption is, “You just do your job and stay 
in your lane and then everybody will have the desired outcome.  But it is not realistic.  It 
just isn’t.  Some days, you are going to be in The Zone.  You are going to be The Man. 
And you will be picking up everybody’s slack.  And then other days, [you  need] the 
help.  I have days where I am not feeling it, I am not in The Zone, I am not motivated ... 
And [I] need those guys to pick [me] up and pick up the slack" (P102). 
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Identifying as a part of a team can contribute to willingness to engage in helping 
or compensatory behavior.  As one Soldier from Field Artillery stated, “You’re a team, 
that’s how you look at it. ‘I got his back. He’s got mine’” (P057). But while some team 
members may be willing to compensate for a disengaged team member, others might see 
him as a liability and a threat to team cohesion or their own or others’ safety.  Indeed, an 
infantry NCO suggested, “What really makes people not cohesive when working together 
is when one person decides that they don’t need to do anything and will just stand there 
and watch and not help” (P119).  As one pilot declared, “If you’re not a functioning 
member of that cockpit then I don’t need you.  You’re going to kill somebody.  You’re 
going to kill me because I am in that cockpit with you.  If you’re not pulling your weight 
… I’m going to take us home and then I am going to make sure that I don’t fly with you 
anymore. I am going to make sure that you’re watching the radio. Two flights in a row 
and … I’m not going to fly with you” (P004). 
A Soldier may perform his task or cooperate with his teammates, but approach the 
effort with a negative attitude.  Many participants noted that a negative attitude could be 
detrimental to teamwork, and suggested that a negative attitude is contagious and can 
spread quickly through a team. An infantry NCO said: “This Soldier, all he does is put it 
down. He is negative all the time. He doesn’t want to be there. He doesn’t want to do 
this. He has something to say even when you are doing the fun stuff!  Always saying 
something, like, ‘This is stupid’ or ‘I don’t know why we are doing this …’  Now you got 
this Soldier, ‘I don’t know why we are doing this, this is stupid.’  And the next one, ‘I 
don’t know why we are doing this, this is stupid.’ And the next one … I mean, it can 
leave your team and jump to another platoon and hit somebody else.  That person could 
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poison the whole thing.  He could ruin the entire company. They will feed off of each 
other.  It is like a disease.  Ebola” (P120). 
Awareness of an individual team member’s personal issues can also cause 
distraction among other team members.  For example, an infantryman explained, “It 
sounds super cliché to say, but, you know, cheating spouses, financial difficulty … you 
try to help that guy out, but there is a certain self-projection into that problem.  Like, if a 
guy has his wife cheat on him, everybody is trying to help that guy – there is that level of 
empathy there – but in the back of their mind, ‘Is this happening to me?  Are there 
indicators that I should look for?’” (P109). 
Perhaps surprisingly, participants also indicated that even an engaged team 
member can become a liability.  A pilot explained how overconfidence in one’s abilities 
can become a problem for an aircrew: “You can get comfortable with the helicopter to 
the point where you are just like, ‘Oh, yeah, I am invincible with this.’  [But] if you try 
and demand too much, it will start to fall out of the sky. You can recover it, but it won’t 
be fun for the rest of the crew” (P030). 
Compositional disruptors.  Compositional disruptors refer to some collection of 
attributes among team members that has the potential to affect familiar routines or 
situations for some period of time.  Participants offered a number of examples of this type 
of disruptor, including the loss and replacement of team members.  Compositional 
disruptors can affect – either directly or indirectly – team processes and team outcomes. 
Changes in team membership can occur either expectedly or unexpectedly, as in 
cases of promotion and attrition, as well as health-related absences and loss.  Personnel 
shifts are especially prevalent in aviation.  A pilot explained that in an effort to ensure no 
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personnel exceed established limits for flight time and that all receive ample rest periods, 
individuals assigned to flight crews were frequently rotated, sometimes daily: “Rarely did 
I fly with the same person more than two times in a row.  I might fly with one person on a 
Monday and then fly with them again the following Monday, but usually, every day it 
was somebody different” (P027). While participants explained the frequency of changes 
to air and flight crew personnel were due, mostly, to restrictions on flight hours, 
shiftwork, and mandated rest periods, many indicated that battle rostering (i.e., pairing 
crew members together for extended periods of time) contributes to team member 
complacency.  Overfamiliarity with team members may lead to overreliance on one 
another and/or reduced vigilance. 
The loss, replacement, or gain of a team member can affect team processes as 
team members learn to renegotiate their roles and/or redistribute work demands. An 
NCO explained, “If somebody leaves, then the guys left back might just have to split 
whatever his work was” (P007).  A shift in team membership may leave team members 
struggling to recognize available resources and to make effective use of them in their 
strategies for managing the disruption.  In addition – and similar to individual 
disengagement, as described in the previous subsection – compositional disruptors can 
affect morale. The loss of life, in particular, impacts morale.  A NCO from Field 
Artillery explained, “If we’re overseas and – like, we’ve had deployment where some 
will get killed … that’s the biggest thing that is going to depress the guys.  That is going 
to bring everyone down.  I think every single guy is down at that point” (P085). 
Many participants suggested that newcomers are treated as outsiders until their 
proficiency level and/or value to the team has been sufficiently demonstrated to other 
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team members.  A pilot explained that a newcomer affects the workload of those who are 
a part of the crew, especially the more experienced pilot: “Well, like, say I’m in the 
backseat.  If it’s a new guy up front, we will try to coach him on things, like ‘Go check 
this out. Check this out. Go over here.’  If it is a more senior guy, someone that you 
have known for a while, you don’t have to say any of that.  You don’t have to work their 
cockpit as well as yours.  It takes some of the workload off.  If you are working with a 
real junior person, you feel like you have to manage both seats” (P032). Team members 
are likely to be skeptical of newcomers even when the newcomer has been fully trained 
and has past experience as a functioning member of another, similar small unit.  An 
infantryman recalled, "I moved to a different company.  They don’t know nothing about 
you.  They pretty much treat you like you are new.  You pretty much have to prove 
yourself and show that you know what your job is" (P101). 
Relational disruptors. Relational disruptors refer to team members’ interactions 
with one another and other persons not a part of the team that have the potential to affect 
interrupt familiar routines or situations for some period of time.  Participants offered a 
number of examples of this type of disruptor, including disrespect, conflict, competition, 
and perceived inequities.  Relational disruptors can affect – either directly or indirectly – 
team processes and team outcomes. 
Unit assignments are largely based on military occupational specialty (MOS). 
 
Each Soldier has a primary MOS (e.g., infantryman), the determination of which is based 
on a host of individual characteristics (e.g., ASVAB score), personal interests, and 
staffing needs.  Individuals perceive others of the same specialty as more similar to 
themselves than persons from other specialties. A NCO from Air Defense Artillery 
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explained, “Crews think that they are better than each other.  And then, no matter what 
crew you are on, you are going to say that you are the best” (P052). Perceptions of 
dissimilarity can incite disrespect, conflict, and/or competition – both within and between 
teams. 
A focus group composed of five infantrymen described a series of negative 
interactions with individuals from other occupational specialties while on deployment
4
. 
As one infantryman explained, “We have the dirtiest uniforms on the [Forward Operating 
Base].  So, when we walked around places, people knew, ‘This [expletive] at least 
works.’ And they don’t care.  The care level from the POGs that don’t do anything – 
they go around eating cake, playing basketball, while you are out [expletive] climbing 
Mt. XXX for three days … You come back and you see the smiles on these people’s 
faces.  You are out there busting your [expletive] and these people are inside, having fun, 
and then there is no respect for you …” (P113).  Negative interactions occurred, for 
example, at the chow hall and at the gym, when infantrymen who had just returned to the 
confines of the FOB, tired and hungry, or were about to go outside the wire and needed to 
use the facilities, were not given immediate access to those resources.   As one 
infantryman said, “I go to the gym and I can’t get a [expletive] bench press because 
[expletive] cook is working out. ‘Dude, I just got back from a three-day [expletive] 
mission. I want to [expletive] work out.  You do [expletive] nothing all day.  Give me this 
[expletive] bench.’  I think everyone has had that issue” (P112).  Indeed, the other 
Soldiers in the focus group nodded in affirmation and offered additional examples of 
ways in which others failed to respect their efforts.  One infantryman described how 
 
4 
Infantrymen were especially likely to self-identify as a select type of Soldier and to exaggerate differences 
between themselves and Soldiers from other branches (e.g., Aviation) and regimental divisions 
(e.g., Combat Support), referring to all non-infantrymen as “POGs” (people other than grunts). 
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living among other infantryman was different than living on a FOB where Soldiers from 
many MOSs were stationed: “We were on a [Company Operating Base]5 and it was one 
platoon rolled out, one platoon stayed in.  We had two platoons on our COB.  If we just 
got back from a mission, the other platoon that didn’t go out, they knew, ‘We are not 
getting in this [expletive] line’ or ‘we are not going to the gym until these guys get their 
[expletive] done.’ I don’t care how hungry I am.  If XXX just got back from a two-day 
mission, he is eating before me” (P115). 
Diversity and perceived dissimilarity within the small unit can cause problems, as 
well. For example, members of both Artillery branches pointed to perceived differences 
between the job functions of those assigned to monitor fire (e.g., Fire Control crew, Fire 
Support team) and those assigned to maintain or move the equipment (e.g., Launcher 
crew, gun section). The former were often perceived as being more intelligent, the latter 
as more physical.  As a Soldier from Field Artillery explained, the combination of MOSs 
can lead to “a lot of competition.  We’re [a specific MOS]; we hump these 100 pound 
rounds in the field. So, we kind of make fun of the [other MOS] – because all they do is 
push a button.  It’s a little joke that we have going on” (P057).  While humor and banter 
were offered in the course of other discussions as ways to build camaraderie, drawing 
salience to differences in job functions or personnel capabilities – even in gest – can have 
consequences for team dynamics.  A NCO from Air Defense Artillery recalled, “There 
shouldn’t be any, like, animosity between the squads. You know what I am saying? 
We’re a platoon.  It should be, ‘Oh wait, you need some help with something?  Hey, no 
problem.’ But down range, it really got to the point where, like, the competition … it 
 
 
 
5 
The personnel on this particular Company Operating Base [COB] were all infantrymen. 
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wasn’t even competition anymore, it was some crazy trash talk.  Literally, there would be 
times where we would be, like, at each other’s throats, ready to fight” (P052). 
Conflict between two team members can result in both – and potentially other – 
team members becoming distracted from the task at hand.  A trainer from the National 
Training Center explained, “Maybe one person did this and wasn’t supposed to do it this 
way.  So, you’ll start hearing the bickering between them. And then they are not even 
focused on what is going on.  They’re focused on each other. They’re bickering … which 
is causing frustration between them … which is causing inefficiency … which is 
spreading.  We know negativity spreads like a cancer.  It goes quickly throughout a group 
… just like a cold” (P002).  A member from Air Defense Artillery explained, “One 
individual would start with another, start a fight.  Next thing you know, the whole group 
doesn’t want to see each other” (P050). A pilot explained, “Sometimes it even spreads 
out further.  We have warrant officers in my company right now, they don’t get along – at 
all – and when those two are around each other, there is so much friction in the air you 
could cut it with a knife.  You can feel the tension. And it’s between those two and then 
everybody else feels it around them” (P021). A crew chief explained, “It’s just like any 
group of people that work together.  There is always going to be head butting situations 
where somebody thinks they are doing the right thing, but they really are not, and then 
somebody speaks up and it just kind of, you know, causes that big argument and all.  I 
have seen it a few times.  We try to minimize it.  Especially with us in the back, we’ll be 
like ‘Both of y’all are dumb, just shut up. He was right and you were wrong.’  We try to 
keep all of that kind of stuff minimized” (P031). 
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Team members share personal histories with one another. To the extent that these 
personal histories are grounded in similar contexts (e.g., deployment), individuals 
compare what they hear from other team members to what they have personally 
experienced.  For example, an infantryman explained that social comparison can lead to 
competition.  “The army is … winding down.  We pulled a lot of security [on the most 
recent deployment].  We weren’t kicking down doors or anything like that.  We were 
pulling security. And I guess the biggest part, for me, that I dealt with was hearing a lot 
of the older guys’ stories, ‘Oh, well, when I went, we were being bad ass and doing this 
and doing that.’ So, now I feel like little brother who is trying to live up to big brother’s, 
you know, football career.  You know what I mean?  Yeah, it’s just a competitive kind of 
thing” (P102). 
Perceptions of inequity, particularly in interactions between leaders and 
subordinates, can affect teamwork.  An Officer from Aviation explained, “It could be a 
violation of fraternization.  Let’s just say that a Company Commander is friends with 
another Lieutenant in another company but a huge jerk to everyone around him.  Really 
nice to that person.  Why are they nice to that person?  Is it a professional relationship? 
Well, they have drinks every Friday. That’s probably frat” (P037). Similarly, a NCO 
from Air Defense Artillery said, “You’ve got to be equal to everybody else. You can’t 
just treat him special because he’s your buddy. That’s the wrong thing to do” (P042). 
While disrespect, conflict, competition, and inequities can negatively impact 
teamwork, team members can also provide encouragement and support for one another – 
which can boost both individual task work and teamwork.  A NCO from Field Artillery 
reflected on how Basic Training taught him to value how team members can strengthen 
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one another: “I did everything to the best of my ability. And once you complete it, you 
think that you are done, but they are going to throw you back into the same thing and 
there is going to be more, and more, and more.  And they just wear you out.  Completely. 
And you think that you can’t go any further. And that’s where your partner on the left on 
and the right come into play. And they push you.  They can complete it … When you 
crawl for 300 yards, they haven’t hit muscle failure but you have, and you just want to 
say, ‘I quit.  I give up.’  The person to your right and your left is just going to say, ‘Keep 
pushing.  Just keep pushing.’   And that builds you up” (P082). 
Structural disruptors. Structural disruptors refer to aspects of the structure of the 
job itself that have the potential to interrupt familiar routines or situations for some period 
of time.  Participants identified several structural disruptors, including operating 
procedures/standards, norms, support systems, and command climate.  Structural 
disruptors can affect – either directly or indirectly – team processes and team outcomes. 
Team dynamics can be negatively affected when members must work together 
under high workload conditions.  Soldiers recounted many instances where team 
members who felt overworked became irritable or disengaged from their team members. 
Under these circumstances, team members may become careless and/or less likely to take 
on additional duties/responsibilities like providing help to a struggling team member.  For 
example, a Soldier from Air Defense Artillery explained, "When we are overworked, we 
are ready to go, we don’t really feel like doing anything extra, we don’t feel like going 
the extra mile at all, we don’t feel like being bothered with anybody. Being overworked 
affects our small group and our attitudes a lot. We all feel it. When we are overworked, 
we are like ‘What is the quickest way to do this?  I don’t care how it’s done, as long as 
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it’s done.’ ‘I don’t care how you get yours done, as long as I get mine done.’  It becomes 
selfish" (P074). 
Team members think, act, and feel in a common context and establish norms for 
team member behavior (Adler, 2013).  Because team members are exposed to similar 
demands, they may develop similar ways of evaluating and responding to demands. 
Embedded in these norms are expectations about how to behave under certain 
circumstances.  Team norms affect how teams perceive and manage potential disruptions 
(Orbist et al., 2010), as well as how teams ultimately evaluate success (Barrios, 2014).  A 
trainer from the National Training Center explained, “We’ve got one group that is highly 
motivated and the newcomers kind of just fall into step with the systems that are in place. 
And then we’ve got another group of unmotivated individuals and any incoming 
personnel that are introduced into that atmosphere, their motivation to perform quickly 
deteriorates” (P007). A strong sense of teamness among team members can make it 
difficult for new members.  This may be especially true when on deployment, where team 
members not only work together but also live in (sometimes very) close physical 
proximity to one another.  As a member of Air Defense Artillery explained, “When you 
deploy, that’s all you see every day.  That’s all you interact with every day.  You pretty 
much become really tight.  When new people come in, it is pretty hard to penetrate that 
little group” (P050).  For example, norms can affect how team members understand 
directives and communicate with one another. 
Teams can develop a shared language, deviations from which can affect how well 
team members understand one another. For example, a pilot recalled, “…best examples I 
could give you – it changed about six or seven years ago – before you went onto the 
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runway, you could just get on the runway and wait there to take off.  It used to be ‘Taxi 
position and hold.’ And then one day it changed to ‘Line up and wait.’ So, then, everyone 
is like, ‘Line up and wait?  What are they talking about?’  Tower is trying to get you to 
move, but you have no idea what they are talking about” (P029). 
Situational disruptors. Situational disruptors refer to external conditions that 
have the potential to interrupt familiar routines or situations for some period of time. 
Participants identified several such disruptors, including the experience of being in an 
unfamiliar place (particularly during deployment), extreme weather conditions, working 
in confined spaces, and threat of danger to self or others.  Situational disruptors can affect 
– either directly or indirectly – team processes and team outcomes. 
 
Participants identified several disruptors associated with being in the field – while 
either in training or on deployment – and the potential for situational disruptors to affect 
morale. For example, an NCO from Field Artillery explained, “And it is hard sometimes, 
because when you are in the field for three weeks and it is 110 degrees, you haven’t taken 
a shower in two weeks and you’re dirty and you’ve been away from home and family for 
that long, it is sometimes hard to keep people motivated” (P080).  Pilots explained that 
landing in dust or on unleveled terrain, at night with little or no illumination, in windy or 
harsh weather conditions is more difficult than landing in clear or on level terrain, on a 
clear day.  Reduced visibility can cause uncertainty. For example, one pilot explained, 
“Coming down to a [hot landing zone], you see windows and people who could possibly 
pull out an RPG and shoot you. You never know what is going to happen.  You can’t see 
everything” (P034). 
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Some environments require individuals to work very closely together, as in a tank 
where crewmembers may be confined together for weeks at a time.  Participants 
frequently commented on living arrangements overseas, while on deployment, which 
were associated with lack of privacy and limited personal space. An infantryman 
explained, “You get over the privacy thing, but personal space … Sometimes you just 
want to get away from people and there is nowhere to go. Where are you going to go? 
You can go to the [dining facility] and you go to the gym and you go to the USO, but at 
the end of the day, you are sleeping right next to a guy that you might like or you might 
have nothing in common with and he gets under your skin.  People have different habits 
and stuff.  Like, you know, one guy might be a really light sleeper and one guy might like 
to stay up all night on his iPad with his girlfriend … You get issues like that all the time” 
(P106). 
Temporal disruptors. Temporal disruptors refer to how time has the potential to 
affect interrupt familiar routines or situations.  Participants identified a number of 
different temporal disruptors, including downtime, waiting and delays, and time urgency. 
Temporal disruptors can affect – either directly or indirectly – team processes and team 
outcomes. 
Time spent not actively engaged in a task (e.g., waiting for a directive) can affect 
morale.  A tanker said, “If you let us sit too long, we get complacent. We get into the 
mindset, “OK, they forgot about us”" (P077).  Long durations of repetitive activity can 
also affect team member motivation and team morale. An Officer from Aviation said, 
“When you do the same exact thing in the same place for a year at a time, or any amount 
of time, really, it will eventually reach that point where it’s … not valued any more.  It’s 
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just ‘this is the same thing that we are doing every day.’ And it got old after about six or 
seven months, you are just at that point where you know exactly what is going to happen 
again tomorrow and it is the same thing, same issues, same problems, same things you 
have to problem-solve and work out every single day" (P035).  An NCO from Air 
Defense Artillery suggested morale can also be negatively affected by spending more 
time on a task than originally expected: “Yeah, like field training exercises where we are 
away from our families, friends, dogs, we set up as if we were deployed, we have to get 
our certifications, our equipment will break.  It affects our performance. We can fail and 
have to stay in the field longer. That can affect morale. Whether it’s having hot chow or 
coming back to take a shower” (P090). 
In addition, time is correlated with experience.  A trainer at the National Training 
Center talked about how teams that have not had ample opportunity to work together can 
struggle managing demands in the training environment.  “They come here to the 
culminating training event and they have a new staff, a new team.  It creates a lot of 
problems, where there is not a lot of trust among the individuals and the staffs and the 
commanders.  Because they haven’t worked together very long” (P006). Experience 
working together can affect teamwork and outcomes. 
Resilience for what? (RQ1c) 
 
The third component of the expanded team resilience framework refers to the 
outcome(s) of interest.  An outcome is the culmination of coordinated efforts that evolve 
over time; and thus, an outcome represents a meaningful emergent state.  Because teams 
are formed to accomplish specific goals, teamwork is purposeful and directed toward a 
(set of) specific end state(s).  Although teamwork is often evaluated in terms of 
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performance metrics, participants identified other important team outcomes, including: 
effectiveness, efficiency, improvement, readiness, safety, satisfaction, and unity. Each 
outcome is described in the following subsections. 
Effectiveness.  Effectiveness is concerned with goal accomplishment.  In the 
military, the criterion/ia for most taskings and missions is set as a standard. 
Effectiveness, then, is demonstrated by meeting or exceeding standard. As a member of 
Air Defense Artillery explained, success is determined by “… sometimes exceeding the 
standards and sometimes barely passing” (P050). 
Assessing performance in relation to a predetermined standard suggests that 
effectiveness is a dichotomous outcome: A team either meets standard (effective) or does 
not (not effective).  A trainer at the National Training Center explained that sometimes 
the goal is no fail, cannot fail.  A medical evacuation is a succeed/fail scenario, “because 
we have to get somebody to the hospital.  It has to happen or they are going to die” 
(P021).  On occasion, a directive can be broken into parts.  In these instances, a small unit 
can prove effective with respect to one (set of) subgoal(s) and not another.  The trainer 
explained, “We have tasks and within those tasks there are standards and you can fail to 
meet those standards.  Like, your hover height, plus or minus a foot. Or your drift, plus 
or minus … And we have evaluations all the time.  So, it’s not like one day you do it and 
then ‘you’re good’ and then the next day you do it, ‘you suck’. You’re proficient 
enough.  Or you try to be as proficient as possible” (P021). This description underscores 
that some variability in performance may be afforded the small unit and effectiveness 
may be judged with respect to a single outcome but also with respect to a general trend in 
performance over time.  However, comments framed in terms of “exceeding the 
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standards” suggest that stakeholders may assess effectiveness along a continuum and that, 
when compared to one another, a team can be more or less effective. 
The criterion/ia by which a small unit is assessed may change as a function of 
context and/or the person(s) making the assessment.  Leaders and other stakeholders 
(e.g., trainers), for example, can determine how strict they want to be with respect to 
meeting standards.  To the extent that teams are aware of the desired end state and the 
standards or criteria by which they will be evaluated, team members are often in a 
position to gauge their own effectiveness. 
Effectiveness (success) is generally perceived as a positive end state. However, in 
certain contexts (e.g., training), others may actively attempt to elicit small unit failure.  In 
training, for example, failure is seen as a driver of self-reflection.  When a small unit is 
not successful, they should endeavor to identify and recognize their own deficiencies. As 
a trainer at the National Training Center said, “… we wanted them to fail, because in 
order for them to get more feedback from us, we had to see where the deficiencies were” 
(P011). 
Efficiency.  Efficiency is concerned with time taken to accomplish a tasking or 
mission. A tanker explained, “In the Army, time is everything. You expect someone to 
move at a certain pace” (P075).  Small units that accomplish a tasking or mission within 
an expected timeframe are efficient.  However, some small units can deliver a product or 
accomplish a tasking much more quickly than their counterparts.  Therefore, efficiency, 
like effectiveness, can be conceptualized as both a dichotomous variable (efficient, not 
efficient) or as a point along some continuum. 
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Small units may not often be in a position to evaluate their own efficiency – or, at 
least, not directly.  Obviously, when a directive specifies a specific suspense or 
timeframe, small units are likely to know if they have met expectation. Otherwise, small 
units may estimate their own efficiency by making comparisons, either with their own 
previous performance or with the performance of other small units. However, the latter 
may yet prove difficult, as one pilot explained: “… because the companies are very 
segregated.  Unless we are doing those big scale training events, you won’t actually 
interact with or see the other companies that often.  But the senior leadership can see how 
much more efficient our company is at accomplishing things” (P028). 
Efficiency may be valued less than other performance-based outcomes.  A NCO 
from infantry explained, “You may have to tweak a strategy a little bit and it may not be 
as efficient, but it will still get done. And at the end of the day, the end result is really 
what you are looking for” (P116). In addition, efficiency is dependent upon effectiveness 
– a small unit can be effective, but not efficient; however, I found no evidence that a 
small unit could be efficient, but not effective. 
Improvement.  Improvement implies positive change over time – but not 
necessarily effectiveness (success) – with respect to some starting point.  The Army has a 
culture of continuous improvement and several participants said things like, “I think with 
anything there is always room for improvement” (P030). Trainers emphasize this 
outcome, as a trainer at the National Training Center explained: “It is ultimately about 
getting better and learning from your mistakes” (P006).  Unlike other team outcomes 
(e.g., effectiveness, efficiency), improvement may be in the eye of the rater.  Judgment 
and interpretation of improvement is likely more subjective than judgment and 
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interpretation of effectiveness, efficiency, safety – all of which are associated with some 
specific criterion or standard. 
Readiness.  Small units demonstrate readiness by having resources properly 
maintained and available, including team members being psychologically and physically 
fit for duty.   Similar to effectiveness, the Army has specific ways to evaluate and track 
unit readiness.  For example, a pilot explained how aviation units are evaluated with 
respect to operational readiness: “Once a year, we are supposed to do an aviation 
resource management inspection.  Basically, civilians and outsiders will come in and 
inspect the unit on how ready they are to go straight into combat.  It’s a really detailed 
inspection.  They go over everything that a unit is supposed to maintain and keep up with. 
A lot of it is safety.  Could be, like, personnel records.  They look at the flight operations 
department, make sure all of the flight hours are up to date.  They look at the 
maintenance records, make sure that all of the appropriate records are – the maintenance 
of the aircraft is up to date and complete, so that you know you are flying a safe aircraft” 
(P028).  Another pilot explained,  “We had twelve, thirteen aircraft and each one of them 
– like, how many hours they have available to fly in between  maintenance and stuff like 
that – like, when we have aircraft that breaks hard, how fast we got the aircraft back on – 
that kind of operational readiness for maintenance and aircrew” (P024). Some Soldiers 
felt that readiness put small units in a better position to prove effective. For example, a 
NCO from Field Artillery said, “As artillery men, if we can’t get from Point A to Point B, 
where, say, the gun is, and I don’t have enough guys to carry enough rounds from the 
bunker to the gun, and load it to shoot it in time. We can’t defend ourselves. Or we can’t 
defend other people that are going to be in the area where the bad guys are” (P082). 
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A small unit can be effective, accomplish a tasking or mission, and not be ready 
to take on the next directive.  Effectiveness is about whether or not a goal was met. But 
readiness is about whether or not prepared to work toward a goal.  A trainer from the 
National Training Center explained the difference between effectiveness and readiness 
“…in terms of ‘I didn’t accomplish my mission’ or ‘I did accomplish my mission’ and ‘I 
accomplished my mission but I have no combat power left.  I have to regenerate combat 
power for the next fight’” (P005). 
There is an attitudinal component to readiness. Motivation, the willingness to 
expend effort, is subsumed by readiness.  A trainer at the National Training Center said, 
“You can tell by their attitudes. They just don’t want to do anything anymore.  They just 
completely give up.  They say, ‘OK, we’re going to die, what do we care?’” (P013).  For 
this reason, psychological readiness may be more difficult to assess objectively. 
Safety. Safety is concerned with the protection and preservation of resources – 
human, equipment, etc.  Safety is most typically inferred through the absence of loss or 
damage to resources, but may also include improvements to well-being or functionality. 
Safety was regarded by many participants as the most important outcome, perhaps 
because of the nature of their work.  A trainer at the National Training Center said, 
“Safety … is paramount in everything that we do – or it should be” (P001). 
Satisfaction/morale.  Satisfaction is an attitudinal outcome concerned with 
subjective feelings of a job well done.  An infantryman explained, “When me and the rest 
of the mortar section go out for a training and actually get to shoot rounds and stuff like 
that … We are good at our job.  And that is what makes that day worth it and any day 
following it.  Being able to do the job and having a little fun, getting to practice a little 
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bit, that is what brings me closer to the rest of the guys”  (P111).  Of course, satisfaction 
can relate to both the result and also the processes followed to get there. Small unit 
members can be satisfied with end result but not with how the job was accomplished.  As 
a pilot explained, “I think that we bit off more than we could chew.  I mean, we were able 
to take care of everything in terms of mission and maintenance and everything. I would 
say [the struggle] really brings everyone down, it really takes everyone down” (P032). 
While there may be behavioral indicators others can use to infer satisfaction, the small 
unit is the best judge of its own morale just as the individual is in the position to judge his 
own satisfaction. 
Unity. Unit members can be satisfied with the work that was accomplished, and 
they can also have positive responses to the individuals with whom they work.  The 
Soldiers used different terms to talk about their relationships with unit members, like 
cohesion, bond, brotherhood, unity … and there are subtle differences in how these terms 
are used.  Unity is concerned with having a positive group identify, a feeling of 
belongingness.  Unity is about unit members not just wanting to do the job but wanting to 
do it together.  Unity affects willingness to provide support to team members.  Failure to 
achieve or loss of unity can lead to turnover and attrition.  For example, an Air Defense 
Artillery crew member said: “I’m getting out.  I can’t put my finger on it, but – I kind of 
feel almost a little betrayed by my unit” (P052).  Those who aren’t perceived as part of 
the team may be ostracized.  As a Field Artillery Sergeant said, “We have places for 
them. It’s called the gym, handing out towels.  And it’s called the command drivers. 
Head count. KP. That’s fine, if you don’t want to be part of the team, go over there and 
peel onions. And when your date is up, don’t come back” (P069). 
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Participants repeatedly indicated that unity was related to effectiveness.  A NCO 
from Field Artillery explained, “You want to build that bond, that family bond … you 
build that big bond and you are able to get the mission done and everything” (P081). 
Although unity is not required for effectiveness, it may boost effectiveness.  Another 
NCO from Field Artillery said, “I have seen people who didn’t like each other who still 
could understand that it was their job to perform, their personal issues didn’t go into the 
tank.  And they were able to push through it, in terms of switching it off and working 
together. But even then, I don’t think that they perform as well as a crew that is really, 
has a real sense of unity, or esprit de corps, of your platoon" (P080).  On the other hand, 
unity does not necessarily mean the team wants to do the job. Members can be happy as 
a collective but not be satisfied with the job or not collectively engaged with the job. 
Resilience at what time? (RQ1d) 
 
The fourth component of the expanded resilience framework refers to a focal 
period of time. Fluctuations in states can be measured in time – this can be a single, 
discrete measurement.  But conceptualizations of resilience as a process require multiple 
observations made over time.  With respect to teams, this can mean successive 
measurements are taken within a discrete performance episode or an outcome is 
measured over multiple performance episodes.   A trajectory represents the plotted values 
of these repeated measures.  Simple trajectories are conceptualized as a function of 
change (slope) between start and end points and simple trajectories can be combined in a 
number of ways to describe more complex temporal patterns. Participants identified four 
simple trajectories, including maintenance, growth, decay, and transformation. 
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Maintenance.  Maintenance is reflected by consistent performance (no change) 
over time.  A trainer from the National Training Center suggested, “Improvement is 
always good but I mean just being able to maintain – especially with the turnaround, with 
us moving around and things always changing, supplies and regulations always 
changing—not so much being perfect but maintaining it” (P014). A team can maintain 
performance levels below, at, or above standard.  For example, a team may continue to 
fail to meet standard over time. Another trainer from the National Training Center 
explained, “I have heard a lot about how, you know, some units will go out and do bad 
the first time, but each time they progress and do better. But then you hear some of these 
[other trainers] talking, ‘yeah this one Captain running his team, he just couldn’t seem to 
get it right’. And, you know, they just kept failing, time and time after time.  Never 
improved.” (P016). Therefore, maintenance is neither good nor bad in and of itself but, 
rather, must be assessed in terms of some specific criterion or set of criteria. 
Growth.  Growth/improvement is reflected by positive change over time.  A 
trainer from the National Training Center explained, “To leave here from being at this 
level <<hand gesture>> to being higher <<hand gesture>>” (P001). Teams can 
continue to grow or make progress without necessarily meeting standard.  An Officer 
from Aviation described the change in small unit behavior, “I didn’t fix them all the way, 
but I made them better” (P037).  Likewise, teams can continue to improve even after 
having met standard. A team that has improved with respect to some starting point may 
still not reach the point of being effective.  Therefore, similar to maintenance, growth is 
neither good nor bad in and of itself. 
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Decay.  Decay is reflected by negative change over time.  A pilot explained, “You 
can beat somebody down to the point that there is no way they could come back. Every 
unit will have its breaking point.  You can do so much to them that they are just going to 
be like, ‘forget it, we can’t do this right.  Every time we try to do something right, we 
can’t.’  I have seen units get tasked out so much that they just continually get beat up. 
They are just like, ‘you know what?  We don’t care’” (P021).  To the extent that team 
success can fall along some continuum (e.g., more or less effective, more or less 
efficient), decay is neither good nor bad in and of itself. 
Transformation.  Transformation is a change in state. Perhaps the best example 
is an aviation unit whose mission it is to fly medical evacuations. When the weather is 
severe, and it is unsafe for the pilots to fly the aircraft, then the pilots change their status 
to unavailable.  If the status were to remain available, the mission would fail – or, 
potentially, succeed but only after a very tumultuous flight.  But if the status changes, 
they are no longer working on the mission. Their state has changed.  Transformation is 
not easily mapped on an x-y axis and so is different from the other simple trajectories
6
. 
Complex Trajectories.  The simple trends can be combined to represent a 
multitude of complex trajectories.  For example, a team might experience decay after a 
period of maintenance – for example, in the case of burnout. The return to previous 
maintained levels of performance (commonly referred to as “recovery”) would require a 
third slope, growth.  Participants endorsed the notion of recovery.  As a crew member 
from Air Defense Artillery explained, “We have lots of multi-tasking. We tend to skip 
over something, which causes us to fail. But we just learn from that and just come back 
 
 
6 
The potential relevance of transformation with respect to team resilience is discussed with respect to 
Research Question 2. 
7 
Protective/promotive and risk/vulnerability factors that affect specific elements of the process of 
managing disruption will be discussed in relation to RQ2 and labeled “influential factors”. 
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and pass it” (P047).   A few participants suggested that the speed with which post-decay 
growth occurs may be important. A pilot said, “At some point, everybody experiences 
negative motivation and those that can recover from it quickly and figure out the system 
… will do better in the long run” (P027).  Indeed, post-decay growth can bring teams to 
new levels of performance, surpassing pre-decay levels.  A NCO from Field Artillery 
said, “… we are always able to regroup and come back stronger” (P085). 
Resilience under what circumstances? (RQ1e) 
 
The fifth component of the expanded team resilience framework refers to the 
circumstances under which the team will manage disruptor cues, disruptors, and/or 
disruptions.  The role of context was alluded to earlier when I discussed how certain 
outcomes may be more/less relevant in certain contexts (e.g., training vs. mission). 
Context is something that can be expected to change – for different types of teams, across 
different time periods.  The study of a relationship, for example between a specific 
disruptor and disruption or a disruption and an outcome, for a specific team is likely to be 
contextualized through the description of a very specific set of circumstances (which can 
be classified as either protective/promotive or risk/vulnerability factors, depending on 
whether their presence is associated with a boost or a dip in team outcome, respectively). 
However, a more general approach to the study of team resilience requires identification 
of a broad array of contexts which may affect the process of managing disruption.  For 
this reason, context is treated herein as that which affects the overall process of managing 
disruption, rather than a specific influential factor associated with that 
process
7
.Participants frequently made comparisons based on the following contexts: Big 
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Army goals, the interpretation and enforcement of standards, and the Army Force 
Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle
8
. 
Big Army goals.  The Army’s major objectives change over time, which can 
affect operational tempo (OPTEMPO), as well as personnel and staffing needs.  For 
example, participants contrasted experiences during the surge with those of the current 
draw down. During the surge, the Army needed a lot of personnel to fill roles.  During 
the current draw down, the Army has fewer roles to fill and thus needs to remove 
personnel. The change in Big Army goals has had an effect on team dynamics, 
particularly in terms of unity and sense of teamness.  "With deployments winding down, 
the Army winding down on Soldiers, they are looking for any little reason to push people 
out.  And it pretty much keeps you on your toes – but in a negative way.  I don’t know 
about these guys, but personally, that’s just not how I want to spend my career" (P111). 
Big Army goals adjust as a function of changes in threat and/or the nature of the 
enemy.  For example, a trainer from the National Training Center (NTC) said: “When I 
first joined we were gearing up, still, to fight the Russians and cold war.  And then 9-11 
occurred and the Army and everything totally and completely changed.  Well, they are 
totally different fights.  Gearing up to fight a conventional military opponent versus an 
insurgent opponent?  Different skills for those fights.  Well, now after ten years, we’re 
geared up, we’re good now.  We are [great] at fighting insurgency and training and 
gearing up for it. Well, now we’ve come to the pendulum is trying to come back, swing 
back the other way and we’re trying as an Army to find that happy medium between the 
two and that’s why we actually call the current threat environment that we are supposed 
 
 
8 
Participants also speculated about differences between branches (e.g., aviation, infantry), but too few 
could speak from experience, thus not discussed here. 
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to replicate here at NTC a ‘hybrid threat.’  We are basically, supposed to be able to fight, 
simultaneously, the Russian cold war army and Al Qaeda.  At the same time.  So, we 
don’t lose all of those hard fought skills and experiences that took a lot of blood and 
sweat to earn that experience … but at the same time we remember how to fight the 
conventional military.  So that way, if the call does ever come – which God willing it 
never does –we are able to fight that kind of conflict” (P010). 
Standards: interpretation and personal preference.  Standards are guides for 
evaluating outcomes, but can be affected by personal preference (of leader, of team) and 
opportunity/room for interpretation (gray areas).  The differences in how standards are 
interpreted and/or enforced create a salient context. A NCO from Field Artillery said, 
"We all have this mindset that if you do everything correctly, you don’t have to worry 
about getting in trouble" (P081).  Unfortunately, what is considered professional 
behavior may vary by leadership or as a function of job assignment or locality. Another 
NCO from Field Artillery explained, “Depending on who you talk to, you might get four 
different answers on, ‘I’m having some Soldiers over, we are going to do some team 
building, we’re going to have some beers, is that OK?’ One senior NCO will tell you, 
‘As long as they don’t drink and drive, absolutely.’  Another NCO will tell you, ‘Is 
everybody involved?  Are you only selecting certain people?  If you are only selecting 
certain people, that’s not OK.’  Another NCO will tell you, ‘Well, if there is alcohol 
involved, you can’t do it.’ And someone else will tell you something that is, maybe, a 
mix." (P086).  A NCO from infantry said: “I hold my guys to a different caliber.  I hold 
my platoon to higher standards than the rest of the company … whether that was 
uniforms, PT, family time … I wanted to instill what I learned as a private into them so 
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that they could maybe go further than I did or become better Soldiers than what I have 
been seeing in the regular Army.  It is hard, because they will be like ‘Why are we doing 
this when everybody else isn’t doing it?’” (P108). 
A tanker explained how everything in a tank is generally positioned the same way 
and everyone is generally trained the same way, but there can still be problems when 
someone new is placed in a crew. For example, “pull someone from another crew who is 
not used to the way that you work. And then what they are used to, what their boss or 
tank commander or gunner, whatever it may be, or even the loader and driver, they do 
something differently and they make a mistake or do it that way, you could hurt 
somebody” (P075). 
Deployment cycle (Army Force Generation, ARFORGEN).  Units move 
through stages of a deployment cycle, currently the ARFORGEN cycle, which includes 
training, deployment, and reset.  When combat Soldiers are not deployed to combat zones 
(e.g., in garrison) or are not actively engaged in training, they are less likely to perform 
duties and tasks associated with the job for which they were hired.  Soldiers reported that 
professional distance was relaxed, to some degree, while on deployment.  For example, 
Soldiers are able to approach higher leadership directly, rather than through strictly 
following the chain of command.  The rules for uniforms are more lenient.  But, as a 
tanker explained, the work is “more rigorous. You get less sleep, you work harder.  No 
days off" (P075).  While deployed, the job becomes more serious under the threat of 
danger. A member of Field Artillery said, “When you go on deployment, it’s you and 
your guys and you could possibly die together. When you are [in garrison], you’re still 
doing your job, it still counts, and you still have to do it the same way that you would if 
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you were on deployment, but that’s not there … You always have ‘I could still go home 
and drink a beer’ in your head” (P060).  A Specialist from Air Defense Artillery 
suggested, “when you deploy, you depend on each other a lot more. So, you gain 
camaraderie.  In garrison, it’s just that everyone is doing their own thing” (P043). Of 
course, garrison, training, and deployment are broad terms and individual experiences 
vary considerably. As one infantryman said, “Every deployment is different for 
everybody.  We were in the same company, different platoons.  But we had completely 
different mission sets and we did two totally opposite things” (P121). 
Concluding Remarks about the Team Resilience Framework 
 
The team resilience framework is a heuristic approach that can be used to convey 
the key components of a particular conceptualization of team resilience. Figure 6 
illustrates the application of this framework to the current study. Comparisons between 
the components addressed herein and those of other studies can facilitate the synthesis of 
team resilience research. 
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Figure 6.  Key components in present application of Expanded Team Resilience 
Framework 
The small military units sampled herein ranged in size from 2 members to 9 
members and were nested in a multi-team system (e.g., aircrew as a part of a flight, tank 
crew as a part of a section). Participants emphasized the necessity for division of labor 
across the specialized roles in each small unit, rendering members’ roles inherently 
interdependent.  The emphasis on interdependence was made explicit in comments from 
each of the five branches. For example, a NCO from Air Defense Artillery said, “The 
Army teaches us to work together.  If one fails, we all fail.  If one fails, the whole crew 
fails” (P047). An Officer from Armor underscored the importance of working together 
with other members in one’s small unit, stating that when a crew member is not 
performing his role, he is “putting everybody else at risk.  If you are deployed, you are 
doing it for your battle buddies.  Because if you are not doing your job, then you are 
putting them at harm; letting them down.  You are not upholding your end.  And in the 
Army, that is a crazy big deal" (P080).  Indeed, team resilience may be particularly 
critical in small military units, because team members have so much interaction with and 
impact upon one another.  A NCO from Field Artillery commented, “When you are 
talking about a small group of guys, a small group of Soldiers of ten or less, the 
individual Soldiers in there have a huge impact on all the other individuals” (P065). 
Membership in small military units is dynamic.  Participants indicated that small 
unit membership does (and is expected to) change over time – particularly as Soldiers 
transfer duty stations, are promoted or separate from the Army, are absent due to 
loss/injury/illness, engage in temporary collateral duty assignments, and/or pursue 
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individual or small group training/certification.  An infantryman noted, “You will have 
this constant flow of changing people around you and you will never really see the same 
people around you for too long" (P101). 
The application of the Expanded Team Resilience Framework to this study guided 
the rich description of the types of disruptors experienced by small units and suggests a 
potential method for classifying disruptors according to one of six sources (e.g., 
individual disruptors, situational disruptors).  The disruptors identified herein should not 
be considered an exhaustive list. Disruptors can present themselves simultaneously or in 
close temporal proximity and so it may be difficult to assign a single disruptor to a 
particular disruption.  For example, is it the lack of personal space or dissimilarities in 
nighttime rituals that affect team dynamics while on deployment?  Although the 
classification system presented herein was derived logically from participants’ recalled 
experiences, the classification system requires validation. 
Most of the disruptors identified by participants were associated with negative 
effects for the team.  But a single disruptor might prove either positive or negative, 
depending on other circumstances.  The same disruptor can be energizing for one group 
of Soldiers and disconcerting for another.  For example, infantrymen are likely to expect 
to have kinetic deployments – after all, they train to engage the enemy directly, often in 
very close physical proximity.  Soldiers may expect to be placed in dangerous situations 
and to have to defend themselves and their peers from an enemy. As one infantryman 
recalled, “My last deployment, we actually did things – like, combat wise – and the stress 
level was lower … if that makes sense.  When you get into a firefight or you are out there 
doing stuff, adrenaline kicks in” (P113).  This was contrasted with a more recent 
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deployment experience, where an infantry unit spent a lot of time pulling security, 
“staring at a T-wall all day.  Just sitting in a big armored vehicle with all of your tactical 
equipment on, sweating your butt off for, like, twelve hours.  I thought it was going to be 
more, like, direct fighting with the enemy. But really it was just, like, security” (P110). 
Another infantryman confirmed, “Yeah, it came to the point where we was just sitting in 
the tower, like, ‘We want somebody to shoot at us’” (P112).  Another infantryman 
added: “You expect to get shot at when you go there.  You are going to war.  You want to 
get shot at.  You want a fight. Cook wants to stay on the FOB and watch TV or play 
‘Call of Duty’” (P114).  These comments suggest that personnel from Combat Arms may 
expect to engage the enemy directly and, at least from their point-of-view, this 
expectation may not be shared among personnel hailing from other Regimental Divisions, 
like Combat Service Support (e.g., cooks).  Likewise, remaining in the relative safety of 
the FOB might prove demoralizing for one group of Soldiers and comforting to another. 
These results challenge the assumption that all disruptors will result in negative 
consequences for a small unit. 
Teamwork is goal-directed, thus the outcomes identified herein are a reflection of 
purposeful collective affect, behavior, and thoughts and reflect desired states. 
Participants identified seven team outcomes: effectiveness, efficiency, improvement, 
readiness, safety, satisfaction, and unity.  A team that achieves one outcome may be more 
likely to achieve another outcome.  For example, satisfaction and effectiveness are related 
to one another. A tanker suggested, “The job will go smoothly, get done, it will be a 
good day” (P074). A member of Air Defense Artillery similarly explained, “If 
everything is going well, our morale is just always up. That keeps the morale up. There 
103  
is nothing negative or anyone that has morale down and feels like they don’t want to be 
there.  Everyone’s morale is up, we’re having fun, it gives us more of the chain of 
command off our backs if our morale is up and we’re doing the right thing” (P047).  On 
the other hand, the achievement of one outcome may conflict with the achievement of 
another outcome.  For example, safety and effectiveness do not always align with one 
another: “Safety is a good thing.  But safety has a point when it goes too far and affects 
our ability to accomplish things. Doing maintenance out on the fly line, we had two 
people go down due to heat exhaustion because they couldn’t take their top off. 
[Leadership was] more concerned about them getting burned.  So, it’s 110 degrees 
outside, you’re in long sleeves, long pants and can’t do anything about it” (P032).  A 
NCO from Air Defense Artillery said, “I don’t know, in the heat of battle … I mean, if 
missiles are coming in, I am not going to be, like, ‘Hey man, make sure you put on all 
three points of contact.  I know we have a missile coming in, but, seriously, where are 
your gloves?’” (P052). 
Performance-based outcomes like effectiveness, efficiency, (aspects of) readiness, 
and safety can be assessed using objective, predetermined metrics.  Attitudinal outcomes 
like (aspects of) readiness, satisfaction and unity are more complex; for example, one 
cannot simply meet x-number of standards and necessarily be satisfied.  Attitudinal states 
may be inferred via behavioral indicators.  The evaluation of success may also depend on 
the level (scale?) at which evaluating – the team can be successful, but the individual may 
not be (or vice versa).  In addition, different stakeholders may have different – even 
conflicting – criteria for determining success.  For example, in training, a team wants to 
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be as successful as possible, but trainer wants to them to improve, which may mean they 
have to stumble a bit in order to learn their own weaknesses and limits. 
Team processes and outcomes can be observed over time and plotted as response 
trajectories. The results herein suggest a set of simple trajectories that can be combined to 
form more complex trajectories. Although participants endorsed each of the 
aforementioned trajectories, it remains unclear whether or under what circumstances each 
trajectory should be classified as representing the process of team resilience.  In addition, 
I was unable to ascertain timing associated with trajectory changes (i.e., slope changes 
associated with complex trajectories).  Longitudinal studies can help to elucidate the 
continued relevance of these and other trajectories to the study of team resilience. 
Resilience trajectories are perhaps indicative of various processes for managing 
disruption.  Indeed, team members make many diverse contributions to the coordinated 
effort, and these can be arranged in any number of combinations, resulting in multiple 
paths that can lead to an outcome.  Team processes and emergent states (outcomes) 
should be expected to vary over time (Henning et al., 2014). A focus on outcomes alone 
does not illuminate the process(es) responsible for observed fluctuations in those 
outcomes over time. 
And finally, the framework encourages the articulation of the context in which 
teamwork occurs.  The primary contexts discussed herein (Big Army goals, standards, 
and ARFORGEN cycle) are distinct from contextual disruptors in that a given context 
may make certain disruptors more likely than others. Although three primary contexts 
have been identified, it is likely that others will emerge through continued research.  The 
identification of broad contexts that describe the circumstances in which team processes 
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occur can help to identify potential moderators of the disruptor-disruption relationships 
relevant to the process of team resilience.  Indeed, according to participants, context can 
affect a broad range of experiences, including what a small unit focuses on, what a small 
unit is exposed to, how a small unit perceives demands and resources, how a small unit 
copes, how members of a small unit interact with one another and external others, and 
how small units manage their time.  For example, several participants indicated that 
although the work was harder while deployed, it was focused.  In garrison, however, 
there is not an enemy to defend against and so other types of taskings can get assigned to 
a small unit.  According to participants, these extraneous tasks can add up, causing 
Soldiers and small units to work longer hours.  A member from Aviation said, “Rather 
than getting home at six o’clock, you get home at nine o’clock. And then it starts all over 
again. So, psychologically, it almost feels more stressful than when you are just 
deployed" (P027). 
Other broad contexts are also likely to be relevant.  For example, participants also 
frequently mentioned differences across branches (e.g., infantryman vs. cook). Branch 
was not formally included as a context in the current theory because few participants 
were able to speak from personal experience working in more than one branch. One 
pilot, who was a former infantryman, recalled: "My first six years in the Army were in 
infantry.  I have been a vehicle commander in Humvees and vehicle crews which worked 
almost identical to the aircrew except it was very much harsher in a vehicle crew.  As 
pilots, we … strive to make sure that the aircrews, the crew chiefs stay comfortable with 
what is going on, that they feel free that they can talk if something is going on, they don’t 
have a fear of reprisal for saying something … the big thing is, we don’t want them, 
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when something should be said, not to say it.  For any reason.  The rest of the military? 
Like, when I was a sergeant, if my driver or gunner said something like that to me, I 
would have just started cussing about it, told them to shut up and do their job.  But now 
that I am in an aircraft, you know, we try to encourage so much that even the private who 
has been in the army for six months can tell me – who has been flying for so long, been in 
the Army for so long – ‘Hey, Sir, you’re coming in too fast, you need to slow it down a 
bit.’  It’s so polar opposite from being on the ground" (P029). 
In conclusion, the utility of the framework for guiding rich descriptions of the 
team work arrangement has been demonstrated through the current application.  The 
framework can be used to articulate relationships of interest as they apply to team 
resilience (e.g., classification of disruptors). The framework is likely to provide 
sufficient guidance for conceptualizing resilience as a capacity (global team property), 
given the framework encourages specification of circumstances which could be 
interpreted more narrowly as the identification of promotive/protective and/or 
risk/vulnerability factors.  However, the framework does not provide guidance for 
describing how teams manage disruption (process) or how teams become resilient 
(emergent state). 
Description of the Process of Managing Cues, Disruptors, and Disruptions (RQ2) 
 
The goals of RQ2 are to describe the primary phases and associated elements of 
the process of managing disruption and identify factors that affect (promote or inhibit) 
these elements.  Recall that resilience is operationalized herein as a general (non-specific) 
collective process of managing disruption that consists of five primary phases: selection, 
mobilization, detection, determination [adjustment, as necessary,] and reset.  Each 
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primary phase is described in the following subsections, and includes a description of 
associated elements and influential factors. 
Phase 1of the Team Resilience Process: 
Specification and Acceptance of a Shared Directive 
Team members, by definition, coordinate efforts to work toward a shared goal. 
 
Team resilience, then, must necessarily begin within the context of goal-directed, 
purposeful behavior.  In both interviews and focus groups, shared goals emerged as 
fundamental to teamwork.  The importance of grounding the resilience process with 
shared goals was made explicit in comments, such as that offered by a NCO from Air 
Defense Artillery: "If everybody has got the same mutual goal, and you are having issues 
with getting to that goal, then there are going to be steps taken to get to that goal and you 
are going to have your ups and downs within the group.  It’s just like with an individual. 
Every time you try to reach a goal, it’s not always going to go perfect.  You are going to 
have to adjust for that.  The group is going to be the same thing … It’s gotta be 
something that the whole group, every person in the group, actually wants" (P089). 
In the Army, taskings and missions are generally directed or delegated by 
leadership and are not self-initiated.  Participants offered few instances as examples of 
self-initiated goals.  Examples included (re)organizing common workspace and/or 
electing to participate in a drill or other training to fill downtime or white space on a 
calendar.  To the extent that the designated leader of the small group, usually a sergeant, 
is afforded the opportunity to exercise his best judgment with respect to use of downtime, 
these goals can be considered self-initiated.  However, it is more likely that teams are 
simply accustomed to spending downtime or filling white space with activities that have 
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been pre-authorized or suggested by higher leadership.  Even those activities that were 
offered as exceptions to leadership-driven goals, while self-initiated, are unlikely to be 
self-identified.  Thus, the term directive, rather than goal, is used to articulate this initial 
phase of the process of team resilience. 
The Army has procedures for introducing directives to Soldiers.  Broad team 
goals can be communicated to new team members during in-processing.  These goals are 
described as "expectations.  What we want from them and what we will ask from them, 
what we will be asking of them.  You know, physically, mentally" (P082).  More specific 
team directives may be communicated through mission briefs and typically requires the 
assembly of all team members at one time.  A trainer from the National Training Center 
explained, “[The brief] effects my team – whether they are going to do their mission on 
time, whether they are going to check in on time … I mean everything has a timeline and 
there’s a reason why we do it. ‘I got to take off at this time to be here at this time on this 
frequency at this place because he needs me to go look at this’” (P004). 
In addition, there are often specific standard operating procedures (SOPs) that 
should be followed while working on a tasking or mission. "Let’s use the aircraft as the 
example. We have work packages that tell you exactly how a certain task or a certain 
maintenance procedure needs to be performed.  And it is very step-by-step, with pictures, 
words … hard to mess it up. Some tasks are bigger than others, some aircraft need 
multiple ones.  So, something that has directions like that and is very cut and dry, I can 
give that to some very new junior leader, and be like, ‘Hey, I’m giving you these guys. 
This tasks needs to be performed on this aircraft.  Manage your time. Here’s your left 
and right limits.  You have three hours to accomplish this.’  And that’s very basic.  Now 
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there are going to be other things, say, ‘We have inclement weather coming in and I need 
you to grab the guys and push the aircraft in and figure out a way to make them all fit into 
the hangar’ or ‘I need you to figure out how to set up a [Land Navigation Range] – even 
though you have never done it.’  And there are going to be guys, like, ‘I’ve never done 
this before, it isn’t something out of a manual that is, like, step by step.’  And that’s 
another development: Problem-solving skills" (P023). Not everything can be captured in 
an SOP and to some extent, directives are given to those individuals and those teams 
perceived by leadership to be capable of handling them.  Ideally, junior personnel receive 
directives with specific SOPs, while more experienced personnel receive directives with 
some degree of ambiguity or flexibility. 
When faced with long-term or complex goals, teams may benefit from setting 
shorter-term or simpler, interim goals.  According to participants, approaching goals 
incrementally can sustain motivation.  As an infantry NCO explained, "There is a process 
to get there.  If it is the PT test or shooting or a ruck march, whatever it is, just be two 
seconds better, be two seconds faster, be one shot better. And then six months from now, 
you are going to see this huge change. You want to go from, you know, an eighteen 
minute two-mile to a ten minute two-mile tomorrow … [but] it takes time, effort, and 
work" (P105). 
Elements: Specification, Acceptance, and Sharedness. Three elements emerged 
as particularly important to the initial phase of the team resilience process: specification 
(understanding), acceptance (buy in), and sharedness.  Directives need to be sufficiently 
described to afford team members an understanding of what they are being asked to do. 
A trainer from the National Training Center explained when directives are clear and 
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explicit, “Everybody knows where they fit, what they’re part in this place is … You don’t 
have to have every single detail out, but you have to have the general who, what, when, 
where, why” (P017).  Participants noted that having an identifiable end state, can sustain 
engagement and perseverance.  For example, an infantryman explained, "I know for me, 
if I have a full workload, if everything is ‘This is what you got to do. This is what you got 
to do. This is what you got to do. And you are done.’  I will be working all day.  I’ll be 
digging that ditch all day.  If I know that once that ditch is dug, I’ll be done" (P102). 
Work can proceed without a specific goal, but as an NCO from infantry explained, “if 
things are kind of ambiguous and not real clear as to what it is, people are less apt to do 
it. They don’t know what the end result is or they don’t k now what they are really doing. 
That clear and concise is definitely a part of it.  But if it’s ambiguous and no one knows 
what is going on, it’s going to be a long day for everybody” (P116).  In addition, 
participants indicated that directives need to be accepted and shared. A tanker explained, 
“If everyone on the team is on the same page and working toward the same goal, then 
generally you will all be … you know, of the right mindset" (P079). 
Influential Factors.  Several factors emerged as important to this phase of the 
resilience process, including: purpose, communication content and framing, leadership, 
team cohesion, individual motives, and the specifics of the task itself.  Communicating 
the reason for the directive can facilitate understanding. Small unit leaders suggested that 
failure to understand the purpose of a directive can lead to Soldiers questioning the 
validity of the tasking or mission.  For example, a member of Aviation asked, “Why are 
we doing it?  Why are we going outside the wire, risking our lives for a mission that 
doesn’t seem like it is helping anyone in the country, doesn’t seem like it is helping us, 
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doesn’t seem like it is protecting anyone … It sounds like we are just out here, burning 
fuel” (P036). These questions can lead to disengagement, demoralization 
(dissatisfaction), and reduced effectiveness.  However, as an NCO from Air Defense 
Artillery suggested, “…if you show them why they are doing it, they are going to do so 
much better.  You can have them pulling weeds out of rocks.  If they don’t know why 
they are pulling weeds out of rocks, they are going to kick some rocks over the weeds.  If 
they know that they are doing it for a specific reason, like to keep the rats or the bugs out 
of the barracks, they are going to make certain that they get every one – because they 
don’t want bugs or rats.  I mean, it is all about painting that big picture for them and 
letting them see, ‘We are doing this for a reason, we are not just trying to waste your 
time’” (P096). 
How the directive and its purpose are communicated can also influence the degree 
to which directives are understood, accepted, and/or shared. Communication includes the 
source, quality, timing, and framing of a directive.  The source and quality of information 
communicated can affect the degree to which a goal is internalized by team members.  A 
NCO from infantry explained, “There is a lot of, ‘I heard this from so and so. What is 
going on?’ There is no clear line of communication from top down and it seems like that 
piece of the puzzle is not there.  And other pieces, like information is going somewhere 
else and we kind of hear it from the left and the right” (P119).  The timing of the directive 
is also important.  An infantryman said, “Not to mention they wait until the last minute to 
tell you to get something done … in, like, an hour.  You have been sitting there all day 
and now they come in with something” (P112). Similarly, the way in which a directive is 
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framed is important.  Another NCO from Infantry explained, “If you present it as 
something that is urgent and needs to be done, then usually it will get done” (P118). 
Leadership can affect the degree to which goals are understood, accepted, and/or 
shared.  Leadership, here, subsumes themes like approachability, leader presence, and 
mutual respect.  A trainer from the National Training Center said, “I personally think 
75% of a unit’s performance is based on its command climate.  The Soldiers are all 
trained roughly the same.  We all do the same type of stuff.  We all know what right kind 
of looks like.  Great units have that … it’s an open dialogue and they can bring up issues, 
discuss fixes at different echelons and are allowed to take the initiative and are not stifled 
...” (P004). A leader can create a climate within which small unit members feel 
comfortable approaching him or her with questions, concerns, or other news.  For 
example, a crew chief from Aviation explained, “Before we go out, we all sit in these big 
rooms and we talk about these things.  We talk about it amongst ourselves and then we go 
to the aircraft and that crew talks about everything. And the person in charge, which is 
usually the Pilot in Command, he says, ‘Look guys, if at any time you feel 
uncomfortable, bring it up, say something, immediately.  If I am doing something wrong, 
say something, immediately.  If you are catching something that we are not catching, say 
something, immediately.’  So, it is definitely across the board, no matter rank, no matter 
how many hours you have in the aircraft, no matter how many missions you have gone 
on, it is ‘Say something.’  Always” (P025). Alternately, a leader can create a climate in 
which asking questions and/or offering suggestions is frowned upon. 
Leader presence affects acceptance. Many participants suggested that team 
members are more likely to respect their leadership and to remain engaged in a tasking if 
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their formal leader is willing to work alongside them. A NCO from Infantry said, “Team 
leaders should be right next to their guys, doing the same work, doing the same amount 
of guard and patrol … carrying the same amount of weight as them … and doing it better, 
because they are the leader, they are the Sergeant” (P116). 
Individual motives and expectations can affect whether directives are understood, 
accepted, and/or shared.  An NCO from Infantry explained, “As infantry guys, they are ‘I 
want to get in a fight.  I want those stories that Sgt XXX had.’  I try to explain to them, 
typically those stories are followed by: ‘That was the day that Sgt XXX got killed.’ Or 
that is the day that we put XXX on the bird and he got shot.’ Those parts of the stories 
are the parts that you don’t forget. The stuff you are talking about, people leave the ‘but’ 
out of it …  I was there ten years ago, as a private.  I was like, ‘I want to go win the war. 
I want to be like all the cool movies.  I want to be that guy’" (P105). Some participants 
suggested that team members need to share a larger purpose, a reason for being a part of 
the Army to begin with. For example, an NCO from Air Defense Artillery said, “I can 
tell you that out of the sixteen people I had in my last class, I think that two of them said 
that they were looking for a career.  The rest of them said, ‘I want a security clearance so 
that I can get a GSA job’ or ‘So I can go work for Ratheon in two years.’  And that is 
what they look at.  Instead of looking at, ‘I’m coming in to protect my country, I am 
coming in to fight’” (P095).  To some degree individual motives/expectations can change 
as a function of tenure and experience.  For example, a NCO from Infantry explained that 
initially, new infantrymen are motivated by “… the cool guy stuff.  ‘I am going to blow 
stuff up, I am going to shoot things. That is what I like.’ That is what the guys coming in 
are joining the infantry for. Down the road, it is more about the brotherhood.  ‘I am 
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going to do it because he is doing it.  I am going to do it because we are all sucking 
together – that is why we are doing it.’ But, initially, it is the cool guy stuff.  ‘Where are 
the bombs at?  Where’s the cool stuff?’ Once you have the brotherhood, you can have a 
lot less of the cool guy stuff” (P120). 
Participants indicated that having a unit identity, especially having pride in that 
identity, can help to facilitate acceptance and sharedness of goals.  A trainer from the 
National Training Center explained, “If you give that [unit] that has a lot of pride, you 
give them the mission, [they] might not know what’s going on, but [they’re] going to say, 
‘well, alright, I’m still going to do it …’” (P017).  As indicated by this statement, there 
may be times when a leader does not know or cannot give sufficient reason or purpose for 
a directive. Despite not having a clear understanding of why the directive is being pushed 
down, small units that have respect for their leadership are more likely to carry out the 
order. Similarly, an NCO from Field Artillery explained, “ … we do a lot of stuff       
that, like I said, is not fun.  But all the time, all my dudes really give it their all.  I would 
say it is one of those things that … maybe they don’t want to let me down.  Kind of.  ‘He 
does all these things.  He is really nice to me. The last thing that I want to go and 
embarrass him or let him down.’  I’ve never had issues with a guy" (P085).  A trainer 
from the National Training Center said, “Respect. You know, like if you don’t respect 
that individual, you’re not going to listen to them. Basically, you’re not going to let them 
lead” (P017). 
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Phase 2 of the Team Resilience Process: 
Mobilization for Collective Action 
The second phase of the process of team resilience is preparation for collective 
action.  Upon the specification and acceptance of a shared directive, the team must 
mobilize for collective action.  Mobilization may be required immediately or teams may 
be afforded more or less time to prepare for collective action.  Teams should have a plan 
in place for moving forward.  As discussed previously, the Army has specific, formalized 
procedures for using certain equipment, performing certain tasks, interacting 
(e.g., communicating) with team members, and addressing other aspects related to a 
tasking or mission.  Much of a team’s effort to mobilize can be directed by standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) and, when operating under short suspense, existing SOPs 
may be the only plan available.  However, SOPs may not provide guidance for 
responding to unpredictable disruptors and/or disruptions.  Rather, teams must manage 
disruption – either proactively, by setting measures in place to avoid or mitigate the 
effects of a disruptor or reactively, by adjusting their process or course as they continue 
working toward their collective goal.  Mobilization affords a team the opportunity to plan 
for potential disruption and to put measures in place to help them manage disruptor cues, 
disruptors, and disruptions as they arise. As one trainer at the National Training Center 
indicated, “Being proactive.  More than half of the problems incurred are due to a lack of 
prior planning” (P007).  Through discussions with participants, four elements emerged as 
particularly important to this phase: prioritization, risk assessment, contingency planning, 
and resource specification. 
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Elements: prioritization, risk assessment, contingency planning, and resource 
specification.  As indicated in the previous section, teams are often tasked with multiple 
directives.  In addition, complex or long-term directives may be parsed into a collection 
of simpler or short-term goals. A trainer from the National Training Center explained, 
“There is no unit in the Army that can get everything done that it has been tasked to get 
done.  Not enough time to get done all of the tasks. Prioritization. You’re assuming risk. 
Then once you prioritize, being proactive.  Going after those things” (P009). 
Prioritization, risk assessment, contingency planning, and resource specification are all 
important elements associated with preparations to act on a directive. 
Teams will be more successful if they are afforded and take the opportunity to 
engage in thorough preparation (i.e., aforementioned elements) for a tasking or mission. 
Relying on a standard operating procedure or making assumptions about the availability 
of resources does not adequately prepare teams to manage disruption.  A trainer from the 
National Training Center said, “I understand that there are rules and guidelines, say the 
SOPs, which say it this way because that’s the bulk of you know, what turns out, so you 
have the most likely instance … but you have to have that structure to be able to go, 
‘Let’s think about maybe this other little factor that maybe never really happens so that 
we can be prepared for it’ … not necessarily be guarding against it, but be prepared that it 
might happen. Like, some of our briefs during the day, ‘If we happen to go down, this is 
what is going to happen. If, once we hit the ground, nobody is in immediate danger, the 
aircraft is not on fire, then we’ll stay in the helicopter until the dangerous stuff stops 
moving and then we will get out of the aircraft’ and then ‘the ascension of command 
from that point is me, you, you, you …’ Not that we are going to get on top of a mountain 
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and roll down it, because that is part of our job not to do, but its talked about, just in 
case” (P017). Having a contingency plan in place can allow a team to continue to move 
forward with a directive, despite exposure to an anticipated disruptor.  Implicit to 
contingency planning is the ability to forecast disruptors, as well as likely antecedents 
(disruptor cues) and effects (disruptions). 
Resource specification includes the identification of necessary personnel, 
equipment, tools, knowledge, skills, and other considerations to perform the directive as 
intended and an inventory of resources currently and/or potentially available to the team. 
Each of the teams sampled herein are composed of individuals who perform specialized 
functions and are assigned to specific roles.  Training for skill development was 
mentioned time and again as an important aspect of this element.  Indeed, individuals and 
teams receive extensive training with respect to their own roles as well as how to 
coordinate with other team members and other teams.  In many cases, team members and 
teams receive certifications that recognize an individual or team has met a certain level of 
proficiency and this certification is required for certain taskings or missions.  Where 
resources are adequate, redundancies in function can be built into the team structure.  In 
addition, with sufficient time, team members can cross-training as a way to prepare for 
the injury, loss, or absence of a team member. 
Influential factors.  Discussions with participants revealed a number of 
influential factors associated with mobilization for collective action, including having 
participated in elements associated with the previous phase, specification and acceptance 
of a shared directive; and also time, leadership support, training, self-awareness, and 
initiative.  Participants were not able to offer any examples of small units preparing to act 
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without having some goal in mind.  Indeed, it is difficult to mobilize for action when the 
directive is unclear or misunderstood (not specific) or for which all team members 
(sharedness) do not buy-in or take ownership of (acceptance).   In addition, the more time 
available to the team prior to actively performing the task, the greater the opportunity to 
engage in elements associated with mobilization. Otherwise, teams will necessarily rely 
on SOPs and prior knowledge and/or experience with a particular disruptor or disruption. 
Leaders can support the mobilization for collective action by establishing an 
operational tempo that is manageable and affords sufficient time for planning activities. 
An Infantry NCO explained, “Leaders have to be a lot more inventive, creative with how 
they [assign taskings].  At my level, take a week’s worth of tasks that I get over the 
course of the week for the platoon – it doesn’t require that all thirty of my guys are 
engaged for the entire work week, each day, five days a week.  So where it comes down 
to me, I am juggling how many tasks these guys can do before it just completely blows 
them out.  And how do I shift that around and shift focus from day to day, based off of 
what they are doing, taking into account what they have been doing for PT, what they 
have been doing extra, what they have going on personally that might have an impact – 
they are all things that have to be taken into account” (P107).  In addition, leadership can 
provide advanced notice of other – simultaneous or future – activities or directives that 
may affect how the team prioritizes or uses resources. Management can also support this 
phase of the team resilience process by making teams aware of and providing access to 
those resources required to perform as intended. 
Most participants offered training as an example of way to strengthen the value of 
personnel resources.  For example, like individuals who need to train for role proficiency, 
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teams need to train together to develop their ability to work together. Training is critical 
for developing proficiency and self-awareness – both in and out of one’s own role on the 
team.  A NCO from Field Artillery explained the value of cross-training, in terms of 
preparation for managing disruptor cues, disruptors, and disruptions: “In a Howitzer 
section, it is absolutely critical that the guys are cross-trained on the different tasks.  If 
something happens to someone, you can operate the Howitzer with a lot less crew than 
what the Howitzer technically requires. So, if there were to be a situation in combat, 
where part of the crew was injured, you could operate with, arguably, three or four guys 
if  you really had to in that situation. And so it is very important that all of the guys be 
familiar with the next level up job that they would need to do.  It is all really easy, as long 
as you take the time to train on it and then continue to switch guys into these roles to 
make sure that they remember how to do it. These simple tasks, people end up seeming 
to forget how to do.  Or, not even forget, but are just not comfortable doing it.  You put 
them in that position and they want to freeze up or they want to … freeze up, really, is the 
best term for it” (P053). 
Indeed, participants indicated that teams can benefit from exposure to disruptors 
while practicing/training together. A pilot explained, “The harder we train, the easier the 
simple things get. That goes just for flying at night. The more you fly at night, the easier 
your flight during the day is” (P004).   An Infantry NCO concurred, stating “In an ideal 
world, we would train to accomplish a task. [But] for a combat oriented unit, you try to 
come up with the most gnarly hellacious scenarios and see if your men can thrive in those 
scenarios, knowing full well that one time in a million would you ever actually find 
yourself in that specific scenario.  You know, you feel like you have that buffer of what 
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your unit is capable of and then you should tailor your unit, backed off from that … you 
want to have extra in the tank, so that if your mission calls for you to perform to this 
level, if shit hits the fan, they need to be prepared and capable of performing at this level. 
This needs to be my optempo so that when things get really bad, I can still say ‘I’ve still 
got something that I can give.’  Because if I don’t and I just plan because I have seen my 
guys do this, well, if I take any curve balls, if there is any change in the mission and I’ve 
got to do more, now I have to get creative or I have to willfully sacrifice.  The other thing 
that units don’t want to do is say, ‘I got that done, but by the skin of my teeth.  My 
company or my platoon is spent.’ Nobody wants to tell their bosses, ‘Man, you got 
everything that I could give.  Don’t ask any more than that.’ The mindset is, if I make 
you climb Mount Everest today and tell you today that we are going to have to do it again 
tomorrow, you need to get right with Jesus, because that is what we are going to have to 
do” (P107). 
Phase 3 of the Team Resilience Process: 
 
Detection of Disruptor Cues, Disruptors, and Disruptions 
 
The first two phases of the team resilience process demonstrate the need for teams 
to both accept a shared goal (directive) and to prepare a plan for achieving the goal. 
Anything that has the potential to affect progress toward a goal – whether the effect is to 
augment, hinder, or completely transform team process – or goal attainment is a 
disruptor. An overview of the types of disruptors to which teams may be exposed was 
provided in the previous section.   Failure to recognize disruptors and their effects can 
result in a team losing an opportunity to reap potential gains or lead to devastating 
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consequences.  Thus, the process of team resilience must also account for how teams 
work together to detect disruptors and disruptions. 
Elements: monitoring, recognizing, and appraising.  Three elements emerged as 
particularly important for the detection of disruptor cues, disruptors, and disruptions: 
monitoring, recognizing, and appraising.  Monitoring is a proactive activity that involves 
actively looking for cues which signal a disruptor or disruption. For example, many 
participants discussed known cues for individual disruptors, those issues that might cause 
a team member to focus or become disengaged with work.  An infantryman suggested, 
“If any of the guys start acting weird or they are not sleeping, or it seems like every time 
they talk to their family they are depressed, or they are just kind of blue and not talking a 
lot or acting all shaky … There might be something seriously wrong” (P106). A NCO 
from Field Artillery offered, "Sometimes you are able to look at the quality of work that 
they do.  How long it takes" (P074).  Cues for relational disruptors include: bickering 
(P002), avoidance or withdrawal from the group (P100), lack of affective bond/cohesion 
(P111), lack of focus on task (P001), lack of communication (P046), and misbehavior 
(P095). 
A team does not operate in a vacuum and other entities may share an interest in 
the team’s success.  While team members, themselves, actively monitor for cues, 
disruptors, and disruptions, their leaders, trainers, and peers are often in a position to 
detect disruptor cues, disruptors, and/or disruptions (P021).  An instructor pilot 
suggested, “As a trainer, I throw more and more at people until I can tell that they are 
getting saturated.  In that situation, where I am giving him stuff over and over and 
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eventually he stops responding, or she stops responding, it is because I have overloaded 
them and now I know that I need to back off” (P027). 
Monitoring for, recognizing, and ascribing meaning to disruptor cues and 
disruptors are proactive behaviors.  Recognizing a disruption – whether at or after onset – 
is a reactive behavior.  Indeed, it is not always possible to detect disruptors before they 
take effect. A NCO from Field Artillery explained, “Sometimes, you don’t know exactly 
what happened, you just know that you are being called to action” (P083). 
Influential Factors.  Participants identified an array of influential factors that can 
affect detection, including having moved through the first two phases to establish, accept, 
and prepare for a shared goal; as well as vigilance; communication; formal systems, 
standards, and SOPs; familiarity with one another and/or with similar experiences; and 
time. Activities associated with the previous phases of the team resilience process, 
specification and mobilization, can prime what team members are looking for, can affect 
whether or not a disruptor is recognized, and can inform how a disruptor is interpreted. 
Explanations of each of the other elements follow. 
 
Vigilance, herein, is associated with attention and focus.  Vigilance was 
implicated in both successful and unsuccessful detection.  A NCO from Field Artillery 
explained, “You’ve got to be paying attention quite intensely and being on there for 
twenty-four hours that is not going to happen with only a four-man crew.  You gotta stare 
at the screen. You cannot take your eyes off of it.  The amount of time for a rocket attack 
is very short, you have a very short window" (P089). A pilot recalled an incident where 
another crew crashed their helicopter, presumably because their focus was too narrow: 
"They could tell they weren’t going to clear a ridgeline. And they just kept going, 
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thinking and praying that, maybe, it was close but they were going to clear it, rather than 
turn around, and once they figured out that they needed to turn around, it was too late. 
They were stuck in too tight of a valley and they were committed” (P027). 
 
The pilot suggested that the narrowed attention resulted in too little 
communication between the two aircrews, adding: “When communication breaks down 
and people stop communicating, it can turn into a bad situation because somebody got so 
task saturated and so focused on clearing a mountain peak that they didn’t notice they 
weren’t going to make it" (P027).  Open lines of communication and good, quality 
exchange can help to keep all members on the same page – especially if not collocated 
(e.g., tank driver or tandem-seat pilots).  As one NCO from Air Defense Artillery 
explained, “If the crew works well together, and something changes or something new 
happens, they will let everybody know” (P096).  Team members need to share 
information with one another.  A pilot referred to effective communication as “two-way, 
like, both from the two pilots up front, the two people in the back.  Also, effective 
communication … you know, like if they do see something, they can relay the severity of 
what they need to say without like touching or … because we’re separated by seats, so 
it’s not like they can reach up and grab us.  They have to like stress in their voice or say 
keywords that will get us to key in on what they are saying” (P021).  In addition to two- 
way, effective communication, team members must also be feel comfortable and be 
willing providing information. For example, a Warrant Officer from Aviation explained, 
"Regardless of whether it’s a CW1 or a Lieutenant Colonel in the front seat, if Joe 
Snuffy, the private in the back, thinks anyone up front is doing something wrong, they are 
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going to be as professional as they can be, but they are going to say, ‘Hey, I’d prefer not 
to die today’” (P030). 
There are formal standards, procedures and formal tracking systems that allow 
one to quickly recognize when an entity has fallen – or is about to fall – below standard. 
For example, in aviation, if a crew member is fatigued he or she
9 
is more likely to have 
error, so leadership monitors how many hours worked and tries to offer or force rest 
(reset).  A trainer from the National Training Center explained, “We have a tracker of 
how many hours you’ve worked over the last whatever months and you can look and say, 
‘Well this guy’s got twelve, this guy’s fourteen, this guy’s eighteen’” (P015).  In 
addition, there may be inspections of equipment to make certain in working order 
(e.g., ARMs inspection). 
 
In addition to formal tracking systems, team members can vary with respect to 
how familiar they are with each other, with the equipment and tools they are using, and 
with the situations they encounter.  Familiarity can help someone to recognize when 
something is amiss – or about to become so. Knowledge and previous experience are 
particularly influential when it comes to recognizing cues and ascribing meaning to them. 
Domain knowledge acquired through training and/or past experience can facilitate 
considerations of second- and third-order effects.  Familiarity with your team members 
plays a key role in how cues are interpreted.  For example, a crew chief from Aviation 
suggested that there are behavioral indicators of task saturation, explaining: “It’s our 
actions, our voice.  Especially if you work with people enough, you fly with them enough 
you pretty much know what they are doing.  If they are overwhelmed, you know it” 
 
 
9 
At the time of this study, Aviation and Air Defense Artillery were the only branches within Combat Arms 
that were open to women. 
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(P026).   A pilot agreed, “You know how someone is going to react … if they are soft- 
spoken, you know if they get irritated easily … even voice inflection is a big one, if 
somebody is easily excitable and typically makes a big deal out of small things, if he gets 
a little excited, you should probably still listen to him because he is saying something, 
there could be a danger close, but you’re not going to think about it as much as the quiet 
mellow guy that nothing works him up, suddenly he starts screaming.  I would say your 
interpersonal relationship is quite big” (P029). 
When team members are familiar with one another, they are aware of each other’s 
tendencies, including personal strengths and weaknesses. Recognizing when someone is 
approaching their limit or placed in a position outside of their comfort zone can be a 
signal that an intervention is required. As one NCO from Air Defense Artillery explained, 
“You have your strengths and weaknesses throughout the group and they will know that, 
compensate for it, and help each other out” (P098).  Lack of familiarity with team 
members can inhibit one’s ability to recognize certain cues. A trainer from the National 
Training Center said, “If you are always working together as a team, you know what your 
battle buddy is going through, or what is going through his mind – is he having marital 
problems or anything like that – and if you throw another person in that is competent and 
doing the job, but you don’t know this guy, you don’t know what’s going through his 
head …” (P017).  Another trainer agreed, “Usually the squad that has been together 
longer, they have more of a success rate.  Because they have been working together 
longer … they can read each other. Because they can get into each other’s heads, they 
know how they are going to react in certain situations …” (P013). 
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Despite the obvious benefits of familiarity among team members, familiarity was 
also been implicated in complacency.  A pilot explained, “If you can predict how 
somebody is going to react in a certain situation, that creates – in our field – that creates 
complacency. So, if I know he’s always going to do this or I know that he’s going to 
pick up that slack, like if I don’t execute a field check or whatever, and I know he always 
does it, but if his mind is somewhere else and he doesn’t do it, that complacency, you 
know what I mean, and that complacency will create an atmosphere where we missed 
something and now we’re running out of fuel.  ‘Oh my God, I thought you were going to 
do it.’ ‘I thought you were going to do it’.  So, it’s not so much that we are so 
comfortable that we can predict each other, it’s that we are so comfortable that we 
understand the … how the other person thinks or what … you know, you work with 
somebody so much that you understand when they say it’s an emergency that it’s a real 
emergency or when the inflection in their voice says … then that means its real or he’s 
just joking around …” (P021). A trainer from the National Training Center remarked, “If 
you take for granted that he was going to execute it, but in reality it was never done, I say 
that’s too comfortable” (P012). 
Phase 4 of the Team Resilience Process: 
Determination of (Potential) Course Correction 
The fourth phase of the team resilience process is determination of (potential) 
course correction. Given a meaningful disruptor cue, disruptor, or disruption has been 
identified, the team must now decide what, if anything, to do about it. This phase is 
primarily concerned with making a decision whether or not to initiate some course 
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correction and, if so, deciding upon a particular adjustment.  An adjustment may be a 
single activity or a series of activities. 
Participants described several general ways a team can adjust its course of action 
in response to a perceived disruptor cues, disruptors, and/or disruptions.  Many of the 
adjustments described are cognitive strategies for handling disruptions that cannot be 
controlled.  For example, one of the ways a team may adjust to manage disruptor cues, 
disruptors, and/or disruptions is to restrict or expand team member roles. An individual 
who is experiencing a personal issue, such as marital problems, may be (temporarily) 
asked to contribute less, effectively restricting his role. In an effort to redistribute an 
individual team member’s responsibilities, other team members may engage in 
compensatory behaviors that effectively expand their own roles. Another way team 
members may adjust to manage disruptor cues, disruptors, and/or disruptions is to 
reframe or adjust the goal or the meaning ascribed to the disruptor cues, disruptors, 
and/or disruptions. An infantryman offered an example of how the same situation can be 
framed two entirely different ways: "There is a lot of guys who are performing infantry 
missions.  They focus on that day’s mission, getting their guys through it.  And that is the 
same thing that we do. However, their perception of it and how they actually perform 
them – there absolutely is a difference. ‘Oh, well, we have to drive through this terrible 
town.’ As opposed to, “Oh, we’re going to go pick a fight’" (P109).  Similar to reframing 
is shifting focus.  For example, instead of focusing on the present situation, which may 
not be especially enjoyable, teams can adjust their lens to shift focus to the bigger picture 
or the desired end state.  A NCO from Air Defense Artillery described how his crew 
handled failing a drill and being placed on lockdown for three days: "You just, like, 
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embrace the suck.  You fail and then it will always be on the back of your mind, but you 
always know that you aren’t going to be on lockdown for years" (P052). 
In addition to modifying team member roles, team members can model more 
appropriate behavior for one another or look to others as models of appropriate behavior. 
A tanker explained, "If you don’t have confidence in yourself to bounce back, then you 
are not going to bounce back.  But if you have a person next to you who can help you to 
bounce back, who has a positive mindset and can help you, then it will be easier” (P075). 
Teams may also attempt to rationalize a disruptor cues, disruptors, and/or disruptions 
away. An infantryman remarked, “FOB XXX takes rockets all the time.  I’m sure it’s 
scary for some people, but for all of us?  It’s not scary at all.  It’s probably not going to 
hit where I am and if it does, well, it was your time to go” (P111).  In addition, team 
members can discuss or commiserate about their collective situation. 
Influential Factors.  Participants identified several factors that might affect 
deliberation and action, including activities associated with the first three phases of the 
team resilience process such as goal setting, preparation, and interpretation of disruptor 
cues, disruptors, and/or disruptions; as well as efficacy, effort, empathy, and 
participation.  Goal acceptance and ownership can affect whether a team continues to 
look for ways to address the disruptor cues, disruptors, and/or disruptions, such as 
identifying available resources.  As a trainer at the National Training Center suggested, “I 
think that a lot of it comes down to motivation and the ownership of a task.  If you’re 
facing a challenge, then you’ll go down there and look for those resources.  If you’re 
motivated.  If you’re taking ownership of the task.  If not, the motivation is not present, 
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then who really cares what resources are available” (P008).  Another trainer suggested, 
“It’s easier to say ‘I can’t do something’ rather than to be proactive” (P009). 
Adjustments may not occur for several reasons.  For example, a disruptor cue, 
disruptor, or disruption may go recognized. Alternately, the team may have appropriately 
recognized the disruptor cue, disruptor, or disruption, but did not deem it worth 
addressing.  In both cases, the team has not (yet) entered the third phase of team 
resilience.  However, even if a team has appropriately detected a meaningful disruptor 
cue, disruptor, or disruption, the team may yet not adjust behavior either because the 
team does not have the opportunity or team members do not know how to initiate a 
course correction. 
The deliberation process can be strengthened if there is participation from many 
or all team members as options and generated and a decision to take action is made. 
Participation in the decision-making process can boost motivation and engagement. An 
infantryman recalled, “I was always told when I was a private, when I was an E4, that it’s 
not my job to think.  As we all know, everybody loves to think for themselves. So, I have 
three E4s on my team.  All of them love to think for themselves – I don’t give them much 
room to do it often, but when I do that is a big motivator for them. They can be like, 
‘Alright, I can think about this and figure out how this needs to be done …’ and just 
come to me with questions and what not.  I found that to be pretty useful (P116). A 
trainer at the National Training Center recalled his own experiences while training at 
NTC, “I still remember those two incidents [here], completely handed to me, and then 
coming up with a way to adapt and win. And it wasn’t an [after action review], it was us, 
as a unit … and I think that depends on what type of unit you are. My commander, my 
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troop commander, he allowed – even if he didn’t listen to us – he allowed us and NCOs 
to have a role in the plan, we would have our say.  Speak our piece. Another guy I 
worked for, he would come up with the plan on his own and we had very little buy-in. 
So, as a group, we got together after we got up and we talked about how we do better, 
how we could beat these guys.  That sort of allowed everyone to buy in to what we were 
doing” (P006).  In aviation, crews are encouraged to work together to solve problems. 
For example, a pilot said, “There are people who would argue … they would say, ‘there 
are pilots and there are crew chiefs and we will act as such.’ [But] I find that people are 
more – at least the crews that I have always worked on or worked with – they will do 
what you say and more … they will go the extra mile … if you do genuinely care for 
their wellbeing, the wellbeing of their family, and how they do they job.  I think that 
we’re all the same – especially in that helicopter.  I can kill them just like they can kill 
me” (P021). 
In a previous section, individual disruptors and their effects on team processes 
were discussed in some detail.  For example, an individual who is having marital 
problems may display certain cues that suggest to other team members that he has 
become disengaged or unable to maintain focus on work. Team members may be in a 
position to help him work through his problems or to allow for some slack in his 
performance.  Team members are only likely to do this if they feel empathy for him.  If 
they do not have empathy, they will interpret his behavior as weakness. As an 
infantryman said, “Why can’t you handle it on your own?  You’re a grown man. You’re 
an infantryman.  Handle your [expletive] business and come into work.  Don’t go crying 
about it, don’t go bitching about it, don’t go looking for the easy way out … Your 
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[expletive] wife is cheating on you?  You leave her. [Expletive] it, dude. Your 
[expletive] family member dies?  Alright, sorry man. You’ll be alright.  I’ve had all of 
these issues before.  I’m good.  Why can’t he be good?  Be a [expletive] man” (P113). 
Another infantryman said, “If that individual – especially in the infantry – if he is having 
issues handling certain situations, then he is probably in the wrong profession.  He ain’t 
going to get nothing out of the rest of us.  We have all been there. That’s what it all 
comes down to. You are not going to get … From me?  You are not going to get 
anything. You are not going to get no tears, no remorse. I feel no mercy for you” (P112). 
A third said, “I am like the exact opposite.  If someone has an issue, I tell them to come 
to me – if they feel comfortable coming to me.  I am not going to fix the problem, but I 
will help you to find a solution.  If it’s bad enough.  You know?  If you did something 
stupid and it’s like ‘I forgot this and blah blah blah’ then ‘Well, suck it up, Dude. That’s 
your own fault.’  But if it’s something like … I don’t know … like, you’re having trouble 
at home or something like that. Sure, come talk to me” (P115). 
Phase 5 of the Team Resilience Process: Reset 
 
The fifth and final phase of the resilience process is reset.  Two elements emerged 
as particularly important for reset: restoration and reflection. Participants recognized 
situations where a mission or tasking was accomplished, but they had exhausted all of 
their resources and felt ill-prepared to approach the next tasking/mission without first 
regenerating or restoring the resources.  In addition, teams need to reflect upon what they 
have experienced so as to be able to learn from the experience and apply those lessons in 
the future.  Indeed, teams do not always accomplish their tasking or mission, and the 
experience of “failure” can take time to understand. 
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The importance of both knowledge of results and participative discussion were 
underscored. For example, a NCO from Aviation explained, “things can happen and 
everybody can walk away, perfectly fine.  But then again, you can do something and 
everybody dies. You can learn from all of that … up to that point, what went wrong? 
We know they crashed.  We know this happened.  From there, let’s back track and see 
everything that they did. I would hope so. If those guys didn’t make it, they obviously 
gave up their lives doing what they did.  Nobody wants to do that. What we do is very 
dangerous.  But, I don’t want them to just die and not have something good come out of 
it.  Make sense? If they gave their lives for a purpose and they may have done it doing 
everything wrong, now everybody else can see what they had done wrong and, uh, spend 
a little more time with our families … ” (P025). 
A trainer at the National Training Center suggested that teams are more likely to 
improve over the course of performance episodes if they experience failure and have the 
opportunity to reflect upon that failure.  “Sometimes it is good to let someone fail a little 
bit because if someone is always jumping in too soon then they may not really feel like 
they failed.  They may just feel like, ‘Oh, this is a team effort’” (P003).  Another trainer 
explained that a leader’s support and provision of constructive feedback is essential for 
handling failure.  “Failure is acceptable.  It’s not ideal.  I guess … how you react to the 
failure is what determines whether it is good or bad.  Command is ultimately responsible 
for setting up the idea that failure is OK as long as we are learning from our failures so 
that we don’t make that mistake again” (P004). 
Participants also suggested ways that teams could reset as a collective, including: 
commiseration, humor, and group activity.  For example, an infantryman explained, “We 
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talk about how some stuff is just stupid.  Like, well, you feel like if you are not doing 
anything, you shouldn’t be at work.  But you are just pretty much sitting around and just 
wasting your time …Or you are doing little minor things that really don’t have nothing to 
do with what your job is” (P101). A NCO from Infantry said, “Being funny.  That’s 
about it.  Everyone can talk shit.  I mean, you get a good laugh when you go into work” 
(P115).  Another NCO from Infantry suggested, “Do a squad barbeque.  I mean, you 
invite everybody … A barbeque is the go-to” (P122).  And a third NCO from Infantry 
added, “I mean, I am cussing to get home from deployment, but a couple of weeks later 
we are going to have fun, shooting at each other with paint balls, bungee jumping … 
whatever we decide. ATV-ing.  And those are things that most of the guys click on” 
(P121). 
Influential factors.  Several factors can influence the reset phase of the team 
resilience process, including activities associated with previous phases, as well as 
knowledge of results, availability of and willingness to accept feedback, (down)time, 
management support, shared (or similar) experience, and unity.  Time is, perhaps, the 
most influential factor because time offers a way to put distance between the experience 
and downtime affords the opportunity to engage in restoration/reflection activities. As a 
Soldier from Field Artillery said,  “It’s always the attitude and the culture, I guess, ‘GO! 
GO! GO! GO! FAST! FAST! FAST! FAST!’  So, when you get down time and there is 
not that element going on, make use of it. You have got to.  Because if you don’t and 
you try to stay in that same mentality of always having to go fast and jump on that next 
mission and attack it, constantly, then you burn yourself out” (P065). 
134  
Downtime allows team members an opportunity to “work on” things external to 
group.  For example, to address those individual problems which may have spilled over 
into the work domain. Unfortunately, team members will sometimes use downtime to 
work on less critical or remaining tasks, rather than using downtime to restore or reflect. 
A pilot offered a few reasons for not using downtime for its intended purpose: “And 
that’s something that has taken me awhile, to actually work through that.  But at a time 
where, you know, about two weeks, I actually laid down to rest for four hours and it was 
just constantly fixing the aircraft because when they come back they have holes in them 
and you know the last crew that come back had one of those instances where they were 
bleeding all over the aircraft. Well, all that’s corrosive, if I allow blood to eat my 
aircraft, well, that’s one aircraft I don’t have to go out and get the next guy.  And it is 
taxing.  And it’s one of those ‘Alright, I gotta be there for the guys who are a little bit 
more junior and I just trained them up before I got out here’ … I gotta make sure that 
everything’s hit because as soon as that pilot turns the switch on, that aircraft needs to be 
up and ready to run. So, there are those situations. And that’s not helping them to be that 
tasked” (P016). 
Management support can also affect reset.  There is sometimes a perception that 
downtime needs to be filled with training or administrative duties.  For example, a pilot 
reflected, "I hate to say this, but I have been around long enough to know – in most 
people’s commands, is they want to train, train, train, train, train and then deploy. And 
there is no time for them to take a knee and reflect on what they could have learned. 
They think a weekend is enough ‘Oh, I gave them a four day weekend. Now let’s go to 
the field.’ They keep executing the mission. That’s not enough.  And you build chronic 
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fatigue in your Soldiers.  And then by the time they get to Afghanistan – and I’ve seen it 
with units that have replaced us in Afghanistan – I’ve seen it in my own unit – the guys 
are just worn out. And they are missing things because they are worn out.  And the same 
can go for units, as well" (P021).  Similar to the role of leader support as descripted with 
respect to phase 2, mobilization, leadership can support the restoration and reflection by 
making resources available and freeing demands. 
Unity is important for both restoration and reflection.  Team members may be 
more likely to engage in restorative activities like commiseration, humor, and group 
activity if they feel they have something in common.  In particular, shared or similar 
experience can affect how team members interact with one another during the reset 
phase. Several participants emphasized how unity can be achieved through shared or 
similar experience.  For example, an infantryman explained, “They have to suffer 
together to get over it … It’s just enduring something together. It’s a common ground. 
Like, ‘OK, you already went through the same thing that I did.  We have that in 
common”’ (P100).  A NCO from Infantry agreed, “It’s the suck factor.  You are getting 
shot at together on a mission together, haven’t bathed in a month, that stuff” (P122). And 
another NCO from Infantry said, “You don’t have to get in fire fights to suck on a 
mountaintop.  It’s that everybody is out there, in pain, tired, just ready to go home … that 
is what causes everybody else to do the same thing. We are all out here together.  It 
seems like it is the most terrible day that you had that week or that month or whatever – 
that is the one that you will laugh about months down the road … It becomes a great 
story.  It’ll be the story of a lifetime” (P121). Similarly, an NCO from Air Defense 
Artillery said, “It just helps that trust aspect. You trust them a little more just because of 
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that. And the new privates coming in, just the fact that they joined is your ground to start 
on. You can just build on that” (P096).  And an NCO from Infantry explained, "… you 
see it all over Facebook, the little memes, ‘you never are a true brother until you have 
almost died together’ and all that stuff, but for some people that is true. And in my first 
tour, I dealt with that a lot.  I didn’t like going places, but my wife said that she would 
notice that when I was with Soldiers that I deployed with, I was a different person.  She 
said I was more relaxed.  And later on I realized that it was because I trusted the people 
that I was with that if something was to happen, they had my back.  Not me looking over 
my shoulder every three seconds and stuff like that.  It’s what I would see into it" (P105). 
Team members are likely to have shared experiences, given the interdependent 
nature of teamwork arrangements.  I wondered whether an individual could derive the 
same comfort and engage in the same restorative and/or reflective activities with 
someone who was not a part of the team – perhaps, a member of another team, who 
presumably had similar experiences.  A NCO from Air Defense Artillery speculated, “I 
guess if you are sitting at a bar next to some old veteran that you’ve never met, you’re 
going to end up talking about stuff that you guys have both done, at different times, in 
different places.  So, it isn’t going to be the same, but it is still there. It certainly isn’t 
going to be the same.  You don’t have that intimate friendship that you would … there is 
no comparison to that.  But, yeah, you are definitely going to understand each other.  I 
mean, it’s an easy start, I guess” (P100).  An “easy start” but apparently not the same. 
Small units typically engage in a formal after action review (AAR). During this 
time, they may receive knowledge of results, as well as feedback from leadership, and 
may have the opportunity to discuss their experiences with one another. The AAR is 
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most effective when constructive feedback is available to team members and team 
members are willing to accept the feedback.  A trainer from the National Training Center 
said, “Some of the problems in the Army might stem from the fact that there isn’t a whole 
lot of external feedback on the everyday routine.  Not necessarily going out to execute a 
mission, but on various operations” (P009).  Another trainer explained, “The worst thing, 
I think, personally, that happens is a unit has an overwhelming victory and you go in the 
AAR and they are, like, “What do you mean?  It worked.” Versus bringing out some 
struggling points because maybe we didn’t do as well on the backside as we would have 
liked to.  And that goes back to making it harder for the units who are doing well … 
because it is human nature.  If you win … If you struggle and maybe don’t do so well on 
the outcome, then you’re a little more open to go, ‘OK, what did we do wrong?  What 
can we do better?’” (P005). 
Concluding Remarks about the Team Resilience Process 
 
Team resilience is herein conceptualized as a general (non-specific) process of 
managing disruption. The conceptualization of resilience as a process of managing 
disruption resonated with participants, specifically those with an opportunity to observe 
and evaluate team processes and outcomes.  As a trainer from the National Training 
Center commented, “You’re not going to see it until they actually conduct a mission. 
Their interaction with each other might look like [they are prepared for success], but once 
they do a mission, that’s when you’ll be able to tell how well they execute everything. 
It’s all in how they respond to frustration” (P001). 
 
Team resilience emerged herein as a five-phase iterative process.  Team resilience 
does not require that teams engage in activities related to each of the phases. For 
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example, a team may never be exposed to disruptor cues, disruptors, and/or disruptions 
and thus never move beyond the monitoring element associated with the detection phase. 
Similarly, overlearned behavior is so well trained that, given a specific stimulus, it is 
elicited automatically.  Thus, some adjustment can occur following a disruptor without 
resulting in conscious deliberation (determination phase).  Some participants indicated, 
for example, that teams and/or team members will skip – either willfully or under orders 
– the reset phase and move directly on to the next assignment. Teams likely engage in 
phases concurrently.  For example, teams may be determining a course of action and still 
actively monitoring for other potential disruptions.  Indeed, because teams may be 
working toward multiple, simultaneous goals, they may be at different phases in the 
process with respect to each directive, respectively.  Teams may also cycle back to 
previous phases of the process hence underscoring the iterative nature of team resilience 
(See Figure 7). 
An ambiguous goal is a disruptor in and of itself.  With an ambiguous goal, a team 
is left to fill in the blanks for themselves, assign their own purpose, and/or determine  
their own approach.  If team members do not understand why they being direc               
ted to perform a task, they may not take it seriously, potentially compromising 
effectiveness, efficiency, and safety. Unfortunately, clarity is not always possible. Yet, 
teams continue to work as directed.  To some degree, acceptance may counteract 
ambiguity.  If team members can accept the bigger picture, then an ill-articulated smaller 
goal may still be accepted.  Participants indicated that goals sometimes require 
adjustment. A trainer from the National Training Center explained, “You have to evaluate 
where they are at and then you have to make goals and expectations and then you have to 
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adjust those goals and expectations throughout the training rotation” (P002). Similar to 
an ambiguous goal, lack of planning or inadequate preparation can cause a disruption in 
and of itself.  Indeed, having a plan is also important but not sufficient for success. 
Several participants suggested that it was not always possible to predict the likelihood of 
team success, despite evidence of thorough preparation. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Illustration of the primary phases, elements, and examples of influential factors 
associated with the team resilience process. This illustration represents a single cycle or 
episode but the team resilience process is normally iterative to support subsequent 
performance episodes. Arrows depict a general process flow and not a rigid sequence.  In 
actuality, phases may overlap, be skipped, postponed or repeated, and regression to 
previous phases may occur whenever needed. 
 
Detecting disruptor cues, disruptors, and/or disruptions includes activities 
associated with monitoring, recognition, and ascribing meaning.  This phase has two 
components similar to those found in Cognitive Appraisal Theory (CAT) as advanced by 
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Folkman and Lazarus (1984) – primary appraisal (what it is) and secondary appraisal 
(what it means) – but CAT theory does not account for monitoring.  Sometimes, team 
members only know that a disruptor signals a potential problem, but do not understand 
what the problem means or how it might affect them. Given sufficient time, team 
members can discuss what disruptor cue/disruptor/disruption means with one another or 
solicit advice from an outside person (P033). 
Although others outside of the team may detect disruptor cues, disruptors, and/or 
disruptions on behalf of the team, participants suggested that the process of addressing 
the disruption generally falls to the team. A NCO from Air Defense Artillery explained, 
“From higher level up, they let you do your thing.  They let you handle your business” 
(P042).  Another NCO from Air Defense Artillery agreed, “We try not to step in right 
away. Because the thing is, we try to give them the opportunity to handle their business. 
If that’s his Soldier, I’m not going to step in into his business” (P038). 
In some cases, there is no opportunity to react to a disruptor cue, disruptor, and/or 
disruption. An infantry NCO recalled his experience of the death of one of his team 
members: "Out of the nine deployments, in my company, we didn’t lose anybody until 
the last deployment.  And that affected everybody.  We still maintained and still 
continued, but you could tell there was definitely a moment there where everyone was 
‘this is really horrible.’  But we overcame it – we had no choice.  I think that at that level 
– especially overseas where we were, you don’t have the time to necessarily mourn. You 
have to continue. In a way, it is good because you just keep going. You don’t have to 
think about it too much” (P108). 
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Restoration and reflection contribute to readiness.  As stated earlier, teams rarely 
cooperate to address only one shared goal.  Instead, they will address multiple – 
sometimes overlapping, sometimes consecutive – goals.  Therefore, it is possible that 
resources can be sufficient to handle a goal but doing so can effectively deplete resources 
for successive goals. There needs to be a period of restoration, where teams are either 
provided or seek out or otherwise regenerate their individual and collective resources. 
Having a restored resource bank allows teams to continue to function (be ready for the 
next tasking, mission).  In addition, there should be a period of reflection, whereby teams 
consider knowledge of results and feedback and internalize lessons learned/make changes 
so as to be strengthened for next goal. This may include writing SOPs. 
Relationship of Small Unit (Team) Resilience to Psychological Resilience (RQ3) 
 
The third and final research question addressed the relationship between the 
substantive theory of small unit resilience and the Army’s conceptualization of 
psychological resilience.  The Army has loosely defined psychological resilience as “the 
mental, physical, emotional, and behavioral ability to face and cope with adversity, adapt 
to change, recover, learn, and grow from temporary setbacks” (R2C, 2013, p.3). The 
Army’s Ready and Resilient Campaign is based on the premise that psychological 
resilience can contribute to unit readiness. 
Psychological resilience, as defined above, is a state and as such can be affected 
by training and/or intervention.  In an effort to develop and maintain a ready Force, the 
Army has created a number of tools aimed at promoting and assessing psychological 
resilience, including the Global Assessment Tool (GAT) and the Master Resilience 
Trainer (MRT) program.  The GAT is an online assessment tool designed to provide 
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Soldiers with information about their psychological health, including confidential 
summaries of personal results and comparisons with others similar (e.g., demographics) 
to themselves. Soldiers are required to complete the self-report survey annually (Lester 
et al., 2011).  Non-commissioned officers are selected to participate in the 10-day Master 
Resilience Trainer workshop where they are taught the fundamentals of resilience- 
boosting behavior and cognitive strategies.  Program participants are expected to return to 
their duty stations and deliver similar instruction to their subordinates and other Soldiers. 
Both the GAT and the MRT program are grounded in positive psychology (Reivich, 
Seligman, & McBride, 2011), and conceptualize resilience as it is related to four domains 
(emotional, family, social, spiritual) and a set of core competencies (self-awareness, self- 
regulation, optimism, mental agility, character strengths, and connection).  Because 
military outcomes are largely unit-driven, the Army is interested in exploring whether a 
phenomenon akin to psychological resilience occurs at the unit-level. 
At any point in the team life cycle, the configuration of individuals yields a 
measurable (though not necessarily shared) degree of resilience in teams.  It is plausible 
that some composite of individual team member resilience (e.g., an average, disparity, or 
select team member value) may be meaningfully associated with short- and/or long-term 
team outcomes.  This value could also be used to make comparisons across teams. 
However, the cross-discipline review presented at the beginning of this dissertation 
suggests that it may be premature to directly extend what we know about psychological 
resilience to the unit.  Indeed, like other multilevel constructs (e.g., efficacy, 
performance), resilience may prove qualitatively different across levels of analysis. 
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Rather than  set out to map small unit resilience directly onto the Army’s current 
conceptualization of psychological resilience, I opted to use a grounded theory approach 
to explore the breadth of small unit experiences and to allow the data to inform a 
substantive theory of team resilience.  The most salient difference between the Army’s 
current conceptualization of psychological resilience and the substantive theory of team 
resilience developed herein is that the former describes an emergent state, whereas the 
latter describes a process.  Both conceptualizations associate resilience with readiness, 
whereby resilience is a means for promoting the readiness of the force.  Readiness was 
identified as an important team outcome associated with the process of resilience.  Both 
conceptualizations accommodate multiple response trajectories. For example, the 
definition provided in the R2C materials suggest that individuals can cope, adapt, 
recover, learn, and/or grow from experience with disruption(s).  These trajectories may 
be similar to those of maintenance (cope), transformation (adapt), and growth 
(learn/grow), as well one more complex trajectory (recovery) – although the decay 
trajectory identified herein does not appear to be associated with psychological resilience. 
Small unit resilience has components that overlap with psychological resilience. 
 
Each of the four domains of psychological resilience (emotional, family, social, and 
spiritual) are all captured either directly or indirectly by the substantive theory advanced 
herein, as are some of the core competencies. The four domains are included, primarily, 
in the sense that spillover from these domains can affect how team members work 
together and, thus, function as disruptors.  Self-awareness is influential in both 
conceptualizations of resilience, and is particularly important as it relates to the 
mobilization for collection action phase of the team resilience process. For psychological 
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resilience, self-awareness is associated with identifying counter-productive thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviors.  For team resilience, self-awareness is about recognizing the 
team’s strengths and weaknesses.  For psychological resilience, connection  is defined as 
“building strong relationships through positive and effective communication, empathy, 
willingness to ask for help, and willingness to offer help” (Reivich et al., 2011, p.27). 
Many aspects of connection are found in the substantive theory, but the importance of 
their relative effect has been associated with different phases in the process.  For 
example, communication is associated with the specification and acceptance of a shared 
directive, whereas empathy is associated with determination of a (potential) course of 
action.  Reivich et al. define self-regulation as “the ability to regulate impulses, thinking, 
emotions, and behaviors to achieve goals” (p.27).  To the extent that impulses, thoughts, 
emotions, and behaviors can function as disruptors, it could be argued that the process of 
small unit resilience, itself, is indicative of self-regulation. 
The current study was framed as an investigation of unit adaptability.  I chose to 
debrief participants toward the end of our discussion, and asked whether their responses 
would have changed had I asked them to help me understand resilience rather than 
adaptability in small military units.  Indeed, whenever the discussion was focused 
explicitly on resilience, participants had a difficult time breaking free of what they 
believed they knew about psychological resilience and applying it to the unit.  In many 
cases, the result was an assumption that team resilience was simply a function of the 
combined level of psychological resilience of team members – or, perhaps, some 
speculation that team resilience could be supported by identifying and maintaining a 
specific number of resilient team members.  However, one infantry platoon leader 
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suggested, “[Unit]10 resiliency is probably more limited to just their ability to execute 
missions as they come or whatever that particular unit’s mission set is, without any 
distractors and detractors that would affect that unit’s ability to carry out that mission.  At 
the small unit, resiliency is not just getting the mission done, but what is … what is that 
person’s state of mind, what is their ability to … It kind of gets more into that. A small 
unit leader, if you ask them about resiliency, he is probably going to lean more towards 
personal feelings and their ability to juggle military obligations with personal obligations 
as opposed to organizational resiliency, which is more about ‘Is he getting enough sleep? 
Is he getting enough food?’  If he is getting those things, he should be able to do the 
mission” (P107).  Indeed, as the results of this study have demonstrated, resilience at 
various levels of analysis in the military may different, but not wholly incompatible. 
Discussion 
 
The current literature on resilience does not yet provide a sound and definitive 
direction for how resilience needs to be approached at the team level. The current study 
was designed to address this knowledge gap through a comprehensive summary of the 
research literature in and of small groups and systems, articulation of a framework to 
direct the synthesis of existing and future team resilience-related efforts, and construction 
of a substantive theory of team resilience based on empirical data collected from high- 
functioning combat teams in the United States Army. These foundational efforts are 
believed to be critical for the development of our scientific understanding of team 
resilience. 
Team resilience is herein conceptualized as a general (non-specific) process of 
managing disruption which consists of five primary phases: specification, mobilization, 
10 
The term ‘unit’ typically refers to a larger collective, i.e., the Company (roughly 80-100 Soldiers). 
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detection, determination, and reset.  In Phase 1, specification, teams engage in activities 
related to the specification and acceptance of a shared directive.  In Phase 2, 
mobilization, team prepare for collective action by conducting risk assessments, 
generating contingency plans, prioritizing multiple or competing taskings, and the 
specification of resources.  In Phase 3, detection, teams actively and continuously 
monitor themselves, their interactions, and their environment for disruptor cues, 
disruptors, and disruptions.  Once a team recognizes the presence or onset of a disruptor 
cue, disruptor, or disruption, the team must interpret its meaning.  In Phase 4, 
determination, teams explore potential options for addressing a meaningful disruptor cue, 
disruptor, or disruption; and make decisions about whether, when, and how to adjust in 
response.  In Phase 5, reset, teams take pause to restore resources and relationships and to 
engage in reflection.   For each phase, a set of influential factors were also identified. 
These factors were discussed in terms of how they could benefit, hinder, or change team 
characteristics, interactions, and/or behavior. 
The five phases represent a single, complete cycle or episode of team resilience, 
and teams are more likely to experience success if they move through each of the five 
phases.  In addition, there was little discussion of small military units completely 
disbanding after a single performance episode, and so the team resilience should be 
conceptualized as an iterative process.  Team resilience is not necessarily linear.  Indeed, 
results indicate that teams may engage in multiple phases concurrently, return to previous 
rather than move on to subsequent phases, and/or skip phases altogether.  Teams were 
most likely to skip the reset phase – either because they were quickly assigned a new 
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directive or because they willfully the reset period engaged in activities that inhibited 
restoration and/or reflection. 
The current study is one of the few known efforts designed to describe how teams 
manage disruption.  To date, there have been few studies purporting to measure the 
construct of team resilience, and most have conceptualized team resilience as either a 
global property of the team or as an emergent state.  Perhaps only two studies (Morgan, 
Fletcher, & Sarkar, 2013; 2015) have explicitly conceptualized team resilience as a 
process.  These authors used a variety of qualitative methods, including focus groups and 
content analysis of autobiographical materials, to explore the process of team resilience 
as experienced by members of elite sports teams (2015) and also to identify a set of 
influential factors (2013).  The authors define team resilience as “a dynamic, 
psychosocial process which protects a groups of individuals from the potential negative 
effect of stressors they collectively encounter” (2013, p.567).  Their findings suggest that 
elite sports team resilience is a function of five “psychosocial processes”, including 
transformational leadership, shared team leadership, team learning, social identity, and 
positive emotions; and four protective factors, including group structure, mastery 
approaches, social capital, and collective efficacy. 
The Morgan et al. (2013, 2015) model of team resilience bears striking similarity 
to the Army’s conceptualization of psychological resilience, albeit in terms of group-level 
phenonema rather than individual-level phenomena.  Reivich et al. (2011) identify six 
core competencies of psychological resilience: self-awareness, self-regulation, optimism, 
mental agility, character strengths, and connection.  There is conceptual overlap between 
many of the competencies, factors, and psycho-social processes identified through these 
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diverse research efforts.  For example, connection is defined as “building strong 
relationships through positive and effective communication, empathy, willingness to ask 
for help, and willingness to offer help” (p.27) and may overlap conceptually with two of 
Morgan et al.’s psychosocial processes, namely shared team leadership and social 
identity.  It is worth noting that the Morgan et al. (2013) began each session with “a 
general overview of the concept of resilience … and participants were told that the aim of 
the research was to explore what team resilience meant to them in the context of elite 
sport” (p.551).  The specific nature of how the concept of resilience was initially 
presented to participants is unclear.  The semi-structure interview guide included items 
which explicitly probed participants’ understanding of the term resilience, including 
“From your experiences what are characteristics of a resilient team?” and “From your 
experiences, and bearing in mind all that we have discussed so far, how would you define 
team resilience?”.   It is possible that the protocol used for data collection may have 
unintentionally primed participants to discuss only those elements of their experiences 
that seemed especially on point.  Given the research was designed by sports 
psychologists, it may not be surprising that, under these circumstances, participants 
would contribute to the development of a conceptualization of team resilience that is very 
similar to that of psychological resilience. 
One of the primary strengths of the current study is that the protocol used to 
collect data was not bound to a particular definition of resilience, a priori, and so allowed 
participants to openly discuss their experiences as a part of a small military unit without 
being asked to draw to a specific, pre-selected type of disruptors or disruptions, outcome, 
response trajectory, or set of circumstances.   Indeed, when the conversation shifted to a 
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discussion of resilience during the session debrief, many participants suggested that their 
responses would have been different and proceeded to frame their discussion of small 
unit resilience in direct parallel with psychological resilience as conceptualized by the 
Army. 
Despite differences in how resilience was presented to participants, there are some 
similarities between the substantive theory advanced herein and the model proposed by 
Morgan et al.  Both efforts identified elements of a process of resilience that reflected a 
strong leadership presence and emphasized the importance of participation in group 
decision-making (shared team leadership), reflection (team learning),  team identity and 
unity (social identity), affect and emotional contagion (positive emotions). In addition, 
all four protective factors identified in the Morgan et al. model can also be found in the 
substantive theory presented herein.  These similarities provide some empirical validation 
for the substantive theory advanced herein and also suggest that the process of resilience 
may generalize to other types of teams. 
An additional strength of the current effort is that the model accounts for time and 
illustrates how team members move through each phase and progress or regress in their 
efforts to manage disruption and continue working toward their collective goal(s). 
Alliger et al. (2015) offer an illustration of team resilience that is akin to the process 
model advanced herein – and more so, perhaps, than the Morgan et al. studies. Although 
the authors conceptualize team resilience as an emergent construct, they suggest that 
teams engage in three “behavioral strategies” when addressing challenges (similar to 
disruptors and/or disruptions): minimize, manage, and mend. The minimize behavioral 
strategy encompasses proactive planning and the active search for challenges.  The 
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minimize behavioral strategy is very similar to the combination of the mobilization and 
detection phases of the team resilience process described herein. The manage behavioral 
strategy encompasses appraisal and decision-making efforts, which closely relates to (at 
least part of) detection and determination as described in the current study.  The mend 
behavioral strategy is reactive and is concerned with debriefing, learning, and situation 
awareness, and is similar to the reset phase described herein, which includes both 
restoration and reflection.  However, it can be noted that the authors do not present 
specific empirical support for their claims, and instead cite forty years of their own 
experience working with teams of various types.  Nonetheless, their model most closely 
aligns with and thus offers convergent support for the current findings. 
Taken together, similarities among the three abovementioned models suggest that 
studies of team resilience may generalize across different types of teams.  However, as 
suggested in the introduction, without some way to provide conceptual clarity to the term 
“resilience”, it remains unclear how we could ever agree that resilience has occurred. 
Indeed, the literature review revealed an opportunity to construct a framework for team 
resilience that could support and guide the articulation of multiple conceptualizations of 
team resilience. 
The resulting team resilience framework is a heuristic approach that can be used 
to convey the key components – who (of whom), what (to what), why (for what), when 
(at what time), and where (under what circumstances) – of a particular conceptualization 
of team resilience.  The current application of the team resilience framework guided the 
description of disruptor cues, disruptors, disruptions and outcomes prevalent in small 
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military unit work arrangements, as well as meaningful temporal and contextual 
considerations for understanding the process of small unit resilience. 
The current application of the team resilience framework yielded four findings of 
particular interest.  First, a diverse array of disruptors was able to be identified.  Through 
comparative analyses, disruptors were found to cluster together as a function of their 
source: individual, compositional, relational, structural, situational, or contextual. This 
resulting classification scheme may prove useful for determining consistency of effects or 
relationships across “similar” disruptors with respect to other meaningful aspects of team 
resilience.  Second, participants identified seven distinct team outcomes, including 
effectiveness, efficiency, improvement, readiness, safety, satisfaction, and unity. 
Members of small military units do not limit how they evaluate team “success” to 
traditional performance metrics. However, through discussions with small unit members, 
their leaders, and trainers, it became apparent that an outcome may be assigned greater or 
lesser relative importance depending on who is providing the rating (e.g., self or other) 
and under what circumstances (e.g., training, deployment) the outcome is being rated. 
Third, participants also described a set of simple response trajectories (maintenance, 
growth, decay, and transformation) that can be combined to create more complex 
behavior patterns.  None of these simple trajectories are inherently good or bad.  For 
example, a team may maintain a level of performance that is either at, above, or below 
standard.  It is only when the maintenance trajectory is compared against some criterion 
that the team’s level of performance takes on meaning.  It is conceivable that complex 
changes in responses over time can also happen at, above, or below a standard. Thus, the 
traditional “recovery” trajectory may still leave a team operating below standard.  This 
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finding suggests that one must consider more than the shape of the trajectory, but also the 
relative value associated with each associated measurement.  And fourth, results suggest 
that broad circumstances (e.g., Big Army goals, ARFORGEN cycle) can shift key 
elements of the larger framework.  For example, certain disruptors are more likely to 
present in garrison and also, certain outcomes are more likely to be valued in garrison, as 
opposed to on deployment.  This may be similar to the culture/climate distinction in 
psychological and organizational literature (Wallace, Hunt, & Richards, 1988).  The 
identification of broad circumstances under which team processes occur may be helpful 
in identifying potential moderators of disruptor-disruption-outcome relationships relevant 
to the process of team resilience in these circumstances.  Taken together, these results 
suggest that the framework developed in this study is useful not only as means of 
providing a rich, structured description of the team context, but that these descriptions 
generated – singularly or when compared across studies – can bring about new, 
interesting research questions and hypotheses. 
The proposed utility of the framework for synthesizing existing and future efforts 
remains to be tested. While using this resilience framework to accommodate multiple 
conceptualizations of team resilience may seem irresolute, there is as yet insufficient 
guidance from the larger literature on resilience to bound and direct the conceptualization 
of a team resilience as a single phenomenon.  A broad approach, as offered by the 
expanded team resilience framework developed here, can support calls for studies 
designed to investigate whether team resilience can be inferred from multiple criteria 
(Orbist et al., 2010), as well as to investigate whether team resilience can be generalized 
across diverse disruptor cues, actual disruptors, and disruptions (Scholz et al., 2012) 
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and/or outcomes (Vurgin et al., 2011).  Indeed, efforts organized using the expanded 
team resilience framework can better support meaningful inferences about the nature of 
resilience as we move across levels of analysis; that is, in efforts to draw inferences about 
the possible relationships between team member resilience and team resiliencies. 
Indeed, there are numerous other constructs that deal with the management of 
disruption, including vulnerability, adaptation, and coping.  To the extent that both 
vulnerability and adaptive capacity are proactive strategies for managing disruption, and 
(collective) coping is reactive, none provide a comprehensive understanding of how 
teams might manage disruption.  Some authors have argued that vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity are elements of a process of resilience (e.g., Bene, 2012).  Indeed, 
identifying vulnerabilities and resources were both aspects of the mobilization element of 
the current substantive model of team resilience.  It is more difficult to differentiate 
adaptability from resilience, when both are conceptualized as processes – especially if we 
can agree that adaptability can be proactive as well as reactive.  The most salient 
difference between adaptability and team resilience as described herein, is that 
adaptability does not link disruptions to multiple trajectories; specifically, adaptability 
does not account for maintenance (continued, stable performance). This perspective – 
that resilience subsumes adaptability – is in direct contrast to the position taken by 
another group of researchers, who view resilience as an emergent state and state 
“resilience is one of several outcomes” associated with adaptability (Kennedy, Landon, & 
Maynard, 2016).  Given these outstanding differences of interpretation, future efforts can 
investigate whether the process of team resilience is sufficiently distinct from the process 
of team adaptability. 
154  
Practical Applications 
 
The US Army defines psychological resilience as “the mental, physical, 
emotional, and behavioral ability to face and cope with adversity, adapt to change, 
recover, learn, and grow from temporary setbacks” (R2C, 2013, p.3). Although 
psychological resilience, as defined, and the substantive theory presented herein are 
marked by salient differences, the two are not incompatible concepts.  While the 
emphasis of the Army’s Ready and Resilience Campaign (R2C) is on promoting a culture 
of resilience, the end goal is to promote a ready Force. There is nothing in the language 
of R2C documents that suggest resilience must be defined consistently across levels of 
analysis. Indeed, as the cross-discipline review and the substantive theory developed 
herein suggest, psychological resilience and small unit resilience are not identical 
constructs.  Psychological resilience – to the extent that it is associated with individual 
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors during work activity – is likely to affect small unit 
resilience, particularly in the early phases of team resilience when team members are 
negotiating goals and gearing up for action.  Team resilience may, likewise, impact 
psychological resilience.  For example, the Army’s conceptualization of psychological 
resilience emphasizes the core competencies, which include self-awareness, self- 
regulation, optimism, and connection.  A team that has a strong shared identity and sense 
of teamness, and that experiences success as a function of how they manage disruptions, 
may also serve as a protective factor for an individual that is part of that team. 
Conceptualizing small unit (team) resilience as a process implies a capacity for 
change that is worth investigating further.  If, in a work context, the sequence and nature 
of the process of resilience can be reliably identified and observed, then it may be 
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possible to identify periods of vulnerability that place this process and team at some risk 
of failing, and periods of strength when it is least at risk.  It would then be possible to 
design interventions that can support appropriate changes in team behavior and/or 
provide better guidelines adopting a resilience trajectory to reduce this risk.  In addition, a 
proactive training approach could be adopted to build individuals’ capacities to adapt so 
they are better prepared to manage their resilience trajectory in the face of actual or 
potential disruptions.  The substantive theory of small unit (team) resilience developed 
herein can be used to inform the development of future unit-level assessments, training, 
and other interventions, similar to the Global Assessment Tool (GAT) and Master 
Resilience Training (MRT), aimed at improving the readiness and resilience of the Force. 
The cross-disciplinary review of the literature of resilience in and out of small 
teams suggested considerations for the development of a measurement of team resilience 
(see Introduction: An Expanded Team Resilience Framework).  At the time of the review, 
most efforts to measure team resilience relied upon measures developed at the individual 
level, often using a referent-shift to align levels of theory, measurement, and analysis. 
This strategy assumes isomorphism in construct across scales and is problematic if team 
resilience is different than psychological resilience.  Since the conclusion of the cross- 
discipline review, two relevant efforts to create and validate team resilience scales have 
been identified (e.g., Sharma & Sharma, 2016; van der Beek & Schraagen, 2015). 
Sharma and Sharma (2016) based their measure on Morgan et al. (2013, 2015) 
conceptualization of team resilience, citing it as the “most widely explored theoretical 
scaffold in resilience literature” (p.50).  The authors reviewed the literature to generate 
items indicative of each of the four promotive factors (group structure, mastery 
156  
approaches, social capital, and collective efficacy) identified as essential to team 
resilience theory.  The scale was validated using a sample of executive teams from the IT 
Industry and offered as a diagnostic tool that can be “generalized to any work domain” 
(p.XX).  van der Beek and Schraagen (2015) constructed a scale based on Hollnagel’s 
(2011) theory of system resilience and complimented with two additional components 
representing leadership and cooperation within a multi-team system.  Both scales offer 
promise because they have been grounded in theory and have been developed and 
validated for use with teams. 
A similar approach could be used to develop a self-report measure based on the 
substantive theory of team resilience developed herein.  The scale could be used to assess 
how teams are managing disruption at different points in time.  This strategy would be 
consistent with how psychological resilience is currently assessed using the GAT and 
may have utility with respect to evaluating readiness and/or influential factors before a 
team is assigned to perform a directive.  Although it is difficult to imagine that members 
of small military teams will have the opportunity to pause mid-process and complete a 
survey of their experiences and expectations, a similar data-capturing approach was 
implemented during military exercises in order to assess situational awareness (Endsley, 
2000). Alternatively, it would be beneficial to continue to extrapolate observable 
behaviors associated with each of the phases and primary elements associated with the 
process of small unit resilience, an approach that would not require interrupting team 
behaviors.  The Navy has a similar effort underway that affords leaders a means of 
assessing the resilience of submarine tactical operation teams through observable 
behavior (Smallidge, Jones, Lamb, Feyre, Steed, & Caras, 2013).  By monitoring specific 
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behavioral indicators of team processes a team or an external observer could identify an 
intervention or training could be administered to an underperforming work team to 
bolster improvement or course correction and thus increase likelihood of a desired 
outcome. 
Trainings designed to promote team resilience will be successful to the extent 
teams can effectively apply knowledge and abilities acquired in training to respond to 
unexpected conditions in the transfer environment; transfer generalization. 
Unfortunately, because not all disruptors are likely to be predictable, training programs 
that are limited to the development of only procedural knowledge are not sufficient to 
promote the successful management of disruption in transfer (Stokes, 2009). Transfer 
generalization is more likely when training includes the opportunity for team members to 
develop general, shared schemas of team processes (Gorman et al., 2010), which afford 
team members flexibility in the transfer application of knowledge and skills acquired 
during training (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998; Hockey et al., 2007).  This form of 
training requires teams to engage in more than their routine activities in order to be better 
prepared to respond to unexpected demands. One way of systematically imposing 
unexpected demands is to introduce feedback control perturbations into the work system 
of which teams are a part.  This causes teams to be challenged to alter their coordination 
strategies.  The Royal Norwegian Naval Academy recently made a similar observation. 
The Academy observed the performance of cadet naval teams while participating in both 
live and simulated complex training exercises.  The researchers found that teams who 
were presented with resilience-related “factors” (disruptors) during simulated exercises 
achieved greater success on subsequent live exercises than did their counterparts without 
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this prior experience.  These authors suggest that resilience training can be improved 
through the development of realistic simulations of disruptors known to have an effect on 
team resilience (Mjelde, Smith, Lunde, & Espevik, 2016). 
As stated earlier, not all disruptors can be identified a priori, nor are the effects of 
disruptors consistent for all teams across all situations at all times.  In a single related 
effort, Dove-Steinkamp and Henning (2012) systematically perturbed intra-team 
communications during skill acquisition by applying a constant closed-loop transmission 
delay, ranging from 2 to 6 seconds.  Interestingly, performance in the presence of a novel 
transmission delay was affected by the magnitude of the perturbation imposed during 
skill acquisition.  These results suggest that the quality of perturbation introduced during 
training can have a meaningful impact on team performance outcomes, both during and 
after training.  Collectively, this line of research indicates that small military units may 
benefit from perturbation training and that, while these units are likely currently exposed 
to a host of disruptors during training exercises, there may be value in introducing 
disruptors at random to allow teams an opportunity to handle disruptions to procedural 
routines while in training and thus prepare them to better manage disruption in the field. 
Concluding Remarks 
The current study has offered both a substantive theory of small unit (team) 
resilience as a process, and a framework for contextualizing multiple, plausible 
conceptualizations of this team resilience process. The propositions generated by the 
resulting substantive theory of resilience will need to be tested in varied contexts and 
across multiple time points.  To fully develop a formal theory of unit resilience in the 
military, future efforts will necessarily focus on other branches within the Army (e.g., 
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Combat Support, Combat Service Support), higher echelons of organization (e.g., platoon 
through brigade, etc.), different duty statuses (e.g., Reservists), and other military 
services (e.g., Navy), as well as seek convergent and divergent support from other high 
risk occupations (e.g., emergency responders). The results of the present study are 
expected to provide a foundation for developing tools for measuring, organizing, and/or 
training resilient teams in a variety of high-demand contexts. 
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Appendix B1 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
 
Hello. My name is Megan.  This is . We are researchers with the Army Research 
Institute at Fort Belvoir, VA. We’ve traveled to   to conduct a series of interviews 
with you and other Soldiers as part of an effort to learn more about how members of military 
units collectively perceive and adapt to challenge. We believe that your role as    
gives you a unique perspective on unit performance and we would like to have a candid, open 
discussion about your experiences . We have prepared a series of questions to ask 
you.  We ask for only about an hour and a half of your time today. 
 
Before we begin, we want to assure you that your participation is strictly voluntary.  You should 
not feel obligated to participate in this interview. We are also requesting your permission to 
record this interview. To protect your identify, your personal information will in no way be 
linked to any record of today’s conversation. 
 
The information that you provide today will be used for research purposes. Certain comments 
may be quoted to illustrate points identified through our analysis and used to prepare reports and 
other research products. To ensure confidentiality, we will remove all personal identifiers before 
making use of your comments. 
 
Here is a copy of our consent form, which restates the purpose and nature of our research.  Please 
take a moment to read over the document. I am happy to address any questions that you might 
have as you read.  If you agree to participate in this study and to have your comments recorded, 
please sign the appropriate lines on the last page of the document. 
 Distribute Privacy Act Statement and Informed Consent 
 Review signature page to verify nature of consent 
 
Thank you for volunteering your time today.  Before we begin, I would like you to provide some 
basic information about yourself. When you are finished, simply turn the survey face-down.  I 
will collect them at the end of our interview. 
 Distribute Information Sheet 
 
Thank you. 
 If all participants agree to be recorded: 
You have (each) indicated that you agree to have our conversation recorded.  I am going 
to turn on the recorder now. If at any point you would like to say something “off the 
record”, just let me know and I will pause the recording.  I will continue to take notes at 
your discretion. 
<< Turn on recorder. >> 
 
 If not all participants agree to be recorded: 
Section 1: Introductions & Warm Up Questions 
178  
I will not be recording our conversation today. I intend to take notes at your discretion. 
If at any point you would like to say something “off the record”, just let me know and I 
will stop taking notes while we discuss that topic. 
 
For interviews with participants who are in a position to observe or evaluate unit performance, 
use items in Section 2 (supplemented with probes in Section 4). 
 
For interviews with participants who are members of an identifiable, small unit, use items in 
Section 3 (supplemented with probes in Section 4). 
 
 
 
I am interested in learning about the factors that affect how members of small military units, like 
squads and tank crews, work together and how units respond to these challenges. I believe that 
your role as [insert role] affords a unique perspective of small unit behavior and I would like to 
ask you about your observations. I would like for you to think broadly about what might be 
considered a unit challenge. Please feel free to draw on experiences that did not occur at work, 
but none-the-less affected how the individuals that you observed worked together. Although I 
introduced the term “adaptability” earlier in my description of this study, we can also think more 
broadly about unit responses.  For example, unit responses may take the form of changes in 
behavior, changes in perceptions of the work or unit, or changes in feelings about the work, the 
unit or factors affecting the unit. 
 
In order to understand these processes and how you have observed them in different units and in 
different settings, I would like for you to walk me through your past experiences observing small 
work groups.  I’d like to hear about your earliest experience as an observer of small military units 
and how this experience was similar or different from your experiences as an observer of small 
work groups before joining the military. I’d also like to hear about the different units you might 
have observed since that time.  Then I would like to hear your thoughts on factors that affect how 
unit members work together. Throughout our conversation, it will be helpful for you to share 
specific details of some activities that stand out for you.  I want you to have an opportunity to 
describe your experiences in as much detail as you are comfortable.  I will limit my questions to 
those that will prompt you for more detail or for clarification. 
 
I would like to begin by learning a little bit about your experiences in the Army.  Tell me about 
yourself, your military experience … 
 
 What is your current position/title? 
 
 How long have you been in the military? In your current position? 
 
Tell me about your decision to become and the memories you have of your first role 
as for the military. 
 
 Had you held similar positions before joining the military?  [Ask for description] 
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 In what ways have your experiences as – military and nonmilitary – been 
similar?  In what ways have your experience been different? 
 
Tell me a little bit about your role as _. 
 
 In what way do you have the opportunity to observe/evaluate unit performance? 
 
 What types of units do you have the opportunity to observe/evaluate? 
 
What are some of the things that units struggle with?   Seeking multiple examples of challenges … 
 
 How do you know when a unit is struggling with [this specific challenge]? 
 
 Do all units struggle with [this specific challenge]? 
 
o Describe a unit that seems to be unaffected by [this specific challenge]. 
 
Tell me about a unit that has been able to recover from [this specific challenge]. 
 
 What do you think might affect a unit’s ability to recover from [this specific challenge]? 
 
 How quickly could a unit recover from [this specific challenge]? 
 
Tell me about a unit that has not been able to recover from [this specific challenge]. 
 
 What do you think affected the unit’s ability to recover from [this specific challenge]? 
How does the experience of [this specific challenge] affect future unit performance? 
Describe a time when a unit had been pushed too far. 
 
 How did you know that the unit had been pushed too far? 
 
 Describe the short-/long-term consequences of a unit being pushed too far. 
 
 Do these consequences apply to all members of the unit? 
At any point, are units allowed to fail at their mission? 
 If so, what might “failure” look like?  Multiple examples … 
 
What is the nature of the feedback given to units about performance? 
 
 Who receives the feedback, what points does it cover, how detailed, are there suggestions 
for improvement …? 
 
 How do you know when a unit (or unit member) is receptive to the feedback you have 
provided? 
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I am interested in learning about the factors that affect how members of small military units, like 
squads and tank crews, work together and how units respond to these challenges. I would like for 
you to think broadly about what might be considered a unit challenge.  Please feel free to draw on 
experiences that did not occur at work, but none-the-less affected how individuals worked 
together. Although I introduced the term “adaptability” earlier in my description of this study, we 
can also think more broadly about unit responses.  For example, unit responses may take the form 
of changes in behavior, changes in perceptions of the work or unit, or changes in feelings about 
the work, the unit or factors affecting the unit. 
 
In order to understand these processes and how you have experienced them over time, I would 
like for you to walk me through your past experiences with small work groups. I’d like to hear 
about your earliest experience working in a small military unit and how this experience was 
similar or different from your experiences as a part of small work groups before joining the 
military. I’d also like to hear about the different units you might have been assigned to since that 
time.  Then, perhaps we could concentrate on experiences you have had in your current unit. 
Throughout our conversation, it will be helpful for you to share specific details of some activities 
that stand out for you.  I want you to have an opportunity to describe your experiences in as much 
detail as you are comfortable. I will limit my questions to those that will prompt you for more 
detail or for clarification. 
 
I would like to begin by learning a little bit about your experiences in the Army.  Tell me about 
yourself, your military experience … 
 
 What is your current position/title? 
 
 How long have you been in the military? In your current position? 
 
Tell me about your decision to join the military and the memories you have of the first unit to 
which you were assigned. 
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 Had you held positions in small work groups before joining the military?  [Ask for 
description] 
 
 In what ways have your experiences being a part of a small work group – military and 
nonmilitary – been similar? In what ways have your experience been different? 
 
Tell me a little bit about your role as a part of [this particular unit]. 
 
 How did you become a part of [this particular unit]? 
Describe a typical day for [this particular unit]. 
 Tell me about a good day for [this particular unit]. 
 
 Tell me about a bad day for [this particular unit]. 
 
What are some of the things that [this particular unit] struggles with? Multiple examples of 
challenges … 
 
 How do you know when [this particular unit] is struggling with [this specific challenge]? 
 
 What do you think might affect [this particular unit’s] ability to recover from [this 
specific challenge]? 
 
 What do you think might affect how quickly [this particular unit] recovers from [this 
specific challenge]? 
 
 Describe the short-/long-term effects of this experience for the [this particular unit]. 
 
 Do these consequences apply to all members of [this particular unit]? 
 
 How do members of this [particular unit] unwind after [this specific challenge]? 
Describe a time when [this particular unit] had been pushed too far. 
 How did you know that the unit had been pushed too far? 
 
 Describe the short-/long-term consequences of a unit being pushed too far. 
 
 Do these consequences apply to all members of the unit? 
 
In what ways can [this particular unit] learn to better handle future challenges? 
 
 In what ways can [this particular unit] be taught to better handle future challenges? 
What is the nature of the feedback given to [this particular unit] about its performance? 
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 Who receives the feedback, what points does it cover, how detailed, are there suggestions 
for improvement …? 
 
 How often does [this particular unit] receive feedback? 
 
 Is the unit (or are unit members) generally receptive to feedback? 
 
 
 
Can you describe [the phenomenon]? 
 
 How often does [the phenomenon] occur? 
 
 Does [the phenomenon] affect everyone? 
 
 Is the experience of [the phenomenon] the same or different for each unit member? 
How? 
 
 What caused [the phenomenon]? 
 
 What contextual and intervening conditions influenced [the phenomenon]? 
What strategies or outcomes resulted from [the phenomenon]? 
 What were the consequences of these strategies/outcomes? 
How did the process unfold? 
 What were the major events or benchmarks in the process? 
 
 What were the obstacles to change? 
Who were the important participants? 
 How did they participate in the process? 
 
 What were the outcomes? 
 
 Were the outcomes shared equally across participants? 
 
 
 
 
This concludes the formal part of the interview process. Thank you for your participation. We 
really appreciate your time and your comments. 
Section 5: Closing Questions/Remarks 
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We recognize that Soldiers are exposed to a host of demands (e.g., high OPTEMPO, submersion 
in foreign culture), each potentially stressful, and that these challenges may have important 
implications for physical and psychological well-being. The Army is interested in promoting the 
well-being of its Soldiers and has supported a number of research, training, and intervention 
programs aimed at developing a ready and resilient Force. There has been a lot of research 
focused on the related topics of stress, adaptability, and resilience. 
 
What seems to be missing is a clear direction for understanding these phenomena at the unit level. 
Specifically, it is unclear how the modern military context affects collective perceptions of 
challenge, the way units of Soldiers try to adapt to perceived challenges, or the consequences of 
these perceived challenges and behavior changes.  Our research is focused on better understanding 
these issues. We hope that this line of research will be used in the development of future unit-
level assessments, training, and other interventions aimed at improving the readiness and 
resilience of the Force. 
 
This interview is an important first step in our research effort.  Now that you know the full scope 
of this research, is there any information that you would like to add to what we have already 
discussed today? 
 
Is there anything that we have discussed that you would like to clarify or change in any way? 
 
Can you think of any other questions that I can ask future participants that would be helpful for 
opening up discussion of this topic? 
 
We would like to thank you again for your time and participation.  Your comments have been 
very helpful. 
 Remind participants of contact information should they have follow-up questions 
 Provide each participant with a Military One Source Card 
 
 
 
Interview Context: 
 
 
 
Participant(s): 
 
 
 
Rapport: 
 
 
 
Suggestions/ideas for next interview: 
 
 
 
Else: 
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Appendix B2 
 
FOCUS GROUP PROTOCOL 
 
 
 
Hello. My name is Megan. This is . We are researchers with the Army Research 
Institute at Fort Belvoir, VA. We’ve traveled to   to conduct a series of focus groups 
with you and other Soldiers as part of an effort to learn more about how members of military 
units collectively perceive and adapt to challenge. We believe that your role as    
gives you a unique perspective on unit performance and we would like to have a candid, open 
discussion about your experiences . We have prepared a series of questions to ask 
you.  We ask for only about an hour and a half of your time today. 
 
Before we begin, we want to assure you that your participation is strictly voluntary.  You should 
not feel obligated to participate in this interview. We are also requesting your permission to 
record this interview. To protect your identify, your personal information will in no way be 
linked to any record of today’s conversation. 
 
The information that you provide today will be used for research purposes. Certain comments 
may be quoted to illustrate points identified through our analysis and used to prepare reports and 
other research products. To ensure confidentiality, we will remove all personal identifiers before 
making use of your comments.  Likewise, we ask that each of you respect the confidential nature 
of this session, by not later identifying individual participants with comments made or heard 
during this session. 
 
Here is a copy of our consent form, which restates the purpose and nature of our research.  Please 
take a moment to read over the document. I am happy to address any questions that you might 
have as you read.  If you agree to participate in this study and to have your comments recorded, 
please sign the appropriate lines on the last page of the document. 
 Distribute Privacy Act Statement and Informed Consent 
 Review signature page to verify nature of consent 
 
Thank you for volunteering your time today. Before we begin, I would like you to provide some 
basic information about yourself. When you are finished, simply turn the survey face-down.  I 
will collect them at the end of our interview. 
 Distribute Information Sheet 
 
Thank you. 
 If all participants agree to be recorded: 
You have (each) indicated that you agree to have our conversation recorded.  I am going 
to turn on the recorder now. If at any point you would like to say something “off the 
record”, just let me know and I will pause the recording.  I will continue to take notes at 
your discretion. 
<< Turn on recorder. >> 
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 If not all participants agree to be recorded: 
I will not be recording our conversation today. I intend to take notes at your discretion. 
If at any point you would like to say something “off the record”, just let me know and I 
will stop taking notes while we discuss that topic. 
 
We would like to begin by learning a little bit about your experiences in the Army.  Tell me about 
yourself, your military experience … 
 
 What is your current position/title? 
 
 How long have you been in the military? In your current position? 
 
Continue on to Section 2 (supplement items with probes in Section 3, as needed). 
 
 
 
Tell me a little bit about [this particular type of unit]. 
 
 How is [this particular type of unit] structured? 
 
 What types of duties does [this particular type of unit] perform? 
 
What are some of the things that [this particular type of unit] might struggle with?  Multiple 
examples of challenges … 
 
 How do you know when [this particular type of unit] is struggling with [this specific 
challenge]? 
 
 Describe the resources available to [this particular type of unit] that helps it to handle 
[this specific challenge]. 
 
 How does [this particular type of unit] become aware of the resources available to it to 
handle [this specific challenge]? 
 
Describe a time when [this particular type of unit] has been able to recover from [this specific 
challenge]. 
 
 What do you think might affect [this particular type of unit’s] ability to recover from 
[this specific challenge]? 
 
 What do you think might affect how quickly [this particular type of unit] recovers from 
[this specific challenge]? 
 
 Describe the short-/long-term effects of this experience for the [this particular type of 
unit]. 
 
 Do these consequences apply to all members of [this particular type of unit]? 
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 How do members of this [particular type of unit] unwind after [this specific challenge]? 
 
Tell me about a time when [this particular type of unit] has not been able to recover from [this 
specific challenge]. 
 
 What do you think might affect [this particular type of unit’s] ability to recover from 
[this specific challenge]? 
 
 What do you think might affect how quickly [this particular type of unit] recovers from 
[this specific challenge]? 
 
 Describe the short-/long-term effects of this experience for the [this particular type of 
unit]. 
 
 Do these consequences apply to all members of [this particular type of unit]? 
 
 How do members of this [particular type of unit] unwind after [this specific challenge]? 
 
Describe a time when [this particular type of unit] faced more than one challenge in a short 
period of time. 
 
 How did experience with the early challenge affect how [this particular unit] responded 
to later challenges? 
 
 What do you think would have happened if the two challenges were the same or very 
similar? 
 
 What do you think would have happened if the two challenges were different? 
Describe a time when [this particular type of unit] had been pushed too far. 
 How did you know that the unit had been pushed too far? 
 
 Describe the short-/long-term consequences of a unit being pushed too far. 
 
 Do these consequences apply to all members of the unit? 
 
How might a unit with less experience (newly formed) perform compared to [this particular unit] 
with respect to [this specific challenge]? 
 
How might a unit with more experience (longer tenure) perform compared to [this particular 
unit] with respect to [this specific challenge]? 
 
 
 
 
Can you describe [the phenomenon]? 
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 How often does [the phenomenon] occur? 
 
 Does [the phenomenon] affect everyone? 
 
 Is the experience of [the phenomenon] the same or different for each unit member? 
How? 
 
 What caused [the phenomenon]? 
 
 What contextual and intervening conditions influenced [the phenomenon]? 
What strategies or outcomes resulted from [the phenomenon]? 
 What were the consequences of these strategies/outcomes? 
How did the process unfold? 
 What were the major events or benchmarks in the process? 
 
 What were the obstacles to change? 
 
Who were the important participants? (emphasis on role/position) 
 
 How did they participate in the process? 
 
 What were the outcomes? 
 
 Were the outcomes shared equally across participants? 
 
 
 
 
 
This concludes the formal part of the focus group process. Thank you for your participation. We 
really appreciate your time and your comments. 
 
We recognize that Soldiers are exposed to a host of demands (e.g., high OPTEMPO, submersion 
in foreign culture), each potentially stressful, and that these challenges may have important 
implications for physical and psychological well-being. The Army is interested in promoting the 
well-being of its Soldiers and has supported a number of research, training, and intervention 
programs aimed at developing a ready and resilient Force. There has been a lot of research 
focused on the related topics of stress, adaptability, and resilience. 
 
What seems to be missing is a clear direction for understanding these phenomena at the unit level. 
Specifically, it is unclear how the modern military context affects collective perceptions of 
challenge, the way units of Soldiers try to adapt to perceived challenges, or the consequences of 
Section 4: Closing Questions/Remarks 
188  
these perceived challenges and behavior changes.  Our research is focused on better 
understanding these issues. We hope that this line of research will be used in the development of 
future unit-level assessments, training, and other interventions aimed at improving the readiness 
and resilience of the Force. 
 
This focus group is an important first step in our research effort.  Now that you know the full 
scope of this research, is there any information that you would like to add to what we have 
already discussed today? 
 
Is there anything that we have discussed that you would like to clarify or change in any way? 
 
Can you think of any other questions that I can ask future participants that would be helpful for 
opening up discussion of this topic? 
 
We would like to thank you again for your time and participation.  Your comments have been 
very helpful. 
 Remind participants of contact information should they have follow-up questions 
 Provide each participant with a Military One Source Card 
 
 
 
 
Interview Context: 
 
 
 
Participant(s): 
 
 
 
Rapport: 
 
 
 
Suggestions/ideas for next interview: 
 
 
 
Else: 
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Appendix C 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Title: Understanding Factors Associated with Unit Adaptability 
 
 
Purpose of the research: This research is designed to gather information about how members of small 
military units collectively perceive and adapt to challenges. We are interested in having candid, open 
discussions with participants about their experiences as members (or observers) of small military units. 
 
What you will be asked to do in this research: We are gathering information on unit adaptability, what it 
is, and how it might develop over time. We believe that your experiences give you a unique perspective on 
small unit performance. We have prepared a series of questions to ask you. We are really interested in 
hearing about your observations and experiences and we encourage you to give us your most honest and 
complete responses. We ask for only about an hour and a half of your time today. 
 
We are requesting permission to audio-record our conversation. The information that you provide today 
will be used for research purposes and will not be used to evaluate your performance or the performance of 
your unit. Certain comments may be quoted to illustrate points identified through our analysis and used to 
prepare reports and other research products. To ensure your confidentiality, we will remove all personal 
identifiers before making use of your comments. Your responses will help to inform our understanding of 
unit adaptability and will be combined with others’ responses to create government and academic reports. 
 
Location: This research is being conducted with individuals/units/installations within HRC, FORSCOM 
and TRADOC in the U.S. 
 
Voluntary participation: Your participation is voluntary. You may choose not to participate at any time 
and there is no penalty if you do not participate. You may choose not to provide responses to any or all 
questions/topics of discussion. 
 
An audio recorder will not be used if you do not wish to be recorded – and if one or more participants in a 
focus group do not wish to be recorded, the entire session will go unrecorded. If you allow us to use the 
audio recorder, you may at any time request that the recording be paused and we will continue our 
discussion “off the record”. Audio records will be transcribed and permanently deleted within two weeks 
of our conversation. 
 
We will be taking notes throughout the session. In the event that you request to share your thoughts “off 
the record”, we would like to continue to take notes at your discretion. The information that you provide 
today will be used for research purposes. No one outside of the research team will have access to the data 
or to any of your individual responses. All data collected will be treated confidentially and compiled, 
analyzed, and reported at the group level. Certain comments may be quoted to illustrate points identified 
through our analysis and used to prepare reports and other research products. To ensure your 
confidentiality, we will remove all personal identifiers before making use of your comments. 
 
We cannot provide "confidentiality" or "non-attribution" to participants regarding any comments disclosing 
criminal activity/behavior, or statements that pose a threat to self or others. Please DO NOT discuss or 
comment on classified or operationally sensitive information during the session. 
 
Time required: 90 minutes. 
 
Risks: There are no risks greater than those encountered in everyday activities. 
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Benefits: None directly to you, but your responses will help us to develop a model of unit adaptation. 
 
Compensation: No compensation is provided for your participation. 
 
Whom to contact if you have questions about this research: You should send your questions to 3. 
Reference project name: Unit Adaptability. 
 
Whom to contact about your rights in this research: Contact ARI_RES@conus.army.mil. Reference 
project name: Unit Adaptability. 
 
If responding to any of the questions becomes unpleasant for you, you can withdraw from the 
discussion at any time. If you feel you’d like to confer with someone confidentially after this 
discussion, please go to the Military OneSource web site (https://www.militaryonesource.com) or call 
the 1-800-342-9647 number. 
 
If you agree to participate in this research, please check all that apply and sign and date below. 
Agreement: I have read the procedures described above. 
  I voluntarily agree to participate in this research. (check) 
 
Signature: Date:    
 
  I agree to be audiorecorded. (check) 
 
Signature: Date:    
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The Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) Outreach Center 
(866) 966-1020 
E-mail: dcoeoutreach.org 
http://www.dcoe.health.mil/24-7help.aspx 
Trained, professional health resource consultants with expertise in psychological health 
and traumatic brain injury. Available 24/7 - information provided by phone, online chat 
or e-mail. Free! 
 
 
 
 
Suicide Prevention Lifeline for Veterans 
 
(800) 273-TALK (8255) – Veterans Press “1” 
http://www.suicidepreventionlifeline.org/Veterans/Default.aspx  
The Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has 
founded a national suicide prevention hotline to ensure veterans in emotional crisis have free, 
24/7 access to trained counselors. To operate the Veterans Hotline, the VA partnered with the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) and the National 
Suicide Prevention Lifeline. Veterans can call the Lifeline number, 1-800-273-TALK (8255), 
and press "1" to be routed to the Veterans Suicide Prevention Hotline. 
 
 
 
 
Wounded Soldier and Family Hotline 
(800) 984-8523 
E-mail: wsfsupport@conus.army.mil 
http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/wsfh/index.html 
The hotline is an avenue to gather information about medical care as well as suggest ways we 
can improve our medical support systems. Staff members are available 24/7 days. 
192  
Real Warriors Campaign 
http://www.realwarriors.net/ 
The Real Warriors Campaign is an initiative launched by the Defense Centers of Excellence for 
Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCoE) to promote the processes of building 
resilience, facilitating recovery and supporting reintegration of returning service members, 
veterans and their families. 
 
 
U.S. Army Medical Department – Army Behavioral Health 
http://www.behavioralhealth.army.mil/ 
When our Soldiers return home, most will experience a brief readjustment period and a 
successful home transition. Some will need short or long-term counseling to assist in their 
transition. Explore this Web site especially for Soldiers, Families, and friends. Learn how to 
adjust, cope, get ready to deploy, transition to return home, and other information and sources. 
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Appendix D 
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT 
Project Title:  Understanding Factors Associated with Unit Adaptability 
 
 
AUTHORITY: The Department of the Army may collect the information requested in this session under 
the authority of 10 United States Code, Section 2358, “Research and Development Projects.” In 
accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-579), this notice informs you of the purpose, use, 
and confidentiality of this session. 
 
PURPOSE: This research project is designed to gather information regarding Soldiers’ perceptions 
regarding adaptability within military units and help identify important factors related to adaptation at the 
unit level. We are gathering information on unit adaptability, what it is, and how it might develop over 
time. 
 
ROUTINE USES: The information you provide will be used to inform our understanding of collective 
adaptation. The data collected will be used for research purposes only and will not be used to evaluate your 
performance or the performance of your unit. No one outside of the research team will have access to the 
data or to any of your individual responses. The information you provide will help to inform our 
understanding of unit adaptability and findings from this research will be used in briefings and reports to 
senior Army leaders, as well as in research publications available to the public. 
 
DISCLOSURE: Participating in this session is voluntary and you may choose at any time not to 
participate. There is no penalty for choosing not to participate—you may remain quiet during the session. 
However, we are really interested in hearing about your observations and experiences and encourage you to 
give us your most honest and complete responses. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY: Your participation is voluntary. You may choose not to participate at any time and 
there is no penalty if you do not participate. You may choose not to provide responses to any or all 
questions/topics of discussion. An audio recorder will not be used if you do not wish to be recorded – and if 
one or more participants in a focus group do not wish to be recorded, the entire session will go unrecorded. 
If you allow us to use the audio recorder, you may at any time request that the recording be paused and we 
will continue our discussion “off the record”. Audio records will be transcribed and permanently deleted 
within two weeks of our conversation. We will be taking notes throughout the session. In the event that  
you request to share your thoughts “off the record”, we would like to continue to take notes at your 
discretion. All data collected will be treated confidentially and compiled, analyzed and reported at the  
group level. Likewise, we ask that each of you respect the confidential nature of this session, by not later 
identifying individual participants with comments made or heard during this session. We cannot provide 
"confidentiality" or "non-attribution," to participants regarding any comments disclosing criminal 
activity/behavior, or statements that pose a threat to self or others. DO NOT discuss or comment on 
classified or operationally sensitive information during the session. We are planning to take notes during the 
session, however, any information you provide will be combined with the information we receive from the 
other individuals. None of your responses will be linked to you specifically. 
 
CONTACT: For further information about this project or your rights as a participant, send e-mail to:  
ARI_RES@conus.army.mil with subject line titled “Unit Adaptability.” 
 
 
 
 
 
RETAIN FOR YOUR RECORDS 
194  
Appendix E: 
 
UNIT ADAPTABILITY – PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
1. Are you male or female? (mark one) Male Female 
 
2. How old are you:    
 
3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
GED or High School Diploma 
 
Some College but no degree completed 
 
Associate Degree (e.g., AA, AS) 
 
Bachelor’s Degree (e.g. BA, BS) 
 
Some Graduate Education but no degree completed 
 
Masters/Doctoral/Professional Degree (e.g., MA, MS, Ph.D, MD, DDS, JD) 
 
4. What is your current military rank/grade? 
 
Enlisted 
PV1/PV2 
PFC 
CPL/SPC 
SGT 
Warrant Officer 
 
 
SSG 
SFC 
MSG/1SG 
SGM/CSM 
Officer 
2LT 
1LT 
CPT 
 
 
MAJ 
LTC 
COL+ 
 
CW1 
CW2 
CW3+ 
5. How many years/months of military service do you have to date: years months 
6. In the past 5 years, what is the total amount of time you been deployed (e.g., OEF/OIF) and/or been on 
OCONUS assignments (e.g., EUSA, NATO, UN)? 
 
I have not been deployed and/or on OCONUS during the past five years. 
 
Less than 1 year 
 
1 to 1 year 11 months 
 
2 to 2 years 11 months 
 
3 to 3 years 11 months 
 
4 or more years 
